
AP-A180 368 IIT HESEARCH INST CHICAGO IL R/M ANALYSIS OF ELECTROMECHANICAL EQUIPMENTS. (U) MAY 82 J J STEINKINCHNER F/G 9/1 " F30602-81-C-0046 UNCLASSIFIED 1.- 2



UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered) READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER T. REPORT NUMBER RADC-TR-82-141 TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED 4. TITLE (and Substitle) Final Technical Report R/M ANALYSIS OF ELECTROMECHANICAL EQUIPMENTS 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER N/A A. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER OF 7. AUTHOR(4) Joseph J. Steinkirchner F30602-81-C-0046 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS IIT Research Institute 62702F 10 West 35th Street 23380263 Chicago IL 60616 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE May 1982 Rome Air Development Center (RBES) 13. NUMBER OF PAGES Griffiss AFB NY 13441 175 18. SECURITY CLASS, (of this report) TA. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(II different from Controlling Office) UNCLASSIFIED. Same THE DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING IS. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) Same IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES RADC Project Engineer: Anthony N. Ciancio (RBES) 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side it necessary and identify by block number) Reliability (R) Maintainability (M) Predicted R/M C³I System Maintenance Data System Demonstrated R/M Electromechanical Equipments MIL-STD-781 Field Experience Ancillary Equipment R/M Specified R/m ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)
This report presents the analyses and results of a fourteen-month effort to investigate problem areas and determine the impact of ancillary electromechanical (E/M) equipment on USAF C3I system reliability and maintainability (R/M). Equipment and system level field experience data were collected and compared with the specified equipment and system level

DD 1 FORM 1473 EDITION OF ! NOV 65 IS DESOLETE

reliability and maintainability (R/M) numerics.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PASE (When Date Sincres)

SUMMARY

This report describes the results of a fourteen-month program conducted by IIT Research Institute (IITRI) to investigate problem areas and determine the impact of ancillary electromechanical (E/M) equipment on USAF C^3I system reliability and maintainability (R/M). The objective of the program was to verify the R/M performance of ancillary E/M equipments in C^3I systems.

The study methodology developed to achieve the goals outlined for this program consisted of six tasks:

- o Research and Data Collection
- o Selection of equipments to be studied
- o Data Summarization and Reduction
- o Data Analysis
- o Investigation of R/M techniques
- o Report Preparation

The data collection effort was comprised of five subtasks – two field surveys using personal interviews and mailed questionnaires, the acquisition of ancillary E/M equipment specifications/standards, the acquisition of C^3I systems R/M reports, the acquisition of field experience data, and the acquisition of other published related literature. The objective of the data collection effort was to obtain the specified and achieved R/M numerics on E/M equipments and C^3I systems.

The selection of the C^3I systems to be studied was based on a six part criteria. The systems selected for study were the AN/TSC-60(V)-1, AN/TSC-60(V)-2, AN/TSC-60(V)-3, AN/TSQ-91, AN/TSQ-92, AN/TSQ-93 and E-3A AWACS. The selection of the ancillary E/M equipments to be studied was limited to power generation, power conversion, environmental control (ECU) and power distribution by agreement of the RADC Technical Monitor.

Accession For

NTIS CRA&I
DTIC TAB

Unanaounced
Justification

By

Distribution/
Availability Codes

Availability Codes

Availability Codes

Other Special

The analyses was limited by the fact that R/M numerics are not always specified for E/M equipments, and they are not always included in the system level R/M calculations and assessments. The analysis was also limited in that the power generation and power conversion equipments are not included with the system in the USAF Maintenance Data System (MDS) reports, and operating times are not included in the MDS reports. Pseudo R/M numerics were developed to resolve the first two limitations. Two field surveys were utilized to resolve the second two limitations.

The results of the analyses showed that ECU equipments achieve a better R/M than anticipated, power generation and conversion equipments achieve a worse R/M than anticipated, and power distribution equipment may or may not achieve a worse R/M than anticipated (system dependent).

The investigation of R/M techniques resulted in the development of several recommendations that would improve the tracking of future system level and E/M equipment level R/M. The investigation also resulted in the development of a sequential test plan that could be used for demonstrating the reliability of equipments using the Weibull distribution.

PREFACE

This report was prepared by IIT Research Institute for the Rome Air Development Center, (RADC) Griffiss AFB, New York, under Contract Number F30602-81-C-0046, and is submitted in accordance with Contract Data Requirement List Sequence Number A002. The RADC technical monitor for this program was Mr. A. Ciancio (RBES). This report covers the work performed from December 31, 1980 to February 28, 1982.

The principal investigator for this project was Mr. J. Steinkirchner with valuable assistance provided by Mr. B. Arno, Mr. J. Carey, Mr. D. W. Fulton, Mr. W. Kimmel, and Mr. J. Short.

Approved by,

L. Duvall

Division Director

IIT Research Institute

Prepared by,

J.J. Steinkindner

J.J. Steinkirchner Project Manager

IIT Research Institute

TABLE OF CONTENTS

				·	PAGE		
1.0	INTR	DDUCTION.	••••	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	. 1		
	1.1	0bjecti	ve and Appr	roach	1		
	1.2	Scope		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	2		
	1.3	Abbrevi	ations	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	2		
2.0	DATA	COLLECTI	ON	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	5		
	2.1	Phase C	ne Data Co	llection	5		
		2.1.1	Literature	e Search	5		
		2.1.2	User Surve	ey of Ancillary E/M Equipment	6		
		2.1.3		isits of Air Force Equipment Users	12		
		2.1.4		Specifications and Standards	13		
		2.1.5		ers and Manufacturers	16		
		2.1.6	Locating /	Air Force Data Sources	16		
	2.2	Phase 1	-	llection	19		
		2.2.1	Air Force	Data	19		
		2.2.2	Survey	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	22		
3.0	ANAL'	YSIS	• • • • • • • • • • •	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	25		
	3.1			oment	25		
	3.2	3.2 Evaluation of Data Sources					
		3.2.1	Air Force	••••••	29		
		3.2.2	IITRI E/M	Equipment Surveys	32		
	3.3	R/M Ana			34		
		3.3.1	Ground Tax	ctical E/M Equipment Analysis	38		
			3.3.1.1	ECU Equipment Results	56		
			3.3.1.2	Power Equipment Results	57		
			3.3.1.3	Power Distribution Network (PDN) Results	58		
		3.3.2	Ground Tad	ctical C ³ I Systems	58		
			3.3.2.1	AN/TSC-60(V) Analysis	61		
			3.3.2.2	AN/TSC-60(V)-1 Analysis	66		
			3.3.2.3	AN/TSC-60(V)-1 Results	72		
			3.3.2.4	AN/TSC-60(V)-2 Analysis	73		
			3.3.2.5	AN/TSC-60(V)-2 Results	77		

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)

					PAGI
			3.3.2.6	AN/TSC-60(V)-3 Analysis	78
			3.3.2.7	AN/TSC-60(V)-3 Results	82
			3.3.2.8	AN/TSQ Analysis	82
			3.3.2.9	AN/TSQ-91 Analysis	89
			ä.3.2.10	AN/TSQ-91 Results	96
			3.3.2.11	AN/TSQ-92 Analysis	97
			3.3.2.12	AN/TSQ-92 Results	102
			3.3.2,13	AN/TSQ-93 Analysis	103
			3.3.2.14	AN/TSQ-93 Results	108
		3.3.3	Airborne	Tactical C ³ I System	108
			3.3.3.1	Airborne Tactical Ancillary E/M	113
				Equipment Analysis	
			3.3.3.2	Airborne Tactical Ancillary E/M	119
				Equipment Results	
			3.3.3.3	Airborne Tactical C ³ I System Analysis	119
			3.3.3.4	Airborne Tactical C ³ I System Results	126
4.0	INVES	TIGATION	OF R/M AS	SSESSMENT TECHNIQUES	128
	4.1	Equipme	nt Reliabi	ility Specification and Demonstration	128
	4.2			y Specification, Prediction and	140
	Demonstration				
	4.3			Specification Prediction and Demonstration	145
5.0				ICLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	152
	5.1	•		s and Conclusions	152
	5.2	Recomme	ndations	••••••••••••••	157
REFER	ENCES.	• • • • • • •	• • • • • • • • •	************************************	159
BIBLI	OGRAPH	Υ	•••••	***************************************	164
APPEN	DIX	• • • • • • •	• • • • • • • • •	***************************************	A-1

LIST OF TABLES

	TITLE	PAGE
TABLE 2.1.2-1:	UNITS SOLICITED BY MAIL	7
TABLE 2.1.2-2:	UNITS VISITED	10
TABLE 2.1.2-3:	UNITS RESPONDING	11
TABLE 2.1.4-1:	MILITARY SPECIFICATION/STANDARD	14
TABLE 2.2.2-1:	GENERATOR AND ECU SURVEYS	23
TABLE 3.3-1:	SURVEY ONE E/M EQUIPMENT OPERATE TIME	39
TABLE 3.3.1-1:	INITIAL PRODUCTION TEST R/M DATA FOR ECU EQUIPMENT	41
TABLE 3.3.1-2:	SECOND SURVEY R/M DATA FOR ECU EQUIPMENT	42
TABLE 3.3.1-3:	COMPARISON STANDARD FOR ECU EQUIPMENT	43
TABLE 3.3.1-4:	INITIAL PRODUCTION TEST R/M DATA FOR POWER EQUIPMENT	44
TABLE 3.3.1-5:	SECOND SURVEY R/M DATA FOR POWER EQUIPMENT	45
TABLE 3.3.1-6:	COMPARISON STANDARD FOR POWER EQUIPMENT	46
TABLE 3.3.1-7:	ACHIEVED R/M DATA FOR POWER DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT	47
TABLE 3.3.1-8:	COMPARISON STANDARD FOR POWER DISTRIBUTION	50
TABLE 3.3.2-1:	AN/TSC-60(V) OPERATING TIME INFORMATION	62
TABLE 3.3.2-2:	AN/TSC-60(V)-1 R/M NUMERICS	68
TABLE 3.3.2-3:	AN/TSC-60(V)-2 R/M NUMERICS	74
TABLE 3.3.2-4:	AN/TSC-60(V)-3 R/M NUMERICS	79
TABLE 3.3.2-5:	AN/TSQ OPERATING TIME INFORMATION	84
TABLE 3.3.2-6:	AN/TSQ R/M NUMERICS	88
TABLE 3.3.2-7:	AN/TSQ-91 R/M NUMERICS	91
TABLE 3.3.2-8:	AN/TSQ-92 R/M NUMERICS	99
TABLE 3.3.2-9:	AN/TSQ-93 R/M NUMERICS	104
TABLE 3.3.3-1:	R/M DATA FROM AFALD 800-4	111
TABLE 3.3.3-2:	R/M DATA FROM R&M INDEX	112
TABLE 3.3.3-3:	ANCILLARY E/M EQUIPMENT R/M NUMERICS	114
TABLE 3.3.3-4:	E-3A AWACS R/M NUMERICS	121
TABLE 4.1-1:	ENGINE GENERATOR RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS	129
TABLE 4.1-2:	MOTOR GENERATOR RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS	130
TABLE 4.1-3:	AIR CONDITIONER RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS	131
TABLE 4.1-4:	MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENTS	146

LIST OF FIGURES

		TITLE			PAGE
FIGURE 3.3	.2-1: RELIABILI	TY BLOCK DIAGRAMS	AND MATH MODE	.S	64
	OF TSC-60	(V)-1,2,3			
FIGURE 3.3	.2-2: AN/TSQ-91	RELIABILITY BLOCK	DIAGRAM AND	MATH MODEL	85
FIGURE 3.3	.2-3: AN/TSQ-92	RELIABILITY BLOCK	DIAGRAM AND	MATH MODEL	86
FIGURE 3.3	.2-4: AN/TSQ-93	RELIABILITY BLOCK	DIAGRAM AND I	MATH MODEL	87
FIGURE 3.3	.3-1: E-3A AWAC	S LOGISTICS CONFIG	GURATION AIRBO	RNE	126
	RELIABILI	TY BLOCK DIAGRAM			
FIGURE 3.3	.3-2: E-3A AWAC	S LOGISTICS CONFIG	GURATION GROUN	D	126
	RELIABILI	TY BLOCK DIAGRAM			
FIGURE 4.1	-1: TEST PLAN	Z	• • • • • • • • • • • •	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	134
FIGURE 4.1	-2: EXAMPLE 1	TIME TO FAILURE W	EIBULL PLOT	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	136
FIGURE 4.1	-3: TEST PLAN	Z, EXAMPLE 2	• • • • • • • • • • • • •	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	138
FIGURE 4.1	.4: TEST PLAN	IVC, EXAMPLE 3	• • • • • • • • • • • •	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	139
FIGURE 4.1	-5: TEST PLAN	Z, EXAMPLE 4	• • • • • • • • • • • • •		141
FIGURE 4.1	-6: TEST PLAN	IVC, EXAMPLE 5	• • • • • • • • • • • • •		142

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Reliability and Maintainability (R/M) requirements for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) systems are usually imposed at the system level, and allocated to the electronic equipments/subsystems comprising the system. For the most part, ancillary E/M equipments are not included in the system R/M requirements for a number of reasons: a) they are not considered critical to normal system operation because they are only required during specific modes of operation or under specific operating conditions; b) they are used in a redundant configuration and, thus, have a low probability of failure; c) they operate at a very low duty-cycle relative to the other equipments in the system; d) they comprise such a small proportion of the total system complement (relative to the electronic equipments) that it was felt that their contribution to system R/M is negligible; or e) they are bought "off the shelf" or provided as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). However, if any one, or several, of the above mentioned reasons, or assumptions, is not true, ancillary E/M equipments having poor R/M can have a significant impact on C³I system R/M. It has been recently noted that some users of C3I systems have been experiencing significant R/M problems with ancillary E/M'equipments, thus substantiating that a problem exists. This effort investigated the problem areas and determined the impact of the ancillary E/M equipment on the system R/M.

1.1 Objective and Approach

The objective of this study was to verify the reliability and maintainability (R/M) performance of ancillary Electromechanical (E/M) equipments in Air Force Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C^3I) Systems. The report includes a data collection and analysis effort designed to determine the actual R/M performance of the ancillary E/M equipments on various C^3I equipments. The actual R/M values are compared to the specified R/M values to determine equipment performance in the field. The R/M values of the ancillary E/M equipment are then compared to the R/M values of the C^3I equipment to determine the R/M impact of the E/M equipment on the C^3I System. This is followed by an investigation of the various methods of modifying existing R/M prediction and demonstration techniques to account for considerations of R/M performance of E/M equipments in the C^3I systems which they support.

1.2 Scope

There are numerous types of C^3I systems in the Air Force inventory. Each system requires various kinds of ancillary E/M equipments. To limit the scope of this report, ancillary E/M equipments were defined as those equipments providing power generation, environmental control and/or electrical power distribution to C^3I systems. The impact of the ancillary E/M equipments on the reliability of C^3I systems was limited to the following equipments: TSC-60(V) 1, 2, 3; TSQ-91, TSQ-92, TSQ-93, and the E-3A aircraft. These systems comprise a significant sample of the current USAF ground mobile and airborne C^3I systems. The ancillary equipment that support these C^3I systems includes both new and mature designs and is representative of the ancillary equipments used with all USAF C^3I systems. A brief description of the equipment studied in the report is provided in the Analysis Section. For more detailed information on the equipments refer to AFCC Pamphlet 100-98 (ref 1) and TAC Pamphlet 55-43 (ref 2).

1.3 Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and symbols are used frequently throughout the report:

Aa - Availability (Inherent)

AAA - Allocations, Assessments and Analysis

A/C - Air Conditioner

AF - Air Force

AFALD - Air Force Air Logistics Division
AFCC - Air Force Communications Command
AFCCP - Air Force Component Command Post

AFLC - Air Force Logistic Command
AFTO - Air Force Technical Orders
AGE - Aerospace Ground Equipment

ALC - Air Logistics Center
ANG - Air National Guard

AN/TSC - Tactical Communications Central
AN/TSQ - Tactical Operations Center

As - Availability (Based on number of successful starts)

ASOC - Air Support Operations Center

BLIS - Base Level Inquiry System
CDR - Contract Data Requirement

CRC/CRP - Operations Center/Operations Post

C³I - Command Control Communication Intelligence

DTIC - Defense Technical Information Center

e - base of the napierian logarithm

ECU - Environmental Control Unit

E/M - Electromechanical
EMU - Engine Generator

ESR - Equipment Status Report

ETM - Elapsed Time MeterFSC - Federal Stock Class

ISSL - Initial Supply Support List

m - Mean Time Between Failure

MB - Engine Generator

MCR - Mission Capability Rate

Mct - Mean Corrective Maintenance Time

MD - Motor Generator

MDS - Maintenance Data System

MDT - Mean Down Time

MEP - Mobile Electric Power

MMC - Materiel Management Code

MMHFH - Mean Manhours Per Flight Hour MMHOH - Mean Manhours Per Operate Hour

MMMR - Mean Maintenance Manhours to Repair

MR - Maintenance Ratio

MTBF - Mean Time Between Failure

MTBI - Mean Time Between Incidents

MTBM - Mean Time Between Maintenance

MTBME - Mean Time Between Maintenance Events

MTTR - Mean Time To Repair

NIIN - National Item Identification Number
NMCMR - Not Mission Capable Maintenance Rate

NMCOR - Not Mission Capable Other Rate
NMCSR - Not Mission Capable Supply Rate

NMCTR - Total Downtime Percentage
PDN - Power Distribution Network

PG - Power Generation

RBD - Reliability Block Diagram
RMM - Reliability Math Model

R/M - Reliability and Maintainability

R(t) - reliability at time t

t - mission length

TAC - Tactical Air Command

TACC - Tactical Air Control Center
TACS - Tactical Air Control Squadro

TACS - Tactical Air Control Squadron
TCS - Tactical Control Squadron

TCTO - Time Compliance Technical Order

TD - Technician Designator

TIS - Tactical Intelligence Squadron

TRC - Technology Repair Center
TRS - Tactical Recon Squadron

WUC - Work Unit Code

 χ^2 - Chi - Square λ - failure rate

2.0 DATA COLLECTION

The data collection effort was approached as a two phased operation. The objectives of phase one were to determine the most widely used ancillary electromechanical (E/M) equipment in C^3I systems, to investigate the problem areas of existing ancillary E/M equipment in USAF C^3I systems, and to assess the availability of failure data for these equipments. Phase one was also tasked with acquiring predicted and specified reliability/maintainability (R/M) values for the equipment. The objective of the phase two effort was to obtain field experience data on the equipment selected during the phase one effort.

2.1 Phase One Data Collection

The phase one effort consisted of:

- an extensive literature search
- a user survey of ancillary E/M equipment
- on-site visits to Air Force equipment users
- collecting Military Specifications and Standards
- a query of non-Air Force equipment users and manufacturers
- locating Air Force data sources

The following is a discussion of each of these efforts

2.1.1 Literature Search

The literature search consisted of an information request to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), a request for manufacturer's R/M reports on C³I equipment, and various requests for many other reports relevant to the study. The survey of DTIC information requests resulted in acquiring twenty-five reports (ref 3 to 27) which provided insight into possible problem areas of ancillary E/M equipment. The data summarized from the DTIC reports were utilized in the R/M analyses. The request for manufacturer's R/M reports revealed a very limited availability of reports on C³I systems that also have a significant amount of operating time. R/M reports that contained specified, predicted and assessed R/M numerics were obtained on the TSC-60-1, 2, 3 (ref 28 to 30), the UYK-14B, the TSQ-91, 92, 93 (ref 31, 32), and the E-3A (ref 33 to 35). Many other literature sources were used and are documented in the bibliography.

2.1.2 User Survey Of Ancillary E/M Equipment

A user survey was initiated during the early stages of this project to determine the usage and to identify problem areas with ancillary E/M équipment in the field. The survey was also designed to determine the feasibility of using the AFTO 95 forms for failure data. The questions developed for this survey are:

- What types of ancillary E/M equipment e.g., motor generator, air conditioners, ECU's, heaters, power distribution equipment, teletypes, etc, are used at this station?
 - -- Equipment Nomenclature
 - -- Quantity
- May we have copies of the AFTO 95 forms so that we can record and categorize the number of failures?
- Do the AFTO 95 forms list all of the failures that the equipments have experienced?
 - -- If no, give your estimate of the percentage of total failures that are recorded.
- Record the equipment that this equipment is associated with.
- Please list the serial number, acceptance date, ETM reading on acceptance date, current ETM reading and date taken on the table provided.
- Please describe any reliability/maintainability problem that you believe to be significant. Can you supply other sources of data at your disposal?

This survey was distributed, with a survey from another IITRI project, by mail and in-person. Thirty-eight questionnaires were mailed to active Air Force units, and seventy-seven to Air National Guard units. A list of these units is shown in Table 2.1.2-1. Twenty-nine active Air Force units and four Air National Guard units were visited. The purpose of the visit was to emphasize the importance of the survey and to uncover any ambiguities in the questions asked of the units. A list of units visited is shown in Table 2.1.2-2.

Thirty-six questionnaire forms (31%) were returned. The number of returned questionnaires is well above the 20% average for surveys. A list of the units that returned the completed questionnaire is shown in Table 2.1.2-3.

TABLE 2.1.2-1: UNITS SOLICITED BY MAIL

UNIT	TYPE(1)	LOCATION
2ND CMBTCG	AF	PATRICK AFB FL
5TH CMBTCG	ĀF	ROBINS AFB GA
10TH TRW	ĀF	ALCONBURY AB ENGLAND
26TH TRW	AF	ZWEIBRUKEN AB FRG
601ST TCW	AF	SEMBACH AB FRG
600TH TCG	AF	HESSICH-OLDENDORF AS FRG
601ST TCG	AF	RAMSTEIN AB FRG
DET 1 AFCC	AF	APO NY 09021
DET 2 AFCC	AF	OFFUTT AFB NE
DET 3 AFCC	AF	HICKMAN AFB HI
DET 4 AFCC	AF	LANGLEY AFB VA
DET 5 AFCC	AF	ROBINS AFB GA
DET 6 AFCC	AF	WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH
DET 7 AFCC	AF	RANDOLPH AFB TX
DET 8 AFCC	AF	ANDREWS AFB_VA
67TH TRW	AF	BERGSTROM AFB TX
728TH TACCS	AF	EGLIN AFB FL
507TH TACCS	AF	SHAW AFB SC
727TH TCS	AF	EGLIN AFB FL
75TH TCF	AF	EGLIN AFB FL
119TH TCF	ANG	ALCOA TN
HQ PACAF	AF_	HICKAM AFB HI
162ND CMBTCG	ANG	NORTH HIGHLAND CA
226ST CMBTCG	ANG	GADSDEN AL -
201ST CMBTCG	ANG	HICKAM AFB HI
251ST CMBTCG	ANG	SPRINGFIELD OH
252ND CMBTCG	ANG	TACOMA WA
253RD CMBTCS	ANG	WELLESLEY MA
254TH CMBTCG	ANG	GARLAND TX
281ST CMBTCG	. ANG	COVENTRY RI
143RD CMBTCS	ANG	SEATTLE WA
147TH CMBTCS	ANG	VAN NUYS CA COMPTON CA
148TH CMBTCS	ANG	NORTH HIGHLANDS CA
149TH CMBTCS	ANG	HILO CA
201ST CMBTCS	ANG	CINCINNATI OH
123RD TCF	ANG ANG	TACOMA WA
256TH CMBTCS	ANG	VAN NUYS CA
261ST CMBTCS	ANG	BADIN NC
263RD CMBTCS	ANG	SOUTH PORTLAND ME
265TH CMBTCS	ANG	COSTA MESA CA
222ND CMBTCS 3RD CMBTCG	AF	TINKER AFB FL
223RD CMBTCS	ANG	HOT SPRINGS AR
223RD UMBTCS 224TH CMBTCS	ANG	ST. SIMONS ISLAND GA
226TH CMBTCS	ANG	GADSOEN AL
228TH CMBTCS	ANG	KNOXVILLE TN
231ST CMBTCS	ANG	ANDREWS AFB VA
232ND CMBTCS	ANG	MONTGOMERY AL
ESEMP UMBIUS	AIN	LIAILIAA IPILI IM

TABLE 2.1.2-1: UNITS SOLICITED BY MAIL (CONT'D)

UNIT	TYPE	LOCATION
234TH CMBTCS	ANG	HAYWARD CA
242TH CMBTCS	ANG	SPOKANE WA
244TH CMBTCS	ANG	PORTLAND OR
152ND TCG	ANG	ROSLYN NY
154TH TCG	ANG	AURORA CG
157TH TCG	ANG	ST. LOUIS MO
101ST TCS	ANG	WORCESTER MA
102ND TCS	ANG	SLATERSVILLE RI
103RD TCS	ANG	ORANGE CT
105TH TCS	ANG	CHENEY WA
107TH TCS	ANG	PHOENIX AZ
115TH TCS	ANG	DOTHAN AL
116TH TCS	ANG	PORTLAND OR
SOZH ASOS	AF	SHAW AFB SC
9TH TIS	AF	SHAW AFB SC
602ND TACCS	AF	BERGSTROM AFB TX
712TH ASOS	AF	BERGSTROM AFB TX
12TH TIS	ĀF	BERGSTROM AFB TX
HO ESC	AF	KELLY AFB TX
117TH TCS	ANG	SAVANNAH GA
129TH TCS	ANG	KENNESAW GA
104TH TCF	ANG	KLAMATH FALL OR
9TH TIS 602ND TACCS 712TH ASOS 12TH TIS HQ ESC 117TH TCS 129TH TCS 104TH TCF HQ AFMMO 106ST TCF 108TH TCF 110TH TCF 112TH TCF 112TH TCF 113TH TCF 225TH CMBTCS 182ND CEM SQ 262ND CMBTCS 264TH CMBTCS	AF	WASHINGTON DC
106ST TCF	ANG	SALT LAKE CITY UT
108TH TCF	ANG	HANCOCK FLD NY
109TH TCF	ANG	SALT LAKE CITY UT
110TH TCF	ANG	ALCOA TN
112TH TCF	ANG	UNIVERSITY PARK PA
113TH TCF	ANG	HANCOCK FLD NY
225TH CMBTCS	ANG	GULFPORT MS
182ND CEM SQ	ANG	PEORIA IL
262ND CMBTCS	ANG	BELLINGHAM WA
264TH CMBTCS	ANG	CHICAGO IL
267TH CMBTCS	ANG	WELLESLEY MA
271ST CMBTCS	ANG	ANNVILLE PA
282ND CMBTCS	ANG	COVENTRY RI
240TH CMBTCF	ANG	EASTOVER SC
241ST ATCF	ANG	ST. LOUIS MO
244TH CMBTCF	ANG	PORTLAND. OR
269TH CMBTCF	ANG	SPRINGFIELD OH
124TH TCF	ANG	CINCINNATI OH
129TH TCF	ANG	KENNESAW GA
134TH TCF	ANG	FT. DODGE IA
154TH TCF	ANG	COLORADO SPRINGS CO
105TH CEM SQ	ANG	WHITE PLAINS NY
111TH CEM SQ	ANG	WHITE GROVE PA
81ST TCF	AF	KADENA AB JAPAN
507TH TACCS	AF	SHAW AFB SC

TABLE 2.1.2-1: UNITS SOLICITED BY MAIL (CONT'D)

UNIT	TYPE	LOCATION
UNIT 621ST TCS 6130TH TCF 6140TH TCF 274TH CMBTCS 283RD CMBTCS 240TH ATCF 242ND ATCF 254TH CMBTCF 258TH CMBTCF	TYPE AF AF ANG ANG ANG ANG ANG ANG	LOCATION OSAN KOREA OSAN KOREA OSAN KOREA ROSLYN NY SAVANNAH GA EASTOVER SC SPOKANE WA GARLAND TX ST. CROIX VIRGIN ISLANDS
128TH TCF 133RD TCF 138TH TCF 157TH TCF 110TH CEM SQ 163RD CEM SQ 6948TH ESC 6922ND ESS 6911TH ESG 728TH TCS	ANG ANG ANG ANG ANG AF AF AF AF	MILWAUKEE WI FT. DODGE IA GREELEY CO ST. LOUIS MO BATTLE CREEK MI ONTARIO GAP CA SAN ANTONIO TX CLARK AB PHILIPPINES HAHN AB FRG DUKE FLD FL

Notes: 1) AF - AIR FORCE ANG - AIR NATIONAL GUARD

TABLE 2.1.2-2: UNITS VISITED

UNIT	TYPE(1)	LOCATION
10TH TRW	AF	ALCONBURY AB ENGLAND
10TH RTS	AF	ALCONBURY AB ENGLAND
1ST RTS	AF	ALCONBURY AB ENGLAND
621ST TCF	AF	WIESBADEN AB FRG
38TH TRW	AF	ZWEIBRUKEN AB FRG
611TH TCF 603RD TCS	AF AF	ALZEY AS FRG
601ST TCG	AF AF	ALZEY AS FRG
728TH TCS	AF AF	RAMSTEIN AB FRG EGLIN AFB FL
727TH TCS	AF AF	EGLIN AFB FL
5TH TAIRCG	ĀF	OSAN AB KOREA
604TH DASS	ĀF	CAMP RED CLOUD KOREA
267TH TCS	ANG	WELLESLEY MA
22AF/DOV	AF	(2)TRAVIS AFB CA
MOTBA	Ä	(2)OAKLAND ARMY BASE CA
USA ALC	Ä	(2) TOBYHANNA PA
629TH TCF	ĀF	SCHWELENTRUP FRG
626TH TCF	AF	NORDHOLZ FRG
619TH TCF	ĀF	SCHWELENTRUP FRG
606TH TCS	AF	BREMERHAVEN FRG
SEA LAND	C	(2)OAKLAND CA
USA ALC	A	(2) SACRAMENTO CA
1ST CMBTCS	AF	LINDSEY AS FRG
38TH TRS	AF	ZWEIBRUKEN AB FRG
26TH TRW	AF	ZWEIBRUKEN AB FRG
622ND TCF	AF	RHEIN GRAFFENSTEIN AS FRG
600TH TCG	AF .	HESSICH-OLDENDORF AS FRG
601ST TCW	AF	SEMBACH AB FRG
75TH TCF	AF _	EGLIN AFB FL
271ST CMBTCS	ANG	INDIAN TOWN GAP PA
621ST TCG	AF	OSAN AB KOREA
1961ST CMBTCG	AF	CLARK AB PHILIPPINES
101ST TCS	ANG	WORCESTER MA
USAF ALC	AF	(2)MC CLELLAN AFB CA
162ND CMBTCS	ANG	ROBINS AFB GA
636TH TCF	AF	NORDHOLZ FRG
609TH TCF	AF	HESSICH-OLDENDORF FRG

NOTES:

- 1) AF AIR FORCE
 ANG AIR NATIONAL GUARD
 A ARMY
 C COMMERCIAL
 2) TERMINAL POINTS

TABLE 2.1.2-3: UNITS RESPONDING

UNIT	TYPE(1)	LOCATION
507TH TACCS	AF	SHAW AFB SC
727TH TCS	ĀĒ	EGLIN AFB FL
253RD CMBTCS	ANG	WELLESLEY MA
256TH CMBTCS	ANG	TACOMA WA
263RD CMBTCS	ANG	BADIN NC
265TH CMBTCS	ANG	SOUTH PORTLAND ME
3RD CMBTCG	AF	TINKER AFB OK
223RD CMBTCS	ANG	HOT SPRINGS AR
226TH CMBTCS	ANG	GADSDEN AL
234TH CMBTCS	ANG	HAYWARD CA
244TH CMBTCS	ANG	PORTLAND OR
103RD TCS	ANG	ORANGE CT
105TH TCS	ANG	CHENEY WA
107TH TCS	ANG	PHOENIX AX
682TH ASOS	AF	SHAW AFB SC
9TH TIS	AF	SHAW AFB SC
129TH TCS	ANG	KENNESAW GA
104TH TCF	ANG	KLAMATH FALL OR
264TH CMBTCS	ANG	CHICAGO IL
271ST CMBTCS	ANG	ANNVILLE PA
282ND CMBTCS	ANG	COVENTRY RI
244TH CMBTCF	ANG	PORTLAND OR
105TH CEM SQ	ANG	WHITE PLAINS NY
111TH CEM SQ	ANG	WHITE GROVE PA
81ST TCF	AF	KADENA AB JAPAN
621ST TCS	AF	OSAN KOREA
6130TH TCF	A.F	OSAN KOREA
128TH TCF	ANG	MILWAUKEE WI
138TH TCF	ANG	GREELEY CO
157TH TCF	ANG	ST. LOUIS MO
6948TH ESC	AF	SAN ANTONIO TX
6922ND ESS	AF	CLARK AB PHILIPPINES
6911TH ESG	AF	HAHN AB FRG
10TH RTS	AF	ALCONBURY AB ENGLAND
27TH TCS	AF	EGLIN AFB FL
5TH TAIRCG	AF	OSAN AB LOREA
604TH DASS	AF	CAMP RED CLOUD KOREA

Notes: 1) AF - AIR FORCE ANG - AIR NATIONAL GUARD

2.1.3 On-Site Visits Of Air Force Equipment Users

Five visits were made to Air Force units during the early stages of this project. The objective of the trips was to gain field knowledge on the usage, maintenance procedure, record keeping and areas of user concern associated with ancillary E/M equipment. The following is a list of the places visited:

- Wellesley ANG, MA
- SM-ALC, Sacramento, CA
- Eglin AFB, FL
- Griffiss AFB, NY
- Langley AFB, VA

The information provided at these locations is described in the following paragraphs.

<u>Wellesley ANG</u> Base provided usage information in terms of operating time since acceptance on various types of engine-generator sets on the 407L system. They indicated failure data for their equipment could be obtained from AFM/66-1 records. Failure count information on ECUs was also obtained.

Sacramento Air Logistics Center (SM-ALC) personnel stated that a very high level of maintenance is authorized to be performed in the field on engine generators. The result is that depot maintenance has all but been eliminated. For example, out of 545 A/E24U-8 turbine generators that have been procured only 8 were returned to AFLC for rehabilitation in 1980. SM-ALC did not know how much logistic support is procured directly by TAC elements from contractors or vendors using locally available funds.

The result is that parts consumption data generated by AFLC on engine generators does not reflect the total part consumption. The SM-ALC Material Management and Maintenance personnel believe that if valid R/M data are to be acquired, it will have to come from field operational units.

The Sacramento Material Management and Maintenance personnel informed us that the A/E24U-8 turbine generators have never been used as was originally intended, i.e., for interim power until diesel driven generators were brought on-

line. They also said they believe that the gas turbine has the greatest impact on reliability of the A/E24U-8; however, they have no data to support their belief. The A/E24U-8 receives extensive field maintenance and repair.

Eglin AFB personnel stated that frequent engine changes on A/E24U-8 sets can negate the value of elapsed time meter readings. Eglin personnel also reported that air conditioner parts are hard to obtain and can result in a TSC-60 unit being off the air because of inoperative air conditioning. The trip also provided insights into common and uncommon maintenance procedures used on generators and ECUs.

<u>Griffiss AFB</u> Civil Engineering (CE) personnel reported that they maintain paper records on the 60 Hertz emergency generators on the base. SAC personnel reported that all data on the 400 Hertz generators used to power aircraft on the ground are reported through the SAC computer. These data are available; however, elasped time meter readings are ordinarily lost during computerization of the records.

2.1.4 Military Specifications And Standards

An effort was undertaken to obtain all military specification and standards applicable to ancillary E/M equipment used with C^3I systems. The purpose was to establish the specified R/M requirements of the equipment to be studied. Table 2.1.4-1 contains a list of relevant specifications and standards identified and obtained.

TABLE 2.1.4-1: MILITARY SPECIFICATION/STANDARD

Spec/STD Number	Date	Name
MIL-A-38269E	Feb 75	Air Conditioner, A/E32C-17
MIL-A-38339D	Mar 70	Air Conditioners, Lightweight, Compact, Military
MIL-A-38340C	Nov 77	Air Conditioner, A/E32C-18
MIL-A-38345D	Feb 70	Air Conditioner, A/E32C-24
MIL-A-38346D	Dec 78	Air Conditioner, A/E32C-25
MIL-A-38347D	Feb 70	Air Conditioner, A/E32C-26
MIL-A-38348C	Jan 70	Air Conditioner, A/E32C-27
MIL-A-52767B	Sep 79	Air Conditioners: Vertical and Horiztonal, Compact
MIL-A-83380	Feb 79	Generator Sets, Gas Turbine Engine Driven, 30 and 60KW, 400HZ
MIL-G-6162B	Feb 72	Generator and Starter - Generator, Electric Direct Current, Nominal 30 volts, Aircraft
MIL-G-21480	Jul 58	Generator System, Single Generator, Constant Frequency Alternating Current, Aircraft, Class C
MIL-G-26727D	Jun 74	Generator Sets, Diesel Engine, 15KW thru 150KW, 50/60 Hertz, Type I (Tactical Class 2 (Utility)
MIL-G-28670	Apr 74	Generator Set, Gas Turbine Engine, 750 KW, 50/60 Hertz, Prime, Utility.
MIL-G-38195C	Jul 78	Generator Set, Gas Turbine Engine, 60KW, 400 Hertz, General Purpose
MIL-G-38441C(USAF)	Aug 71	Generator Sets, Diesel Engine EMU-19/U, EMU-20/U, EMU-21/U, EMU-22/U, EMU-23/U, EMU-24/U, 400 cycle Output, Multi-Installation

TABLE 2.1.4-1: MILITARY SPECIFICATION/STANDARD (CONT'U)

Spec/STD Number	Date	Name
MIL-G-52732	Jun 72	Generator Sets, Gasoline Engine Driven, 5KW thru 10KW, 60 Hertz, 400 Hertz and 28 Volt Direct Current, Type I (Tactical, Class 2 (Utility)
MIL-G-52884	Mar 81	Generator Sets, Diesel Engine Driven, 15 thru 200 Kilowatts, 50/60 and 400 Hertz, (Tactical)
MIL-G-52889B	Nov 78	Generator Sets, Diesel Engine Driven 5 and 10KW, 60 Hertz (Tactical) (Utility)
MIL-M-4803D	May 77	Motor-Genertor, 400 HZ Precise Output
MIL-M-4818D	Jul 79	Motor-Genertor, Skid Mounted, Type MD-2
MIL-M-4820E	Jul 79	Motor-Generator, Skid Mounted, Type MD-4
MIL-STD-633E	Feb 80	Mobile Electric Power Engine Generator Standard Family MEP-404A, 60KW, 400Hz, Gas Turbine Engine Driven Generator Set Characteristics
MIL-STD-705B	Jun 72	Generator Sets, Engine Driven Methods of Tests and Instructions
MIL-STD-1332B	Mar 73	Definitions of Tactical, Prime, Precise, and Utility Terminologies for Classification of the DoD Mobile Electric Power Engine Generator Set Family
MIL-STD-1408A	Apr 75	Air Conditioners, Family of Environmental Control Units, General Application Characteristics
MIL-STD-1650	Jun 74	DoD Standard Family of Aircraft Ground Support Power Units

2.1.5 Non-AF Users And Manufacturers

A list of non Air Force users and manufacturers of E/M equipments that are similar to that associated with C3I systems was made. These users and manufacturers were contacted to establish if they had any usable data. In some cases these data were available; however, in all cases the data were not germane to the study. The following is a list of non Air Force users and manufacturers contacted:

- Keco Industries, Cincinnati, OH
- American Air Filter, St Louis, MO.
- Trane Co, LaCrosse, WI D. Wedj, Inc, York, PA
- Tobyhanna Army Depot
- Naval Air Station, Norfolk, VA
- HQ US Marine Corps Integration and Logistic Dept.
- Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C. Solar Division of International Harvester
- Paison & Peebles, Division of NE Engineering Industries
- Southwest Research Institute (SWRI)
- Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, VA
- B.B. Saxon, San Antonio, TX

2.1.6 Locating Air Force Data Sources

An extensive effort was made to locate and obtain samples of available Air Force generated R/M data on C3I systems and associated ancillary E/M equipments. The objective of the effort was to establish the availability of useful data to be used during the analysis portion of the report. The managing Air Logistic Centers (ALC) were contacted as well as individual Units and Commands. Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) was also contacted as a possible data source. The following is a list of the Air Force and Air National Guard (ANG) data sources contacted and the information and/or data received:

SOURCE

INFORMATION RECEIVED

San Antonio ALC (managing center for ECUs, FSC 4120)

- Their Data collection and Analysis Component cannot supply failure data on ECUs
- No Initial Spare Support Lists (ISSL) available for FSC 4120 type air conditioners
- ECU repairs are contracted to B.B. Saxon Inc.

SOURCE

INFORMATION RECEIVED

- No repair data available on the EMU-30's turbine engine
- No records available on procurement of parts or repair to ECUs
- Available R/M data received on FSC 4120 ECUs

Warner Robins ALC (managing center for Heaters, FSC 4520)

No failure information available on FSC 4520 heaters

Sacramento ALC (managing center for Motor and Engine Driven Generator, FSC 6115 and FSC 6125) - A/E 24U-8 Depot does not use AFM 66-1 reporting - ISSLs were received for the A/E 24U-8 and MD-4

- They have no data on failure

 They cannot supply procurement data on parts because parts are purchased locally or from other agencies

Tinker AFB, OK

Acquired 407L R/M Index. It is derived from AFM 66 1. It does not contain generator set data. Some ECU maintenance data are listed

TAC Headquarters

- Obtained 407L Base Level Inquiry System (BLIS) covering all TAC Bases
- Informed that no correlation can be expected between Equipment Status Report (ESR) data and MDS BLIS information

602 TAC Wing Bergstrom AFB, TX

No BLIS available. All reports must come from TAC HQ

507 TACC Wing Shaw AFB, NC

No BLIS available. All reports must come from TAC HQ

AFCC, Scott-AFB, IL

- BLIS reports not available because of damage to Maintenance Data System (MDS) files
- ESR data are not collected on the A/E 24U-8, MD-4 and 13 other common generator sets
- ESR data are not collected on the A/E32C-24 and A/E32C-26
- In general ESR data are collected against missions and not systems

601 TCW Sembach AB, FRG They maintain 24 hours a day operation on A/E24U-8 generator, but they did not supply data

USAFE (eight selected bases)

 Report they are unable to provide a BLIS with information on generators sets and ECUs

552 AWACWC Tinker AFB, OK

- Received BLIS report on airborne generator and flightline ground power equipment
- Informed that only two inflight AC power failures listed in one year for entire fleet

SOURCE

INFORMATION RECEIVED

- Received estimate of ground maintenance time per flight hour
- Received mission abort criteria for some systems from E3A flying squadron

Command

AF Electronic Security - Only two COMPASS EARS systems procured

101 TCS Worchester ANG, MA - Obtained list of High 25 reports for A/E24U-8 and other equipment. The High 25 report lists the 25 ANG equipments with the greatest number of maintenance actions during the reporting period

152 TCG Roslyn ANG Long Island, NY

- Requested Latest High 25 report, but did not receive

Headquarters ANG

- Informed High 25 report is not sent to HQ. The report is a unit option so each unit must be contacted separately.

2.2 Phase Two Data Collection

The objective of the phase two effort was to secure failure data on specific C³I systems and their associated ancillary E/M equipments. As efforts proceeded in phase two, several decisions were made concerning the scope of this report. All Ground Fixed C³I systems, i.e., COBRA DANE, PAVE PAWS, etc., were eliminated from the study by the RADC technical monitor. It was feit that it would be more effective to concentrate on mobile and airborne systems because of the commonality of ancillary equipments. As a result all efforts to obtain data on ground fixed systems were terminated. The ground mobile systems selected for analysis were the TSC-60(V), TSQ-91, TSQ-92, and TSQ-93. The AWACS was selected as the airborne system. During a meeting with the technical monitor an agreement was made to study only the ancillary E/M equipment providing power generation, power distribution and environmental control for the selected ground mobile and airborne systems.

A concentrated data collection effort was initiated for those systems and equipments selected for the study. Because of the nonavailability of data from non Air Force sources discovered during phase one, the decision was made to attempt to maximize available Air Force sources. This involved an exhaustive search into the various Air Force Data Systems for useful failure data. To provide another source of failure data independent of the Air Force System, a second survey was initiated in order to gain failure data direct from the field.

2.2.1 Air Force Data

Several efforts were made to secure useful Air Force data. The Maintenance Data System (MDS) was used to acquire numerous reports for analysis. Equipment Status Reports (ESR) were requested and received on several equipments. An attempt was also made to correlate parts procurement into failure information. The following is a description of these efforts.

MDS Reports The Air Force MDS is the data base for numerous reports. The data summarized on these reports are designed to meet the specific needs of the Air Force user. AFLCR 66-15 (ref 36) lists the reports derived from MDS data that are available from the responsible AFLCs. The reports of specific interest

to this study are part of the DO56B series, On-Equipment Maintenance Data Reports. On-equipment maintenance is maintenance actions accomplished on complete end articles of equipment. This includes support general work (accomplishment of scheduled and special inspections), removal and replacement of components, and fix-in-place repair actions. Off-equipment maintenance, DO56C series, is in-shop maintenance performed on removed components. The DO56C series was examined and considered too specific for the scope of this report. The DO56B series does provide the general system data required. The following is a description of the MDS derived reports used in this report.

<u>Detail Maintenance Actions For Selected WUCs (D056B5503)</u>: This report provides from 1 to 12 months detail maintenance data on selected WUCs by how malfunction code, action taken code, base, and serial number for specific WUCs on an end article.

Maintenance Actions, Manhours, and Aborts By Work Unit Code (D056B5006): This report provides on-equipment and off-equipment historical information on the maintenance actions, manhours, and aborts for the past 6 months by month on every WUC included in the master record. In addition, a summary line for each subsystem and system shows totals of this data by month. Due to the method of assigning and reporting equipment classification codes for registered AGE, off-equipment data cannot be displayed in AGE reports.

Summarized Maintenance Actions For Selected Work Unit Codes (D056B5505): This report provides 6 months of summarized detail information on WUCs which do not perform to preset standards. The data is presented in three parts for each WUC. Part I, On-Equipment Actions; Part II, Shop Action; Part III, Parts Replacement (Parts II and III are not reported for AGE not having unique equipment classification).

Selected Part Number Action Summary (D056C4402): This report is a summary or history type report showing a maximum of 12 months and a minimum of 1 month of maintenance and repair data reported by AF bases and AFLC Technology Repair Centers (TRCs). The report reflects action taken (for the time period covered) on items identified by part number within NIIN within MMC within FSC.

Maintenance Action For Selected NIIN Numbers (D056C403): This report provides 6 months of off-equipment detail data on a specific item reflecting application, location, how malfunction codes, and action taken codes. The report is laid out in three parts; Part I, Malfunction and Action Taken Summary; Part II, No Defect Actions, and Part III, Action summary by Base. The report is sequenced by part number within NIIN within MMC within FSC within Technician Designator (TD) and ALC management division.

<u>Parts Replaced During Field or Depot Repair (D056C4404)</u>: This report provides 6 months of detailed maintenance data on those parts (bits and pieces) replaced on a component repaired at bench check, in field maintenance shops, by a TRC or contractor. These are all parts as shown in Block 20, AFTO

Form 346, "Maintenance Discrepancy/Production Credit Record and Master Card," and Block 29, AFTO Form 349 that can be related to the component being repaired by matching job control numbers, equipment classification, and WUC.

Reliability and Maintainability Index, E-3A: (ref 37) Special study by Oklahoma City ALC using MDS data from AFTO 349 cards. The following data elements are reported for each WUC: Failure, MTBF, Maintenance Action, Mean Time between Maintenance (MTBM), Maintenance Manhours, Maintenance Manhours per 100 Operating Hours, Special Inventory, and Failure Rate.

<u>Base Level Inquiry System (BLIS) Reports</u>: These reports contain the raw data as reported on the AFTO 349 forms. Operating times are not reported on these reports.

AFALD 800-4 Manual: (ref 38) This manual lists maintenance events for each system 2 digit work unit code (WUC) of the aircraft. The maintenance events for each system are further divided into inherent events, induced events, and no defect events. Inherent events are activities resulting from failures occurring internal to the equipment. Induced events are activities resulting from failures caused by external sources. No defect events are activities, other than preventive maintenance associated with the removal and replacement of items later found to be serviceable. Maintenance manhours are also listed for each type event. The manual contains data over the entire life of the aircraft.

Equipment Status Reports (ESR) ESRs were received from TAC on the TSC-60, TSQ-91, TSQ-92, TSQ-93 and the A/E24U-8. ESRs were not available on the E-3A or the other ancillary E/M equipments being studied. We were informed that ESRs are only reported on selected equipment which have current command interest. TAC also provided their "Production Analysis Summary" (ref 39). It is a monthly publication which summarizes ESR data by month and fiscal year. The publication reports equipment mission capability for all TAC units combined. The not-mission-capable-time is identified as due to maintenance, supply or other. The times listed are percentage of calendar time that the equipment was in that state. The following table is a summary of the Production Analysis Summaries from October 1980 to September 1981:

EQUIP	QTY/EQ HOURS	COMMAND	MCR	NMCMR	NMCSR	NMCOR	NMCTR
TSC-60 TSC-91 TSC-92 TSC-93 A/E24U-8	13/113880 5/43800 3/26280 4/35040 112/960576	TAC 83.9 TAC 89.3 TAC 95.8 TAC 89.3 TAC 95.9	84.2 87.8 95.8 89.2 97.1	3.2 8.5 4.2 8.1 1.4	10.2 3.3 0 .8	2.4 .4 ~0 1.9	15.8 12.2 4.2 10.8 2.9

MCR - Mission Capability Rate (analogous to availability)
NMCMR - Not Mission Capable Maintenance Rate
NMCSR - Not Mission Capable Supply Rate
NMCOR - Not Mission Capable Other Rate
NMCTR - Total Downtime Percentage

QTY/EQ - Quantity of Equipments/Total Equipment Operate Hours

Supply Lists: An Initial Supply Support List (ISSL) (ref 40) was obtained on the MD-4 and the A/E24U-8 in an attempt to establish a failure rate using parts replacement data. The ISSL is a list of parts for a specific equipment which are authorized to be ordered through the base supply system.

2.2.2 Survey

The second survey of this project was a three month effort whose purpose was to gain failure data direct from the equipment users. Eleven units were contacted in-person about the survey. Each unit was instructed on the mechanics of filling out the form and given a detailed briefing on the overall objective of the project.

The survey consisted of two separate forms: Generator Maintenance Data Survey; and Environmental Control Unit (ECU) Maintenance Data Survey (See Appendix A). Both the generator and ECU forms required that specific questions be answered about each failure in order to gain reliability, maintainability and system availability information about the equipment. The survey form also required that all non-standard operating procedures and/or conditions be recorded on the forms. To help insure completeness of the survey, each unit was contacted by telephone or in-person prior to their submitting the surveys. At that time questions were answered and unclear responses clarified. Table 2.2.2-1 lists the units that were contacted and the quantity and type of equipments involved in the survey.

TABLE 2.2.2-1: GENERATOR AND ECUS SURVEYS

UNIT CONTACTED	SURVEY REQUESTED ON NUMBER/TYPE EQUIP	SURVEY RECEIVED ON NUMBER/TYPE EQUIP	
3rd Combat Communication Group (LGM-3) (AFCC) Tinker AFB, OK	16/EMU-19 25/MEP-005A 7/MEP-006A	25 MEP-005A 7 MEP-006A	
712 ASOC Bergstrom AFB, TX	6/A/E24U-8 1 MD-4 3/ECUs	6/A/E24U-8 1 MD-4 4/ECUs	
12 TIS Bergstrom AFB TX	2 MB-15 2 MD-4 13/ECUs	2/MB-15 3/MD-4 1/MD-2 14/ECUs	
602 TACS Bergstrom AFB, TX	2/MD-4 16/A/E24U-8 36/ECUs	15/A/E24U-8 37/ECUs	
12 TRS Bergstrom AFB, TX	6/MB-15 25/ECUs	6/MB-15 19/ECUs	
91 TRS Bergstrom AFB, TX	6/MB-15 25/ECUs	6 MB-15 24/ECUs	
728 TCS Duke Field Eglin AFB, FL	16/A/E24U-8 3/MD-4 12/A/E32C-27 10/A/E32C-25 8/A/E32C-23 4/A/E32C-18	14/A/E24U-8 1/MD-4 9/A/E32C-27 5/A/E32C-25 1/A/E32C-23 3/A/E32C-18	
727 TCS (T) Hurlburt Field Eglin AFB, FL	10/A/E24U-8 9/MD-4 12/A/E32C-27 10/A/E32C-25 8/A/E32C-18	10/A/E24U-8 10/MD-4 8/A/E32C-27 5/A/E32C-25 3/A/E32C-18	
507 TACC Shaw AFB, SC	14/A/E24U-8 16/A/E32C-27 9/A/E32C-25	17/A/E24U-8 11/A/E32C-27 12/A/E32C-25	
9 TIS Shaw AFB, SC	4/MB-15 2/MD-4 14/A/E24U-8	3/MB-15 2/MD-4 1/MD-2 15/ECUs	

TABLE 2.2.2-1: GENERATOR AND ECUS SURVEYS (CONT'D)

UNIT CONTACTED	SURVEY REQUESTED ON NUMBER/TYPE EQUIP	SURVEY RECEIVED ON NUMBER/TYPE EQUIP	
62 TRS Shaw AFB, SC	6/MB-15 25/ECUs	6 /MB-15 27 /ECUs	
682ASOC Shaw AFB, SC	6/A/E24U-8 1/MD-4 4/ECUs	6/A/E24U-8 4/ECUs	

3.0 ANALYSIS

3.1 Selection Of Equipments

Selection of the equipments to be studied in this report was based on the following factors: a qualifying system must have adequate failure data available; the specified, predicted and demonstrated R/M values must be available in a form which will allow comparison with observed results; the selected systems must also use a variety of ancillary E/M equipments; the E/M equipments of interest are those which provide electrical power generation, electrical power distribution, and environmental control; the selected equipments come from different environments (i.e., Ground Mobile and Airborne) and be used in several different locations; and each selected system's demands of its ancillary equipment be different from the other selected systems.

The preliminary analysis revealed that the following systems met the selection criteria: TSC-6O(V), TSQ-91, TSQ-92, TSQ-93 and the E-3A aircraft. These systems have the greatest amount of available field experience data which can be compared to the specified, predicted and demonstrated R/M values. The systems also use several types of ancillary equipments. The following is a list of the ECU and power equipments associated with the selected equipments:

	TSQ-91	TSQ-92	TSQ-93	TSC-60(V)	E-3A AWACS
MD-4 EMU-12E EMU-21 EMU-22 A/E24U-8 MB-15 MEP-005 MEP-006 A/E32C-24 A/E32C-25 A/E32C-27	X(3) X(3) X(1)	X(3) X X X(3)	X(2) X X X(6) X	X(3) X(1) X X(10) X(5) X(1) X(3) X(8) X(8) X(1)	
MEP-116A					X

The number in the columns corresponds to the number of surveyed units that use that combination of equipments. This information was taken from survey number one.

The TSC-60(V), TSQ-91, TSQ-92, and TSQ-93 are all ground mobile systems. The TSC-60(V) is designed to be remotely operated and controlled; therefore, its ancillary equipments are not required to support personnel. The TSQ-91, 92 and 93 are designed to provide housing for numerous personnel performing a command and control function in support of tactical air operations in the field. The E-3A is the airborne system. It is the most complex system considered in this study. It has undergone the greatest amount of testing as a complete unit when considering the basic aircraft as ancillary to the mission systems. The following is a brief description of the selected C^3I systems and their ancillary E/M equipments. For more detailed information refer to AFCC Pamphlet 100-98 (ref 1) and TAC Pamphlet 55-43 (ref 2).

AN/TSC-60(V)-1

The AN/TSC-60(V)-1 Communications Central is an HF/SSB radio housed in an air conditioned shelter. Two 1 KW transmitters, receivers and associated equipment provide voice, CW, teletype or high speed data, multiplexed teletype and speech-plus-teletype signals.

AN/TSC-60(V)-2 & 3

AN/TSC-60(V)-2 and OZ-11/TSC-60(V)-2, which make up the AN/TSC-60(V)-3, Communications Central, are transportable HF SSB communications centrals. They provide point-to-point and ground-to-air communications using two independent radio groups consisting of two 2.5 KW transmitters and two radio receivers. Each radio group provides four 3 KHz independent sideband (ISB) channels with a transmit capability of 2.5 KW (PEP/average) power output. The radio equipment is automatically tuned and operates in the 2 to 30 MHz frequency range in either simplex or duplex mode.

AN/TSQ-91

The CRC/P Operations Center, when integrated with the AN/TPS-43 radar, functions as the major weapons control agency of the TACS by performing all functions of surveillance and weapons control in its assigned area of tactical responsibility. Modular in design, the CRC/P is capable of adjusting to the needs of a given deployment by additions/deletions to the basic set of the following modules: Group Display, Console, Data Processing, Ancillary Equipment, and Air Conditioning.

AN/TSQ-92

The TACC is the command action arm of the Tactical Air Control System. Necessary facilities are provided to perform the Combat Operations and Combat Plans functions of the Air Force Component Command Post (AFCCP). Unlike the CRC/CRP, the TACC is essentially a manual operation; it consists of desk positions, manually posted plotting displays, and communications equipment necessary to support personnel in the accomplishment of the Tactical Air Control

Mission. Like the CRC/CRP the TACC is modular in design; capable of adjusting to the needs of a given deployment by a building-block approach to the basic set of the following modules: Group Display, Furnishings, and Air Conditioning.

AN/TSQ-93

The primary purpose of the ASOC is to provide fast reaction to ground force requirements for Tactical Air Support. Working in close coordination with Army personnel, ASOC personnel provide the focal point for information exchange, coordination, and allocation of sorties provided by the TACC to fulfill Army requirements. Like the TACC, the ASOC is essentially a manual operation; it consists of desk positions, manually posted map displays and communications equipment necessary to support personnel in their performance of the assigned mission. Modular is design, the ASOC is comprised of three unique modules; the Operations Module, Air Conditioning Module, and the Communications Center.

E-3A

The E-3A Sentry, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft is a long-range radar platform providing air surveillance in all weather and above all kinds of terrain. The E-3A has a data storage and processing capability, can provide real-time assessment of enemy actions, and can display status and position of friendly resources. The E-3A performs a dual role: (1) a Command and Control Center to support quick reaction deployment and Tactical Air Operations by TAF units, and (2) a survivable early-warning airborne command and control center for identification, surveillance and tracking of enemy forces. The aircraft also provides command and control in the NORAD environment. The E-3A crew consists of 17 aircrew members; 4 flight and 13 mission crew.

A/E 24U-8

The A/E 24U-8 is a transportable 60/120 KW, 400 Hz power plant consisting of two fully-equipped EMU-30/E gas turbine generators and associated distribution equipment mounted on a pallet. The power plant will operate in all-weather and all global environmental conditions for extended periods. One generator will automatically start if the other one degrades. The EMU-30/E is currently being replaced by the MEP-404A.

MB-15

The MB-15 consists of an engine, generator group, control system, winterization system, and housing equipment. The unit is designed to operate in all types of weather. The generator is directly coupled to a diesel engine (6-cylinder (International Fermont) 4-cycle, liquid-cooled, turbo-charged). The MB-15 is a skid-mounted generator set. Wheels can be mounted to the skid.

MD-4

The MD-4 is a skid-mounted motor-driven generator set designed for permanent or semi-permanent installation. The purpose of this unit is to convert 60 cycle AC power to 400 cycle AC power. Power to turn the generator is furnished by a 6-pole synchronous AC motor. The set operates on an input power of 220VAC, 3-phase, 60 Hz or 440VAC, 3-phase, 60 Hz.

MEP-005A/MEP-006A

The MEP-005A and MEP-006A are self-contained, wheel or skid-mounted power unit used for electronic and navigational equipment. The engine is a liquid-cooled, 6-cylinder, valve-in-head, 4-stroke cycle, turbo-charged, diesel engine. To extend their capabilities, the sets are designed to accept and operate with the following kits: load bank, fuel burning or electric winterization, wheel-mounting, automatic transfer panel 50/60 Hz, remote control box, auxiliary fuel burning or electric winterization kit.

EMU-21/EMU-22

The EMU-21 and EMU-22 are transportable, trailer-mounted, power facilities designed to furnish alternating current for electronic and navigational equipment. The generator is coupled to a Monarch diesel engine, Model CSR-3. The engine is an air-cooled, 3-cylinder, 4-cycle type. They are equipped with a 24V electrical starting system. The engine speed is controlled by an electronic governor. The units are designed to operate at -65° F to $+125^{\circ}$ F at sea level and -65° F to $+75^{\circ}$ F at 8,000 feet. They have an integral heating system, battery system, engine operation control panel, and generator instrument and control panel. A towing facility is provided.

A/E32C-18

The A/E32C-18 is designed to provide ventilation, cooling, heating, pressurization, filtering and dehumidification to meet electronics and personnel environmental control. This unit is self-contained.

A/E32C-23

The A/E32C-23 is designed to provide ventilation, cooling, heating, pressurization, filtering, and dehumidification to meet electronics and personnel environmental control requirements. This unit is self-contained. It supports the following equipment: AN/TRC-97, AN/TSC-15 and S-280 Maintenance Shelter.

EMU-12E

The EMU-12E is a transportable 30KW, 400HZ, Precise, Tactical turbine generator set mounted on a skid. The generator will operate in all-weather and all global environmental conditions for extended periods.

MEP-116A

The MEP-116A is a mobile 100KW, 400HZ, skid-mounted diesel generator set used to provide ground electrical power for the E-3A AWACS.

A/E32C-24

The A/E32C-24 is designed to provide ventilation, cooling, heating pressurization, filtering, and dehumidification to meet electronics and personnel environmental control requirements. This unit is mounted on the pallet assembly and supports the following equipment: AN/TSC-62, AN/TGC-27, AN/TSW-7, AN/TSC-60(V)-1 and AN/TPN-19.

A/E32C-25

The A/E32C-25 is designed to provide ventilation, cooling, heating, pressurization, filtering, and dehumidification to meet electronics and personnel environmental control requirements. This unit is mounted on the pallet assembly and supports the following equipment: AN/TSC-62, AN/TGC-27, AN/TSC-60(V)-1, AN/TGC-27 and AN/TGC-28.

A/E32C-27

The A/E32C-27 is designed to provide ventilation, cooling, heating, pressurization, filtering, and dehumidification to meet electronics and personnel environmental control requirements. This unit is mounted on the pallet assembly and supports the following equipment: AN/TSQ-91(V), AN/TSQ-92(V) and AN/TSQ-93(V).

3.2 Evaluation Of Data Sources

This section provides an in-depth evaluation of the field experience data sources utilized to derive the achieved R/M numerics.

3.2.1 Air Force

Maintenance Data System: The Air Force, under Regulation 66-1 and 66-5, established the Maintenance Data System (MDS) to provide for the recording, storage, and retrieval of information concerning action taken by field maintenance personnel to keep Air Force systems and equipments operational. The significance of MDS data for management decisions throughout the entire material function makes it imperative that data elements recorded be accurate and that quality data be obtained.

To insure accurate data reporting all of the data are given a comprehensive edit in accordance with criteria outlined in Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) 00-20-2 (ref 41). This edit produces five reports providing information concerning the type of errors in the data submitted and are used at major command and base level to isolate recording inaccuracies for which corrective action is required. Once corrections are made the data are analyzed to identify failures from maintenance actions by identifying specific combinations of maintenance codes (how malfunction, action taken, when discovered, etc.). Maintenance action and the number of maintenance manhours for each maintenance action are also tabulated. Equipment operating time is not reported into MDS; therefore,

operating time must be estimated or derived from another source. In the case of this study operating times for all equipments except the E-3A were derived from estimates made by using personnel or Elapsed Time Meter readings (if available) provided by using units on two different surveys. The reported flying time was used as the airborne operating time for the E-3A. An estimate of the ratio of ground operating time to flight hours provided by personnel at Tinker AFB was used to derive the ground operating time for the E3-A.

It should be understood at this point that the depth of information that is contained within the MDS and is retrievable is governed by the level of maintenance authorized to field unit personnel. For example, if an element of a system has been maintenance coded "Depot Repair Only" and is removed in the field for an apparent failure of the item, there is no information available from within the MDS that confirms or denies the failure or cause of failure. Therefore, any system Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) computed on the basis of assumed, but unconfirmed, item failures reduces confidence in the MTBF calculation. On the other hand, it is frequently found that field maintenance personnel are authorized to repair an item down to and including piece part or component replacement. The MDS does contain piece part replacement and consumption data. Where such data exists, it would appear to be a valid source for confirming item failures and making MTBF calculations. However, a recent study performed by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) (ref 42) found that "non-faulty components are removed in 4 - 43% of all corrective maintenance actions..." and "technicians fail to find a faulty part or damage a good part in about 10% of all maintenance actions. These findings may be due to inadequate test equipment, tools, and maintenance manuals, as well as to inadequate training." In support of the IDA findings, it is interesting to note that in one of the MDS data products it was recorded that from seven bases maintaining AN/TPS-43 radars over a 12-month period, 90 piece parts were replaced in the transceiver C and O unit. Thirty-five piece part replacements, or 39% of the total, occurred at a single base. The remaining six bases averaged nine piece parts replaced during the same time period. Thus, questionable maintenance actions at a single base distorts any composite MTBF calculation.

It would appear that the MDS is not a good source of data for this report. We believe this is not the case. The data we did receive was useful because we were

assessing the impact of the power generation or ECU on the system (TSC-60V, TSQ-91, etc.) where both the power generation and ECU equipments and the system were subject to the same maintenance reporting rules and in most cases were reported by the same unit. Therefore, the MDS reliability numerics for one system, which may or may not reflect the system's actual reliability, should be comparable to the MDS reliability numerics for the power generation and ECU equipments. This is particularly true for mature systems. As a result, our major concern was not the inadequacies of the MDS but rather that sufficient ancillary E/M equipment data are reported into the system.

Equipment Status Reports: Another source of Air Force data independent of the MDS is the Equipment Status Report (ESR). ESRs deal with availability of systems to perform the mission. The Production Analysis Summary referred to in the Data Collection section is produced from monthly ESRs. The value of this information is that it is a measure of the impact of the ancillary E/M equipment independent of operating time. The mission capable rate is the percentage of calendar time that the equipment is available to the command for immediate use. The reports are a direct measurement of the ability of the Air Force's support function (maintenance, supply, etc.) to furnish mission capable equipment to the operational units. However, like the MDS, only limited types of equipments are covered by ESRs and of those equipments covered the reporting is only for the equipment status and not for its subsystems. In the final evaluation, ESR data appear to be a good assessment of availability as seen by the equipment users.

<u>Initial Supply Support List (ISSL)</u>: The ISSL is a list of parts for a specific equipment which are authorized to be ordered through the bare supply system. Examination of the MD-4 and A/E24U-8 ISSLs revealed a low number of parts on each list. Parts not on the list must be individually procured by the unit, often from local vendors. Sacramento ALC confirmed our suspicion of a high rate of local parts procurement on ancillary E/M equipment, and further informed us that no data were available on local parts procurement. Establishing a failure rate from parts replacement was therefore unrealistic.

3.2.2 IITRI E/M Equipment Surveys

<u>Survey One</u>: The first survey was generated to gain elapsed time meter readings (ETM); evaluate the AFTO Form 95, Significant Historical Record, as a data source; and to determine which ancillary E/M equipments were being used with which systems in the field.

ETM readings were received on 11 generators and 4 Environmental Control Units (ECU). Due to the small number of responses, insufficient data were available to derive statistically significant operating time estimates that would be valid for the entire Air Force generator and ECU inventory. ETM readings for the A/E24U-8 are given for each EMU-30 and not for the entire unit. It was also learned that ETM readings on all the equipment surveyed may not be a good estimate of operating time due to unknown replacement times of ETM meters and poor recordkeeping on ETM readings.

It was hoped that access to the AFTO Form 95 would provide good failure information. The AFTO Form 95 remains with the equipment at all times providing a maintenance record unaffected by deployments, returns to depot or base changes. The survey revealed that out of 154 responses only 13 responses said that all equipment failures were recorded on the Form 95. The most common comment was that only TCTO changes and some major repairs were recorded. We concluded from the responses that the quality of the failure reporting on AFTO Form 95 not only varied greatly from unit to unit but also from individual to individual within the units. The result was that the AFTO Form 95 was considered unuseable for failure information.

Equipment usage was also established from the survey. The A/E24U-8 was the most widely used engine generator and the MD-4 was the most widely used power converter. The A/E24U-8 was used with 31 of the 52 C^3I equipments and the MD-4 was used with 24 of 52. The A/E32C-24 and A/E32C-25 air conditioners were the most widely used ECUs. They were each associated with 13 of the 52 C^3I equipments. The AN/TSC-60(V) utilized the greatest variety of electrical power generators and ECUs being identified with 7 different electrical power generators and 3 ECUs. The usage information was used primarly to help select the C^3I equipments to be studied.

The first survey was conducted concurrently with another survey (ref $^{\cdot}$ 43). One of the objectives of the other survey was to obtain operational profile data for AF ground tactical equipments. These data were provided by subjective estimates made by using personnel. Data were provided for the AN/TSC-60(V), AN/TSQ-91, AN/TSQ-92 and AN/TSQ-93 systems, and were used to develop operating time estimates for use during this study by the following equation:

Operating hours/year = [Number of days operating at home station/year) X (Number of hours operated/day) + <math>[Number of deployments/year) X (Number of days deployed/deployment) X 24 hours/day)

The operating hour estimates are provided in the following sections with the detailed analysis of the individual systems.

Survey Two: The second IITRI survey was conducted to gain failure experience data on the power generators, power converters and ECU equipments used with C^3I systems. Field experience data were received on 122 engine generators, 18 motor generators and 202 ECUs. The data from the survey were required because the power equipments were not included in the MDS reports, and only the A/E24U-8 power equipment was included in the ESRs.

The R/M numerics derived from this survey data are presented in the following section with the detailed analysis of the power generation, power conversion and ECU equipments.

The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (W-M-W) Non-parametric Rank Sum Hypothesis Test (ref 44) was run on the sample data for the A/E24U-8 to determine if it was reasonable to assume that the operating time samples from the two surveys came from the same population. A significance level of 0.05 was chosen for the accept-reject criteria. The test showed that there is no reason to believe that the averages of the two groups differ; therefore, it was concluded that the data were from the same population and that the equipment usage during the second survey could be assumed to be the same as the equipment usage during the first survey. The A/E24U-8 was chosen for the test since it was the only equipment that had a statistically significant sample available from both surveys. The results of the test are significant since the R/M of the ancillary equipment

which was derived from the second survey data will be compared with the R/M of the system, and the system R/M numerics were calculated using operating time derived from the first survey.

3.3 R/M Analysis

Two distinct methods were utilized to determine the reliability/maintainability (R/M) impact of ancillary electromechanical (E/M) equipments on the ${\rm C}^3{\rm I}$ systems which they support.

The first method that was utilized was to compare achieved R/M numerics of the E/M equipments with the specified equipment values to determine if the R/M is different from what was anticipated for the equipments. This method was utilized because it did not limit the number of E/M equipments to those that support the five systems selected for the study. A direct measure of the R/M impact of E/M equipments on C^3I systems can not be ascertained with this method, but it can give an indication that the impact is higher/lower than what was anticipated.

By necessity the analyses were restricted to making comparisons between inherent R/M numerics and field experience data. Since the inherent numerics consider only part failures and optimum repair conditions, and since the field experience data may or may not conform to these restrictions, a definite bias may exist where the achieved R/M numeric is always worse than the specified numeric. A second method of analysis was developed that would cancel out this bias. This second method measured the percent of achieved system failure rate, maintenance time, and maintenance actions associated with the ancillary E/M equipment and compared this percentage with what was called out as a requirement in the procurement specification or what was specified or demonstrated on similar type equipments during Initial Production Tests (IPT) (ref 3-18). The method required that specified and/or predicted R/M numerics be available. C³I systems for which some specified and/or predicted R/M numerics were available and for which field experience data were available are the AN/TSC-60(V), AN/TSQ-91, AN/TSQ-92 and AN/TSQ-93, and the E-3A. If an R/M numeric was not specified in either the procurement specification or in the IPT reports, the results of the IPT test were used. The use of test results or field experience on similar type equipments is an accepted method for obtaining R/M predictions when other data are not The rationale for using the IPT results was that all of the available.

equipments passed the IPT; therefore, the results were the best available prediction for the E/M equipments considered in this study.

It is important to note that a reference such as a specified or predicted numeric is not necessary to assess the impact that ancillary E/M equipments have on the achieved R/M of C^3I systems. They are necessary to assess whether the impact is different from what was anticipated during the conceptual and development phases of the system, and, therefore, whether they have an adverse effect on system R/M. The impact that the ancillary E/M equipments have on the R/M of C^3I systems then was measured as a percentage of the system R/M. The anticipated impact based on specified and/or predicted numerics can be used to judge whether the R/M of the E/M equipments had an adverse effect on C^3I system R/M.

There are many attributes currently utilized to measure the R/M effectiveness of ground tactical electromechanical equipments. The following attributes were chosen to measure the effectiveness of the equipments chosen for this study.

Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF). MTBF is a measure of life-length between unscheduled maintenance due to equipment failures. It is calculated by summing the total time and dividing by the number of failures that occurred during the time span. Two measures of MTBF were calculated. The first was calculated using calendar hours as the time base. Since ground tactical electromechanical equipments spend a large percentage of time (second survey estimate of 81% for ECUs) in the nonoperating state, it is better to use calendar hours than operating hours to measure the number of unscheduled maintenance actions due to failures that can be expected to occur during a given period of possession. The second MTBF calculation utilized operating hours as the time base. Since the equipment is usually operating during a mission, this measure gives an indication of the number of unscheduled maintenance actions due to failures that can be expected to occur during a mission, and, therefore, can be used to calculate a mission reliability. Also since reliability requirements, either reliability or MTBF, are stated as a function of operating time, this method of calculating MTBF must be used to measure the effectiveness of the equipment (during test or in the field) against the requirement.

Mean-Time-Between-Maintenance (MTBM). MTBM is a measure of life-length between unscheduled maintenance due to failures, induced malfunctions and no defect found states. It is calculated by summing the total time and dividing by the number of unscheduled maintenance actions. This measure of life-length gives a more realistic indication of field performance than does MTBF since induced malfunctions and equipment outages that can't be traced to a failed part routinely occur in the field. Two measures of MTBM, one based on calendar hours and one based on operating hours were calculated. The same rationale for utilizing the two measures that was used for MTBF applies for MTBM.

Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR). MTTR is a measure of the expected downtime due to unscheduled maintenance actions. MTTR usually includes only the time actually spent to restore the unit to an operating state and does not include time waiting for parts. MTTR is calculated by summing the actual repair times and dividing by the number of repair actions. MTTR is not a good measure of actual field downtime or manhours spent to repair since it does not include wait times nor is it a function of manhours; however, it is a good indication of active maintenance time required and it is used for both reliability and maintenance requirements and must be used to measure the effectiveness of the equipment (during test or in the field) against the requirement.

Mean Downtime (MDT). MDT is a measure of the expected downtime due to unscheduled maintenance actions. This measure includes both actual repair time and time spent waiting for parts. MDT is calculated by summing the total time the equipment is down due to repair and dividing by the number of unscheduled maintenance actions. MDT is a better measure of equipment outage than MTTR and, therefore, gives a better measure of long-term equipment availability.

Reliability (R). Reliability is a measure of the probability that the equipment will function successfully for a given period of time and given specified operating conditions. In other words it is a measure of the probability of mission success. It is a function of time and failure rate and is calculated by the following equation:

 $R(t) = e^{-\int \lambda dt}$

where e - is the symbol for the base of the napierian logarithm,

t - is the mission length, and λ - is the failure rate

Reliability is the numeric that is specified in many procurements and could be used to measure the effectiveness of the equipment (during test or the field) against the requirement. If, however, the failure rate is constant or assumed to be constant the reliability equation simplifies to:

$$R(t) = e^{-t/m}$$

where m - is the MTBF

Therefore MTBF can be used as a measure of reliability.

The constant failure rate assumption has been used for the electromechanical equipments considered in this study and it will be used to quantify the achieved reliability for comparison purposes.

Availability (A). Availability is a measure of the probability that the equipment will be available to perform its mission at any instant in time. It is specified in many procurements as a measure of maintenance. The method for calculating availability called out in ground tactical electromechanical equipment procurements is:

$$A_a = M/(M + R)$$

where A_a is the achieved availability, M is a measure of equipment uptime and R is a measure of equipment downtime. The attributes used to measure uptime and downtime vary from procurement to procurement. A second measure of availability that is not called out in procurements but for which data are recorded on some demonstration tests is the ratio of successful starts to attempts to start. These data were recorded on the second survey and are used as an alternate measure of availability.

A survey was initiated to gather data which could be used to develop estimates of operating times for the ancillary E/M equipments. This survey was conducted jointly with another IITRI project. These data were deemed necessary

since Air Force Maintenance Data System (MDS) field experience data were to be used to provide the R/M estimates and since the MDS does not report operating times. The survey form requested that personnel at selected Air Force units record operating time meter readings and the date of the reading for two points in time - when the unit was received at the Air Force base and the date the survey was completed. The data received were used to develop an average operate time/calendar year (ot/cy) for each equipment. A mean ot/cy for each equipment type was generated from these data. Since the survey was initiated prior to the final selection of equipments for the study, the survey results contain ot/cy's for additional E/M equipments. The mean and median ot/cy is given by equipment type in Table 3.3-1.

A second survey was instituted which provided a second estimate of ot/cy. This survey was sent to selected Air Force units with the request that they record operating time meter readings and the date of the reading for two points in time - start of the survey and end of the survey. The survey period was to run approximately ninety days. The respondents were requested to estimate the actual operating hours accrued during this period for those equipments that do not have operating time meters. A list of the units surveyed is given in Table 2.2.2-1. The mean ot/cy is given by equipment type in Table 3.3.1-2 and 3.3.1-5.

The operating time estimates obtained from a survey conducted during a previous IITRI study (ref 43) were used to obtain an estimate of operating time for the AN/TSC-60, AN/TSQ-91, AN/TSQ-92 and AN/TSQ-93 C^3I systems. These estimates of operating time/calendar year (ot/cy) are based on subjective estimates made by using personnel at selected Air Force (AF) and Air National Guard (ANG) units. The analyses of the data are presented along with the analyses of the systems in the following sections.

3.3.1 Ground Tactical Ancillary E/M Equipment Analyses

This section presents the analyses of the achieved R/M of ancillary E/M equipments against the specified and/or predicted R/M for the equipment. The purpose of the analyses was to obtain an estimate of the impact the ancillary E/M equipment might have on the ${\bf C}^3{\bf I}$ system they are supporting. For the purposes of

TABLE 3.3-1: SURVEY ONE E/M EQUIPMENT OPERATE TIME

EQUIPMENT	NO. OF READINGS	OPERATE MEAN HR/YR	TIME MEDIAN HR/YR
A/E24U-8	26	240.8	100.5
MB-15	15	136	81
MB-18	23	154. 2	121
EMU-12E	2	101	101
EMU-19	28	110	122.5
EMU-21	10	103.2	106.1
MEP-006A	11	170.5	155
MEP-016	4	28.3	16.7
MEP-026	2	184.6	184.6
MD-2	6	477.7	554.6
MD-4	14	1487.5	751.2
H-1 Heater	2	9.6	9.6
AE32C-18	1	1468.4	1468.4
AE32C-24	2	965.3	965.3
AE32C-26	1	982.3	982.3

this study an adverse impact is defined as an R/M numeric that did not satisfy the specified R/M numeric or was worse than the value generated during the Initial Production Tests (IPT). Selected achieved R/M numerics were analyzed from data acquired during the second survey and were compared with the specified R/M numerics for the equipments.

Data were also extracted from Initial Production Tests conducted by the U.S. Army at the Aberdeen Proving Ground (ref 2 to 18). These data were used as an estimate of the predicted R/M for the equipments being studied since many of E/M equipments only have one specified R/M numeric, and, since all of the equipments tested passed the R/M requirements of the Initial Production Tests it was felt that these data would be a good bench mark for comparison of the actual achieved One problem with the Initial Production Test (IPT) data was that the equipments are not identical to the E/M equipments surveyed in the field. resolve this problem, an average of the IPT data was used as the reference for Table 3.3.1-1 contains the IPT data for ECUs and Table 3.3.1-4 contains the IPT data for the power equipment. Table 3.3.1-2 contains a summary of the data collected on ECUs during the second survey. Table 3.3.1-5 contains a summary of the data collected on the power equipment during the second survey. Table 3.3.1-7 contains a summary of data collected for the power distribution equipment that was derived from the TAC BLIS and D056B5503 reports. specified MTBF and Endurance for the ECU equipment was obtained from MIL-A-38339D (ref 45). The specified R/M numerics for the power equipment was obtained from MIL-G-83380, MIL-M-4820E, MIL-M-4818D, MIL-G-26727D and MIL-G-52884 (ref 46 to 50). The comparsion data are shown in Table 3.3.1-3 for ECU equipments, Table 3.3.1-6 for power equipments and Table 3.3.1-8 for the power distribution equipment.

The allocated R/M numerics for the AN/TSQ power distribution networks were extracted from the AAA report (ref 32). The R/M numerics given for the power distribution networks in the reference were for the console, data processing, ancillary equipment and group display modules. No R/M numerics were given for the air conditioning, furnishings, operations or comm center module power distribution networks nor were there a provision for them in the reliability math model. The allocated R/M numerics given in Table 3.3.1-8 are based on the

TABLE 3.3.1-1: INITIAL PRODUCTION TEST R/M DATA FOR ECU EQUIPMENT

						REFEREN	ICE NUMBER					
ATTRIBUTE		10	5	7	3	4	2	6	14	15	16	TOTAL
NUMBER OF EQUIPMENTS	3	12	5	5	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	-
EAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES (HOURS)	l											
(POSSESSION HOURS, CHARGEABLE FAILURES)	ĺ											ľ
POINT ESTIMATE	6804	65088	728	26260	-	-	-	-	16416	-	-	1093
LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	2162	13717	491	5538	5746	9255	5866	8775	6350	1274	4520	783
UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	38278	12.7X10 ⁶	1126	512281		-	•	-	50058	-	-	1573
MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES (HOURS)	ļ)
(OPERATING HOURS, CHARGEABLE FAILURES)]											
POINT ESTIMATE	2262	7285	536	1926	-		-	-	1335	•	•	145
LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	719	1535	362	406	612	326	509	739	516	344	344	104
UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	12728	142008	829	37548	-	-		•	4883		•	206
SINGLE SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	850	1873	390	495	796	424	661	960	599	447	579	111
CHARGEABLE FAILURES	2	1	18	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	Z
NON-CHARGEABLE FAILURES	1 4	3	-	2	Ž	0	2	1 '	1	-	1)
SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE (CLOCK- HOURS/MAN-HOURS)	101.4 100.1		s -	3.2	13.2	a	0.2	. 0	-	-	0	132.9
UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE (CLOCK-	1											'''''
HOURS/MAM-HOURS)	7.5 9.2		-	6.3 9.3	4.2	0	2.7	5 41.2	•	-	0	62.0 66.6
MAINTENANCE ACTIONS	103	4	18	19	20	0	3	117	4	-	1	28
UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE ACTIONS	12	4	18	4	2	0	2	1	4	0	1	4
HEAN TIME TO REPAIR (CLOCK-HOURS)	0.6	2 3.0	52 -	1.5	B 2.10	0	1.3	18 -	-		0	2.4
MAINTENANCE RATIO (GLOCK-HOURS, OPERATING HOURS)	0.0	241 0.0	1020 -	0.0	049 -	0		-	-	_	0	0.005
POSSESSION HOURS	13608	65088	13104	26280	17208	27720	17568	26280	49248	3816	13536	27345
OPERATING HOURS	4525	7285	9651	1926	1834	978	1524	2214	4004	1030	1334	3630
AVAILABILITY	1											1
A (OPERATING HOURS)	0.9	997 0.5	9995 -	0.9	992 -		-	-	-	-	-	0.998
A _s	1 .	-	-			-	1.0	1000 -				1,000
NUMBER OF STARTUPS	-	-					111				-	11
FAILURES TO START		-				-	0	-	-	-	-	1
STOPPAGE FAILURES	1 -					-	2				•	l
TOTAL MAINTENANCE DOWNTIME (HOURS)	-	•	•	•	•	-	•	•	-	1.5	-	1.
REQUIREMENTS]											
RELIABILITY AT 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT (& = 24 HOURS)	0.9	5 0.9	5 -	0.95	0.95		-	0.95	-	-	-] .
AVAILABILITY	0.9	5 0.9	5 -	0.95	0.95	•	-	0.95	-	0.95	-	
ENDURANCE TIME (HOURS)	1500		-	-	-	300	500	•	-	-	-	١ .
MTBF (SPECIFIED) (HOURS)	1 .	-				-	-	-	960	960	960	1 .
MAINTENANCE RATIO	1 .	-	-	-	-		-	•	-	-	≤ 0.03	∤ .
SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE INTERVAL (MOURS)	1.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	•	<u>></u> 250	ļ

MOTES:

¹⁾ IF ONLY ONE ESTIMATE IS GIVEN, CLOCK-HOURS . MANHOURS.

ABLE 3.3.1-2: SECOND SURVEY R/M DATA FOR ECU EQUIPMENT

				A/E 32C-	-52					
ATRICAL	2	52	a	2	92	£	2	=	901	TOTALS
NUMBER OF AF UNITS	•	•	•		۳	.	~		-	11
NUMBER OF ECU'S	2	Q	2	2	7.	-	∞	-	-	202
MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURE (HOURS)										
(FOR POSSESSION HOURS)										
POINT ESTIMATE	6317	24750	19152	4992	2960		3878			2626
LOWER 905 CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	4724	10814	11965	1052	3020	793	1844	1146	833	7405
	8632	72527	99869	97310	13675		9844			11806
MEAN TINE BETWEEN FAILURE (MOURS)										
(FOR OPERATING MOURS)										
POINT ESTIMATE	1547	3285	3163	260	1891		713	•		1757
LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	1157	1435	1504	118	852	187	339		34	1400
	2114	9626	8028	10916	3857		1809	,	•	2232
SINGLE SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	1226	1641	1704	14	957	243	385		\$	1474
NUMBER OF FAILURES DURING										
STARTUP	~	0	-	•	-	0	·	0	٥	va
OPERATION	35	φ	•	~	~	٥	4	~	0	63
MEAN TIME TO REPAIR (CLOCK-HOURS)	3.77	1.50	8.14	4.00	5.90	•	2.0	2.00	٥	4.47
MEAN WAIT TIME (CLOCK-HOURS)	*197	×1338	1860	>1356	>949	٥	>426	~	•	>725
MEAN DOWN TIME (CLOCK-HOURS)	×201	>1340	×1868	>1360	>955	0	>428	-	۰	>730
NUMBER OF TIMES ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT										
SAUT-OFF	-	•	٥	0	-	•	0		۰	2
CONTINUED OPERATION	91	ĸ	80	~	s	•	4		•	45
AVERAGE SELTCHOVER TIME (HOURS)	1.83	0.43		9.0	o.		0.67		•	1.29
AVERAGE POSSESSION HOURS	2482	2475	2467	2496	2554	2376	2424	3432	2496	2484
AVERAGE OPERATE HOURS	80	328	310	280	720	260	446	,	102	472
MANBER OF FAILURES	33	4	ĸ	-	g	۰	S	0	•	35
ESTIMATED MUMBER OF STARTUPS	5373	1492	1871	2	840	2	444	_	12	10173
AVAILABILITY										
ψ"	0.9996					1.000		1.000	1.000	0.9995
₹*	0.9975	75 0.9995	95 0.9974	74 0.9929	9 0.9965	,	0.9972	, ~		0.9974
REQUIREMENTS:		;	:	į				,		
NTBF (MOUNS) MINIMUM SPECIFIED AT 90% CONFIDENCE	434	Ę	434	43	2	434	.	7 37		
EMDURANCE (HOURS)	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000		

TABLE 3.3.1-3: COMPARISON STANDAND FOR ECU EQUIPMENTS

		E	M1L-A-383390					374	A/F 12C.			
ATTRIBUTE	AVERAGE	REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENT	=	2	ຊ	2	52	28	12	8	TOTALS
MEAN TIME BETWEEN RATINGES (AWIDS)												
(OPERATING TIME, CHARGEABLE FAILURES)												
POINT ESTIMATE	1452	98										
LOWER 905 CONFIDENCE INTERVAL												
UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL	3											
SINCE SIDED SOS LINIT	2089		7.7									
MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (MOURS)	:		;									
(OPERATING TIME, ALL REPAIRS)												
POINT ESTIMATE	888			•	713	960	1547	3285	1681	3163	•	1757
LOWER 905 CONFIDENCE INTERVAL	683					-	:	:	•		;	
UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL	ğ			•	ñ	817	/GTT	1435	268	Š	66/	1400
LIMIT	1169			•	1809	10916	2114	9626	3857	8028	•	2232
SINGLE SIDED 908 LIMIT	719				385	7	1226	1641	957	1704	243	1474
MEAR TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (MOURS)											•	
(POSSESSION HOURS, ALL REPAIRS)												
POINT ESTIMATE	0299			•	3878	4992	6317	24750	986	25161	•	3535
LOWER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL	5141			1146	1844	1052	4774	1001	1020	11965	702	2406
UPPER SOS CONFIDENCE INTERVAL											3	3
HEAN SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE (CLOCK-					*	9/310	25	/252/	5/951	3800		11806
HQURS)	0.5											
MEAN TIME TO REPAIR (CLOCK-HOURS)	5.5			2.0	2.0	4.0	3.8	1.5	6.9	8 .1	•	4.5
MEAN DOWN TIME (CLOCK-HOURS)	•			•	×428	>1360	>201	×1340	▶955	×1868	•	>730
MIRIEMME RATIO	0.00	0.030		,	0.3918 0.0107	0.0107	0.0060	0.0060 0.0040	0.0071	0.0062	•	0.0061
A, (OPERATE TIME)	0.9983	56.0			0.0972 0.0920	0 6424	2000	0 9475 0 9495	2986	400		4604
A (START UP/OPERATION FAILURES)	1.0000			1.0000	0.9977 1.0000	1.0000	966	0.9996 1.0000	0.9988	0.9995	1.0000	0.9965
RELIABILITY AT 905 CONFIDENCE (t = 24 MMSS)		-										
(OPERATE TIME, CHARGEABLE FAILURES)	0.9786	0.95			0.9396 0.8465	0.8465	0.9846	0.9846 0.9927	0.9858	0.9924	0,906.0	0.9864
AVERAGE SHITCHOVER TIME (HOURS)	٠				0.67	0.50	 5	0.43	8.	•		1.29
PERCENT OF FAILURES WHERE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IND TO BE SAUTOFF BECAUSE	•			•	•	•	w	•	11	•	•	•
OF FAILURE					l		١			l		

TABLE 3.3.1-4: INITIAL PRODUCTION TEST R/M DATA FOR POWER EQUIPMENT

			REFERE	ICE NUMBER		
ATTRIBUTE	11	9	1	12	13	TOTALS
NUMBER OF EQUIPMENTS	5	2	3	4	3	17
MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES (HOURS)						
(POSSESSION HOURS, CHARGEABLE FAILURES)						
POINTS ESTIMATE	10080	6240	2664	5760	10152	6135
LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERNAL LIMIT	2124	1315	846	2228	2140	3400
UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERNAL LIMIT	196491	121637	14987	21073	197895	12332
MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES (HOURS)						
(OPERATING HOURS, CHARGEABLE FAILURES)						
POINT ESTIMATE	1938	1010	1500	667	1821	1221
LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERNAL LIMIT	408	213	476	258	384	677
UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERNAL LIMIT	37788	19688	8439	2439	35497	2454
SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT						752
NUMBER OF STARTUPS	245	134	-	-	- '	379
FAILURES TO START	2	0	-	-	•	2
STOPPAGE FAILURES	1	0	-	-	-	1
CHARGEABLE FAILURES	1	1	2	3	1	8
NONCHARGEABLE FAILURES	4	3	6	21	2	36
SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE (CLOCK/MAN HOURS)	11.5	26.7	-	21.4/30.	4 25.0	84.6/93.
UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE (CLOCK/MAN HOURS)	4.6	31.6/44.8	-	8.9/10.9	3.9	49/64.2
MAINTENANCE ACTIONS	45	143	-	46	<i>3</i> 5	269
UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE ACTION	10	7	-	16	3	36
MEAN TIME TO REPAIR (CLOCK HOURS)	1.15	4.51	-	0.56	1.30	1.36
MAINTENANCE RATIO (CLOCK-HOURS, OPERATING HOURS)	0.0083	0.0577	-	0.0152	0.0159	0.0137
POSSESSION HOURS	10080	6240	5328	17280	10152	49080
OPERATING HOURS	1938	1010	3000	2000	1821	9 769
AVAILABILITY						
A _S	0.9918	1.0000	-	-	-	0.9947
Aa (OPERATING HOURS)	0.9994	0.9956	-	0.9992	0.9993	0.9989
TOTAL DOWN TIME (CLOCK-HOURS)	-	417	-	-	-	417
REQUIREMENTS						
RELIABILITY AT 90% CONFIDENCE (t=24 HOURS)	0.95	0.90	-	-	0.95	-
AVAILABILITY	0.85	0.95	_	-	0.85	-
ENDURANCE TIME (HOURS)	500	500	1000	500*	500	•
MTBF (SPECIFIED) (HOURS)	_	-	450	500	•	

^{*} REDUCED FROM 5000 HOURS

TABLE 3.3.1-5: SECOND SURVEY R/M DATA FOR POWER EQUIPMENT

ATTRIBUTE	A/E 24U-81	MD-4	MD-2	MB-15	MEP005	MEP006	TOTALS
NUMBER OF AF UNITS	9	2	2	5	1	1	12
NUMBER OF GENERATORS	29	16	2	23	52	7	140
MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (HOURS)							
(FOR POSSESSED HOURS)							
POINT ESTIMATE	2145 (1)	3051	•	3094	9920	7848	2963
LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	1767 (1)	1952	801	2129	5027	2493	2539
UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	2626 (1)	2050	•	4668	22761	44152	3476
MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (HOURS)							
(FOR OPERATING HOURS)							
POINT ESTIMATE	167 (1)	1745	•	35.5	308	154	348
LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	138 (1)	1116	197	24.4	156	48.8	295
UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	205 (1)	2888	•	53.5	707	864	404
SINGLE-SIDED 90% LIMIT	144 (1)	1214	256	26.2	176	57.8	306
NUMBER OF STARTUPS	4201	36	112	599	354	93	5395
NUMBER OF FAILURES DURING							
STARTUP	27	,-4	0	12	1	0	4
OPERATION	47	14	0	œ	ĸ	2	,
MEAN TIME TO REPAIR (CLOCK-HOURS)	6.28 (1)	44.7		4.19	4.00	3.00	9.68
MEAN WAIT TIME (CLOCK-HOURS)	>207 (1)	>828		27.7	>981	>888	>366
MEAN DOWN TIME (CLOCK-HOURS)	>213 (1)	>873		>281	>985	>891	>376
AVERAGE SWITCHOVER TIME (HOURS)	0.10 (1)	0.68	,	0.15	0.05		0.25
AVERAGE POSSESSION HOURS	2370 (1)	2670	2556	2690	2381	2242	2455
AVERAGE OPERATE HOURS	92.5 (1)	1527	262	30.8	74.0	43.9	199/288 (2)
NUMBER OF FAILURES	74	14	0	50	9	8	116
AVAILABILITY = 1-(No. of STARTUP FAILURES/NUMBER OF STARTUPS)	0.9936	0.9722	1.0000	0.9800	0.9972	1.0000	0.9924

NOTES:

1)

FOR EACH EMU-30 134 EMJ's/67 - 8's

TABLE 3.3.1-6" COPPARISON STANDARD FOR POWER EQUIPMENTS

			# CF	RECEIPTION OF THE STATE								£.	ACHIEVER RIP		
	MIL-6-8330	30219-W-11H G	ML-M-42180	MIL-6-267278	HIL-6-52884/54	MIL-6-83380 MIL-M-4870E MIL-M-4P180 MIL-6-867279 MIL-6-52864/54 MIL-6-52864/84		£	A/E 240-8	į	? <u>.</u>	£	Si acini	ME PROF	TETALS
ATTRIBUTE	A/E 248-R	ě	2-38	£. 15	#\$00a.im	HE POORA	=== ==================================	Ì							
MEAN TIME METHEEN FAILURES (MONES)															
(OPENATING TIME, CHANGEABLE) POINT ESTIMATE*		600	4000	1001			005/05#	1221							
LONG'S SOC CONFIDENCE INTERVAL								633							
APPER NO CONTRENCE INTERNAL								7654							
HERITARY ACCEPTABLE	905	1000	1000		5 6	£		25							
SINGLE-SING WE CONTINUE															
MEAN TIME METHERS PRINTERSONCE (WESTER)															
(permater tife, At Revine)		Ę	6					æ	.9 1	1705		35.5	ž	2	ž
SOME SEC CONTINUENCE INTERNAL		}						2		411		,	2		ž
Chail .								£	É	1		\$3.5	, <u>e</u>	ž	ş
STABLE-STAED 907 CONTRENCE								E	ž	1/10	ž	~ *	3/1	u S	ž.
MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE															
(POCSESSION NOWS, ALL NEPAIPS)								*10	361	į		į		į	į
LONED NO. CONTINENCE INTERNAL			٠										ř i	į	
LIMIT DEPENDENCE TATERVAL								š,		Ē		<u>.</u>) i	į	
1111								25.21	484	190°		4665	13761	314	7
(CLOC) HOURS								• 6							
MEAN THE TO MENTIR (CLOCK		6.0	9.0	10				-	ç			~	•		· .
HERE BOTH 11ME (CLOCY HOURS)								•	:13	_		Œ.	¥	į,	÷
NEAD WAS ADDRESTED SEPARATIONS (MINURES)		9.0	-					- 6 - 10 - 10		. 0161		0,31.0		3.00	د نوید
ANALLADILITY							A 0,5		*	٥ ن		. 866 .	*	ů.	¥1.0 0
A (STARTUR / NUMBER 9 OF								į	*	ن ه.:	1 (101)	U MAGN	: 90 2	1 (1446)	
HELLIABILITY AT 992 CONTIDENTS							نه و/ بي اه ۱	į	1. Mark		10 to 12	0 4001	ن لا .: د	ن د و	ž.
ANT DATE SATTEMENT P THE CHOME.)									5			£ 15	į		ř.
															1

NATES 1) DEFERRAR MEDIANDERS MENT CPECIFIED FOR 144 1PT EQUIPMENTS.
2) TAG REFERRAL MEDIANDERS MENT CPECIFIED FOR 144 1PT EQUIPMENTS.

TABLE 3.3.1-7: ACHIEVED R/M DATA FOR POWER DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT

	0 001	1 (0/0	75C-60(V)-2	1SC-60(V)-3	TOTAL
ATTRIBUTE	TAC BLIS	15 05685503	005685503	005685503	TSC-60(V)
NUMBER OF EQUIPMENTS	12	58	25	15	130
MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE EVENTS (FOR POSSESSED HOURS) FOUINT ESTIMATE LOMEN 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE SIDEO 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	105120 22154 2049123	127020 55498 372220	49191 29441 92040	18771 9992 40000	54229 37659 80938
HEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE EVENTS (FOR OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 50% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	36739 7743 716164	38640 16882 113229	15189 8956 27999	5709 3039 12164	16496 11456 24621
MEAN TIME BETWEEN SYSTEM DOWNTIME (FOR OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT	39847			:	° °
MEAN TIME TO REPAIR (HOURS)	0.5	4.2	1.8	4	3.6
AVERAGE POSSESSION HOURS AVERAGE OPERATE HOURS MUMBER OF MAINTENANCE EVENTS MUMBER OF SYSTEM OUTAGES	8760 3061.6 1 0	8760 2664.8 4	8760 2664.8 10	8760 2664.8 7	8/60 2664.8 21

TABLE 3.3.1-7: ACHIEVED R/M DATA FOR POWER DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT (CONT'D)

ATTRIBUTE	15	180-91	150-92	150-93	TOTAL
	TAC BLIS	D05685503	005685503	005685503	S.
NUMBER OF EQUIPMENTS MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE EVENTS	rc.	16	ø	13	32
(FOR POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	8760 4165 22234	2748 2176 3517	92009	28470 12439 83428	5574 4453 7065
MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE EVENTS (FOR OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LONER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	4080 · 1940 10355	1280 1014 1638	8785	9798 · 4281 28711	2170 1734 2750
NEAN TIME BETWEEN SYSTEM DOWNTIME (FOR OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	22126				
HEAN TIME TO REPAIR (HOURS)	3.5	4.6	9	5.2	4.6
AVERAGE POSSESSION HOURS AVERAGE OPERATE HOURS HUMBER OF MAINTENANCE EVENTS NUMBER OF SYSTEM OUTAGES	8760 4080 5 0	8760 4504.3 51	8760 1350 0	8760 3014.7 4	8760 3410.3 55

TABLE 3.3.1-7: ACHIEVED R/M DATA FOR POWER DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT (CONT'D)

ATRIBUTE	TOTAL GROUND DOSGBS503	TOTAL GROUND TAC BLIS
NUMBER OF EQUIPMENTS NEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE EVENTS (FOR POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	165 19018 15714 23219	24820 12578 56948
MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE EVENTS (FOR OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	6129 5064 7482	9523 4826 21850
NEAN TIME BETWEEN SYSTEM DOWNTIME (FOR OPERATE HORRS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT		61972
MEAN TIME TO REPAIR (HOURS)	4.3	3.0
AVERAGE POSSESSION HOURS AVERAGE OPERATE HOURS MUMBER OF MAINTEMANCE EVENTS MUMBER OF SYSTEM OUTAGES	8760 2822.9 76	8760 3361.1 6

TABLE 3.3.1-8: COMPARISON STANDARD FOR POWER DISTRIBUTION

ATRIBUTE	AN/TSC-60(V)-1 ALLOCATED ACHTEVED	50(V)-1 ACHTEVED	AN/TSC-60(V)-2 ALLOCATED ACHTEVED	-60(V)-2 ACHIEVED	AN/TSC-60(V)-3 ALLOCATED ACHTEVED	O(V)-3 Achteved
MEAN TIME BETHEEN MAINTENANCE (HOURS) (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	73500	38640(3) 16882(3) 113229(3)	61616	15189 8956 27999	45327	5709 3039 12164
MEAN TIME TO REPAIR (HOURS)	0.2(1)	4.2(3)	0.2(1)	1.8(3)	0.2(1)	8.8
MCT (HOURS) Point Estimate Maximum acceptable						
AVAILABILITY (AN) (2)	0.99999	0.99989	0.99999	0.99988	0.99999	0.99916
MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (HOURS) (POSSESSED HOURS). POINT ESTIMATE LOW						

TABLE 3.3.1-8: COMPARISON STANDARD FOR POWER DISTRIBUTION (CONT'D)

ATTRIBUTE	AN/TSQ-91 ALLOCATED ACHIEVED	1-91 ACHTEVED	ALLOCATED ACHIEVED		AN/TSQ-93 ALLOCATED ACHIEVED
MEAN TIME BETHEEN MAINTENANCE (HOURS) (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE-SIOFO 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	6195(4)	1280(3) 1014(3) 1638(3)	85000(5)	8785	9798 4281 28711
MEAN TIME TO REPAIR (HOURS)					
MCT (HOURS) Point Estimate Maximum Acceptable	1.47	4.6	1.47 0		5.2
AVAILABILITY (AN) (2)	0.99976	0.99676	0.99998 1.0	0000.1	0.99947
MEAN TIME BETWEEN WAINTENANCE (HOURS) (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOM					

MOTES:

PREDICTED VALUE
CALCULATED FROM MTBF AND M ALLOCATIONS
D05685503 REPORT
BASED ON MAXIMUM CONFIGURATION SYSTEM
BASED ON TWO GROUP DISPLAY MODULES 2562

1434 m

assumption that the AN/TSQ systems are maximum configuration. This assumption is based on conversations with the Item Manager who indicated that the AN/TSQ inventory used for this study is for maximum configuration systems. The module quantity used to derive the allocated power distribution R/M numeric for the systems are:

<u>Module</u>	AN/TSQ-91	<u>System</u> AN/TSQ-92	AN/TSQ-93
Console	3		
Data Processing	i		
Ancillary Equipment	1		
Group Display	3	2	

As can be seen no allocated R/M numerics were given for the AN/TSQ-93 Power Distribution Network (PDN) and only one AN/TSQ-92 module type had an allocated R/M numeric for the PDN. No comparisons could be made for the AN/TSQ-93. The achieved results presented for the AN/TSQ-92 will be pessimistic since the allocated system numeric is optimistic. The Work Unit Codes (WUC) that were used to derive the achieved R/M numerics are:

AN/TSQ-91

WUC	MODULE	DESCRIPTION
ABAAO	AN/TSA-34 COMM CENTRAL ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SHELTER 1570650-100	POWER ENTRY BOX 1582268-1
ABABO	AN/TSA-34 COMM CENTRAL ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SHELTER 1570650-100	POWER CONTROL PANEL 1570802-100
ABACO	AN/TSA-34 COMM CENTRAL ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SHELTER 1570650-100	INTERNAL CABLING
ACAGO	OA-8446 OPERATIONS CENTRAL OJ-108 OPERATIONS CENTRAL CONSOLE	PANEL, POWER DISTR
ACDCO	ELEC EQUIP SHELTER	CABLESET, CONSOLE MODULE
ADAFO	OA-8447 OPERATIONS CENTRAL GROUP OJ-108 JPERATIONS CENTRAL CONSOLE	POWER DISTR PANEL

ADEAO	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SHELTER	INTERCONNECTING BOX 1582785-100
ADEBO	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SHELTER	INTERCONNECTING BOX 1582786-100
ADEDO	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SHELTER	INTERNAL CABLING
ADEEO	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SHELTER	POWER CONTROL ASSY
AERBO	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SHELTER	POWER CONTROL ASSY
AERAO	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SHELTER	INTERNAL CABLING
	AN/TSQ-92	
<u>wuc</u>	MODULE	DESCRIPTION
ABAAD	AN/TSA-34 COMM CENTRAL ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	POWER ENTRY BOX
ABABO	AN/TSA-34 COMM CENTRAL ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	POWER CONTROL PANEL
	AN/TSQ-93	
WUC	MODULE	DESCRIPTION
AAAAO	OA-8451 COMMUNICATIONS GROUP ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT SHELTER	PANEL, CONTROL
AAABO	OA-8451 COMMUNICATIONS GROUP ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT SHELTER	PANEL, DISTRIBUTION
AAACO	OA-8451 COMMUNICATIONS GROUP ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT SHELTER	POWER ENTRY BOX
ABABO	OA-8452 OPERATIONS CENTRAL GROUP ELECTRICAL EQUIP	POWER ENTRY BOX

The allocated R/M numerics for the AN/TSC-60(V) power distribution networks were extracted from references 29-31. The WUCs that were used to derive the achieved R/M numerics are: AABOO and ABBOO. Both of these WUCs are described as Power Distribution Installations. The same WUCs are used on the AN/TSC-60(V)-1, -2 and -3.

SHELTER

Confidence limits were calculated using the following equations:

Two-sided confidence interval

UL =
$$\frac{2T}{\chi^2_{2r}, 1-(1-P)/2}$$

LL =
$$\frac{2T}{\chi^2_{2r+2}}$$
, $(1-P)/2$

single-sided confidence limit

LL =
$$\frac{2T}{x_{2r+2}^2}$$

where X^2 = Chi-square

r = number of failures

P = confidence level

T = total time

Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR) was calculated by summing the individual active repair times (clock nours) for unscheduled maintenance actions and dividing by the total number of maintenance actions.

Mean Down Time (MDT) was calculated by summing the MTTR and the mean wait time.

The Maintenance Ratio (MR) for the IPT equipments was calculated by dividing the total active clock hours repair time by the total number of operating hours. The MR for the second survey equipment was calculated by summing the total time to repair (clock hours) with an average scheduled maintenance time derived from the IPT data and dividing by the total operate time for the equipment. The average was derived by the following equation:

Scheduled Maintenance Time (Hours) = [(Total Scheduled Maintenance Time (Clock-Hours) for IPT)/(Total Operate Hours For IPT)] X Total Operate Time for equipment

For example, the MR for the A/E32C-24 equals:

 $MR = (124.4/51072) + ((132.5 \times 51072)/(36305 \times 51072) = .0024 + .0036 = .0060$

As can be seen from the example the scheduled MR contribution for all of the equipments is 0.0036. This correction factor was required because scheduled maintenance times were not reported on the survey. Since the equipments included in the IPT are similar to the surveyed equipments, and since the equipments were kept on IPT for an average of 8.9 months, the IPT scheduled maintenance time should be a reasonable estimate of the scheduled maintenance for the surveyed equipments.

Availability was calculated by several different methods. The first method is a measure of inherent availability (Aa), that is, an estimate of the probability that an equipment will be up or down due to failures and active repair time. It is calculated by the equation:

 $A_{2} = MTBF/(MTBF + MTTR)$

The second method is a measure of the actual number of times an equipment failed to start or failed at startup. It is calculated by the equation:

$$A_S = 1 - (A/S)$$

- - S = total number of failures for ECUs or total number of attempts to start for power equipments

The third method is taken from the Equipment Status Reports (ESR) and is a measure of the equipments ability to perform its mission. This estimate was only obtained for the A/E24U-8.

Average switchover time is an estimate of the amount of time required to switch ECU or power generating equipments. It is important if a single equipment is providing power or air conditioning and redundant equipments are available, because it gives an estimate of downtime for the system. When combined with the percent of failures where the electrical equipment had to be shut off because of failure, it provides another estimate of system downtime and consequently availability.

3.3.1.1 ECU Equipment Results

The following ECU equipment-attributes satisfied the definition of an adverse impact:

EQUIPMENT	ATTRIBUTE
A/E32C-18	MTBM MTTR R
A/E32C-23	MTBM MTTR R
A/E32C-24	MTTR
A/E32C-26	MTTR
A/E32C-27	MTTR
A/E32C-39	MTBM R
ALL A/E32C	MTTR

As can be seen by the list, the major contributor is MTTR. Since the standard that the equipments were compared with was based on maintenance actions conducted by trained test personnel at a test facility, it is not surprising that the field numeric exceeded the standard. Of the ECU's that did not meet the MTBM, MTTR and R standard, one, the A/E32C-39, was data limited in that zero failures occurred and although the other two, A/E32C-18 and A/E32C-23, failed to meet the IPT standard, they did exceed the MIL-A-38839D requirement indicating that they would have passed a reliability demonstration test. The largest impact appears to be in the amount of time associated with waiting for parts (one month

"是一个人的,我们就是一个人的。"

average). There is no standard to judge this time against. It should be noted that only 4% of the failures resulted in the system having to be shut down. This result is significant in that it indicates that the ECU equipment functional MTBF is 47,672 hours.

3.3.1.2 Power Equipment Results

The following power equipment-attributes satisfied the definition of an adverse impact:

EQUIPMENT	ATTRIBUTE
A/E24U-8	MTBM MTTR R
MB-15	MTBM MTTR R A
MEP005	MTBM MTTR R
MEP006	MTBM MTTR R
MD-2	MTBM
MD-4	MTTR
ALL ENGINE GENERATORS	MTBM MTTR R
ALL MOTOR GENERATORS	MTTR
ALL POWER EQUIPMENT	MTBM MTTR

The major contributors for engine generators and power equipment in general are MTBM and MTTR. The major contributor for motor generators is MTTR. The average amount of time waiting for parts is 16 days (>376 hours). If this time were included in the availability calculation, none of the equipments would meet the

availability requirement. In fact, the wait time for the 4/E24U-8, MB-15, MEP005 and MEP005 is greater than the MTBM calculation; therefore, the calculated inherent availability would be less than zero.

3.3.1.3 Power Distribution Network (PDN) Results

The following PDN equipment-attributes satisfied the definition of an adverse impact:

EQUIPMENT	ATTRIBUTE
AN/TSC-60(V)-1	MTBM MTTR
AN/TSC-60(V)-2	MTBM MTTR
AN/TSC-60(V)-3	MTBM MTTR
AN/TSQ-91	MTBM MTTR
AN/TSQ-92	MTBM

All of the equipments failed to meet the standard for MTBM, and all of the equipments except the AN/TSQ-92 failed to meet the standard for MTTR. The AN/TSQ-92 MTBM result is pessimistic since it is limited by the fact that zero maintenance events occurred and since the allocated MTBM numeric is optimistic in that not all of the power distribution equipments were included in the allocation.

3.3.2 Ground Tactical C³I Systems

This section presents the analyses of the achieved R/M of ancillary E/M equipments as a percentage of the system R/M. The achieved Mean Time Between Maintenance Events (MTBME), Mean Maintenance Manhours To Repair (MMMR) and Availability (A_a) R/M numerics were analyzed from various field experience reports and the percent system R/M contribution of the ancillary E/M equipments was calculated. This percentage was then compared with the percentage

anticipated by the specified and/or predicted values. An adverse effect was defined as a higher achieved percentage than the percentage derived from the specified R/M numerics. The predicted value was used if the specified value was not available. The analyses are presented by system type in the following sections.

Field experience data were obtained from D056B5503, TAC BLIS and TAC ESR reports and the Second Survey. The D056B5503 and TAC BLIS reports are generated for a specific calendar period and contain maintenance actions and times to perform the maintenance actions. They do not contain the operating times accrued by the equipments during the period. Since specified MTBF, MTBM, MTBME and Aa numerics are based on operating time, and since the data for the power and ECU equipments were generated from an entirely different data source and covering a different calendar period, it was believed that more reliable comparsions could be made by utilizing achieved R/M numerics based on operating hours. The estimates of operating time were derived from information obtained from Survey One (ref 43) and equipment inventory data obtained from the Item Managers. The estimate was derived by calculating an average number of operating hours per calendar year from the reference 43 information and then multiplying this average by the inventory. The equipment inventories and information used to derive the average operating hour estimate is given in the following appropriate sections.

An estimate of achieved R/M was derived based on possessed hours. This estimate was used to gage the amount of maintenance activity and therefore the impact of failures and maintenance over a calendar period.

The specified, predicted and demonstrated MTBF, and the predicted and demonstrated MTTR and A_a were obtained from R/M Contract Data Requirement Submittals (CDR). In many cases specific R/M numerics were not available directly from the CDR reports and had to be calculated. In other cases the system level specified, predicted and demonstrated R/M numerics did not contain provisions for the power and ECU equipments; therefore, the R/M numerics had to be revised to include them. The method of calculation and assumptions made to derive the missing and revised R/M numerics are given in the appropriate section below.

It was assumed that the data given for the Electronic Equipment characteristics on the D056B5503 and TAC BLIS reports for both the AN/TSC-60(V) and AN/TSQ-XX systems was the difference between the total system data minus the power distribution and ECU data. The field experience data for the power equipments were not part of these reports.

The achieved R/M comparison numerics for the equipments were calculated as follows:

TAC BLIS

MTBM = Mean Time Between Maintenance Events (MTBME)

MTTR = (Total Maintenance Manhours)/(Total Maintenance Events)

Aa = MTBM/(MTBM + MTTR)

D05685503

MTBM = MTBME = (Total Operate Hours/Year)/(Total Events)

MTTR = MMMR = (Total Maintenance Manhours)/(Total Events)

Aa = MTBM/(MTBM + MTTR)

The Chi-square method was used to derive confidence intervals about the MTBM point estimate. The data from the second survey was used to derive the power equipment achieved R/M numerics that were used for the percentage calculation.

The achieved point estimate R/M numeric was used for the percentage calculations as statistically it is the best estimate. The Chi-square 60% confidence limit was utilized for those cases where zero maintenance events occurred. The 60% confidence limit was used because it is not as pessimistic as assuming one failure occurred (63% confidence limit). The predicted and demonstrated R/M numerics are given, if known. They were not used for the percentage calculation unless a specified value was not given. The order of precedence used for the percentage calculations was: (1) specified, (2) predicted and (3) demonstrated.

A high percentage of the D056B5503 maintenance events were classified as failures. This tends to contradict other sources that report that 23% of field maintenance actions are failures (ref 51) or 2-43% (ref 42). These D056B5503 data would tend to give a pessimistic value for the achieved R/M; however, for the purpose of this study we can assume that the biases apply uniformly to the electronic, ECU and power distribution equipments; therefore, the percentage of system maintenance attributed to the electronic, ECU and power distribution equipments would be the same as if no bias were present. The percent contribution due to power generation (conversion) equipment may be biased against power generation (conversion) equipment since the power generation (conversion) equipment R/M numerics were derived from data collected during the second survey and these data should contain less errors.

3.3.2.1 <u>AN/TSC-60(V) Analysis</u>

The current Air Force inventory was obtained from the Item Manager at SM-ALC on 9 February 1982. The inventory is the following:

EQUIPMENT	AIR FORCE	TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (TAC)
AN/TSC-60(V)-1 AN/TSC-60(V)-2 AN/TSC-60(V)-3	58 57 <u>15</u> *	12 0 <u>0</u>
TOTAL	130	12

^{*} Quantity is for OZ-11 10kw Transmitter

The information used to derive the average operating time is given in Table 3.3.2-1. Two averages were calculated. One for TAC units and one for all Air Force units. The TAC operating time estimate was derived from the four TAC units and was used to develop the R/M numerics for the field experience data given in the TAC BLIS report. The operating time estimate derived from all the Air Force units was used to develop the R/M numerics for the field experience data given in the D056B5503 reports since all Air Force units including Air National Guard provide data for this report.

TABLE 3.3.2-1: AN/TSC-60(V) OPERATING TIME INFORMATION

		PER EQUIPMENT	<u> </u>		TOTAL	IINTT
UNIT	HRS HOME	HRS DEPLOY	TOTAL HRS	#EQUIPM	TOTAL OF HRS	UNIT TYPE
5thTAIRGG	390	0	390	2	780	AF
1961COMMGP	2160	1228.8	3389	2 1	6778	AF
604DASS	360	1056	1416	1	1416	AF
239CCF/241ATCF	192		192	1	192	ANG
223CMBTCS	150	612	762	2	1524	ANG
224CMBTCS	700	1440	2140	1	2140	ANG
244CMBTCF	600	3360	3960	1	3960	ANG
263CMBTCS	90	96	186	1	186	ANG
229TCS	2160	360	2520	3	7560	ANG
222CMBTCS	24	2880	2904	1 3 2 1	5808	ANG
264CMBTCS		960	960	1	960	ANG
261CMBTCS	600	1440	2040	1	2040	ANG
103TCS	600	576	1176	3 1	3528	ANG
265CMBTCS	200	360	560		560	ANG
226CMBTCS	1200	1296	2496	4	9984	ANG
111CEMSQ	1600	1188	2788	1	2788	ANG
267CMBTCS	240		240	4	960	ANG
105TCS	720	396	1116	3 3	3348	ANG
1CMBTCS	800	4320	5120	3	15360	AF
603TCS	5840	1680	7520	6 3 2	45720	AF
101TCS		432	432	3	1296	ANG
256CMBTCS	256	2160	2416	2	4832	ANG
606TCS	3960	1728	5688	4	22752	AF
727TCS	800	2160	2960	2	5920	AF TAC
3RDCMBTCG	1000	1608	2608	6	15648	AF
507TACCS		2664	2664	4	10656	AF TAC
682ASOC	960	1848	2808	1	2808	AF TAC
105CEM	400	1080	1480	1	1480	ANG
107TCS	1620	1080	2700	3	8100	ANG
244CMBTCS	360	1440	1800	1 2 2 3	1800	ANG
234CMBTCS	600	1188	1788	2	3576	ANG
621TCS	160	0	160	2	320	AF
728TCS	2400	1344	3744	3	11232	AF TAC
2CMBTCG	1440	2268	3708	4	14832	AF
217CMBTCS	160	306	466	2	932	ANG
				83	221176	

Figure 3.3.2-1 gives a simplified reliability block diagram (RBD) and reliability math model (RMM) for the AN/TSC-60(V) equipments. The diagrams and models depict a logistics configuration wherein it is assumed that if any unit fails the system fails. The term "logistics" comes from the fact that the model can be used to derive a good estimate of the number of maintenance actions that will be required. A functional RBD and RMM includes redundancy and can be used to derive a good estimate of mission reliability. The Collins R/M reports (ref 28 - 30) contain functional RMM and RBDs for the AN/TSC-60(V) equipments. The logistics R/M numerics were used for this study because the data available from the field maintenance reports could be used to generate reasonably accurate comparisons for logistics R/M numerics, but could not be relied upon to provide information on system mission capability. Any mission capability data collected during the study are discussed in the appropriate section.


References 28 - 30 did not provide specified, predicted or demonstrated Mean-Time-To-Repair estimates for the AN/TSC-60(V) electronic equipment. The estimate used in the analyses was a pseudo predicted value that was derived as a weighted average of the individual equipments by the following equation:

MTTR (Electronic System) =
$$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} ((Failure \ rate)_{j} \ X \ MTTR_{j})}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} (Failure \ rate)_{j}}$$

References 28 - 30 did not provide a specified or allocated MTBF value for the power distribution network (PDN). The allocated estimate used in the analysis was derived by the following equation:


MTBF(PDN, ALLOCATED) =
$$\frac{MTBF (Systems, Specified)}{MTBF (System, Predicted)} \times MTBF (PDN, Predicted)$$

The power distribution network for the AN/TSC-60(V) equipments is defined as WUCs AABOO and ABBOO.




See Note 1

Reliability Math Model: $R_S = R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4$ TSC-60(V)-1



Reliability Math Model: $R_S = R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4$ TSC-60(V)-2



Reliability Math Model: $R_S = R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4$ TSC-60(V)-3

Note 1 - The TSC-60(V) Power Distribution System is included in the Power Distribution Block and excluded from the TSC-60(V) block.

FIGURE 3.3.2-1: RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAMS AND MATH MODELS OF TSC-60(V)-1,2,3

The RBD, RMM and R/M numerics given in references 28 - 30 did not provide for power and ECU equipments as part of the AN/TSC-60(V) systems. The specified and predicted MTBF numerics provided in the reference were revised so that they reflected the incorporation of the power and ECU equipment by the following equation:

The specified MTTR estimate for the AN/TSC-60(V) systems were revised so that they reflected the incorporation of the power and ECU equipment. The estimate was derived as a weighted average of the power, ECU and electronics by the following equation:

MTTR (System) =
$$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} ((Failure rate)_{j} \times MTTR_{j})}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} (Failure rate)_{j}}$$

The specified MTBFand MTTR estimates for the power and ECU equipments were obtained from the equipment specification if the numeric was called out in the specification or from data extracted from the Initial Production Test (IPT) reports (ref 2-18). The AN/TSC-60(V) system operates with two different types of power equipment - power generation or power conversion. The specified MTBF, MTTR and A_a system level estimates were revised utilizing both types of power. The power and ECU equipment R/M numerics are averages of the types used with the system, and were obtained by calculating the R/M numerics from the data obtained during the second survey. The AN/TSC-60(V) utilizes the A/E32C-24, -25 and -27 ECUs; the EMU-21, -22, A/E24U-8, MB-15, MEP005 and MEP006 power generation units;

and the MD-4 power conversion unit. The ECU and power R/M numerics for the equipments used with the AN/TSC-60(V) equipments are:

			R/M NUMERIC					
EQUIPMENT	TYPE	QTY	MTBF		M	TTR		<u>م</u> م
			SPECIFIED	ACHIEVED	SPECIFIED	ACHIEVED	SPECIFIED	ACHIEVED
ECU	ALL	202	434	1757	2.5(1)	4.5	0.95	0.9974
Power	MB-15	23	1000	35.5	2.0	4.2		0.8942
Generator	MEPO05	25	335	308		4.0		0.9872
	MEPO06	7	250	154		3.0		0.9809
	EMU-30	134	500	167		6.3		0.9636
	TOTAL	189	530	88.8	2.0	5.7	0.90(2)	0.9397
Power Conversion	MD-4		4000	1745	0.5	44.7	0.90(2)	0.9750

NOTES:

From results of IPT tests. A predicted value based on similar equipment.
 Average from IPT requirements

3.3.2.2 AN/TSC-60(V)-1 Analysis

The field experience data summarized from the TAC BLIS report is given below. These data cover the twelve month calendar period August 1980 to August 1981 for twelve AN/TSC-60(V)-1 systems.

CHARACTERISTIC	SYSTEM	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	POWER DISTRIBUTION	ECU
Total Maintenance Events Total Maintenance Actions Maintenance Events with	134 279 6	130 273 6	1 1 0	3 5 0
System Downtime Total Maintenance Manhours Maintenance Manhours with System Down time	1624.1 182.3	1613.6 182.3	0.5 0	10.0
Average Operate hours/year Total operate hours/year Mean Time Between Maintenance Events (MTBME)	3061.6 36739.2 274	3061.6 36739.2 283	3061.6 36739.2 36739	3061.6 36739.2 12246
(Hours) Mean Time Between System Downtime	6123.2	6123.2		

As can be seen by the data presented above, there is an average of over two maintenance actions for each maintenance event. This is one reason why it is imperative that maintenance events be identified and used to assess the achieved R/M rather than the number of maintenance actions. It can also be seen that only 4.4% of the maintenance events resulted in system downtime; therefore, MTBME should not be used to assess the achieved mission reliability unless the events can be further qualified to determine if system downtime resulted from the event. The power distribution and ECU equipment did not cause any system downtime during this reporting period.

The field experience data summarized from the D056B5503 report was given below. This data covers a twelve month reporting period for fifty-eight (58) AN/TSC-60(V)-1 equipments.

CHARACTERISTIC	SYSTEM	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	POWER DISTRIBUTION	ECU
FAILURES	1302	1255	4	43
OTHER MALFUNCTIONS	37	35	Ó	2
NO DEFECT	0	0	Ŏ	Ō
TOTAL EVENTS	1399	1290	4	45
MAINTENANCE MAN HOURS	7371.6	7094.5	16.6	260.5
AVERAGE OPHRS/YEAR	2664.8	2664.8	2664.8	2664.8
TOTAL OPERATE HOURS	154558	154558	154558	154558
TOTAL POSSESSION HOURS	508080	508080	508080	508080

As can be seen by the data presented above 93% of field maintenance actions are classifed as failures.

The data used for the percentage calculations are presented in Table 3.3.2-2.

TABLE 3.3.2-2: AN/TSC-60(V)-1 R/M MIMERICS

TABLE 3.3.2-2: AN/TSC-50(V)-1 R/M MPRETICS (CONT-D)

EQUIPMENT	ATTRIBUTE	PECIFIED PREDI	SPECIFIED PREDICTED DEMONSTRATIOM 2ND SURVEY TAC BLIS	OM ZND SURVEY	TAC BLIS	005685503	S S	MOTES
POWER - DISTRI-BUTION	MTBH (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	73500 90300	213 532		36739 7743 716164 9444	38640 16882 113230 19332		~
	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT				105120 22154 2049123 27023	127020 55498 372220 63550		
	MTTR (CLOCK-HOURS) (HAN HOURS)	0.5			0.5	4.2		
	AVAILABILITY (Aa)	0.9999	£		0.9999	0.9999		
ECU	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	434	885 682 1169 719 532	1757 1400 223? 1474	12246 4737 44804 5500	3435 2679 4472 2816		۰ مامام
	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT		6670 5141 8803	9292 7405 11806	35040 13555 128195 15736	11291 8806 14701 9258		~~~~
	ITTR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAN HOURS)	0.5	2.5	5.4	3.3	5.8		~
	AVAILABILITY (Aa)		0.9972	0.9974	0.9997	0.9983		

TABLE 3.3.2-2: AN/TSC-60(V)-1 R/M NUMERICS (CONT'D)

EQUIPMENT ATTRIBUTE	GEEMRATION POINT ESTIMATE LONER 90% CONF UPPER 90% CONF STINSLE-SIDED 99 STINSLE-SIDED 99 STINSLE-SIDED 99	MTBM (POSSESSED HE POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% COWFIC UPPER 90% COWFIC SINGLE-SIDED 90%	MTTR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAN HOURS)	AVAILABILITY (Aa)	CONVERSION POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIL UPPER 90% CONFIL UPPER 90% CONFIL	MTBM (POSSESSED I POINT ESTIBATE LOWER 90% COMF UPPER 90% COMF SINGLE-SIDED 99	MTTR (CLOCK-HOURS)	1-4/ 21: 1144 11474
BUTE	MTBH (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDEO 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDEO 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	BM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT	CK-HOURS) Hours)	ITY (Aa)	BM (OPERATE MOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	CLOCK-HOURS)	147 AF1
SPECIFIED PREDICTED	230		2.0	0.9962	4000/400		0.5 1.0	
DEMONSTRATION	1221/222 677/182 2454/290 752/173	6135 3400 12332	1.4	0.9989	1221/222 677/182 2454/290 752/173	6135 3400 12332	1.4 1.8	
SPECIFIED PREDICTED DEMONSTRATION 2ND SURVEY TAC BLIS	88.8 75.4 105 78.0	2901 2461 3441 2546	5.7	0.9397	1754 1116 2886 1214	3051 1952 5050 2122	44.7	
005685503								
ESR NOTES	2, 8, 6, 8, 8	~~~	~~	0.971 2, 16	2, 6, 7, 8 2, 8 2, 8 2, 8	~~~	~ ~	•

TABLE 3.3.2-2: AN/TSC-60(V)-1 R/M MIPERICS (CONT'D)

SPECIFIED PREDICTED DEMONSTRATION 2ND SURVEY TAC BLIS

MOTES

3

005685503

MOTES:

ATTRIBUTE

EQUIPMENT

SPECIFIED IS AM AULOCATED MUMERIC
DEMONSTRATED IS AM AVERAGE FROM 197 EQUIPMENTS
DEMONSTRATED IS AM AVERAGE FROM 197 EQUIPMENTS
SPECIFIED IS AM EGHTED AVERAGE
SPECIFIED IS AM EGHTED AVERAGE
SPECIFIED IS AM EGHTED AVERAGE
SPECIFIED IS MISCOND AVERAGE FROM 197 EQUIPMENTS BASED ON CHARGEABLE FAILURES/ALL MALFUNCTIONS
SPECIFIED IS MISCOND AVENDATION FOR THE SEPARATE EQUIPMENTS. NO SYSTEM LEVEL TEST DATA MERE AVAILABLE.
SPECIFIED IS MISCOND AVENDATION FOR ALL EXCEPT POWER. POWER IS BASED ON SECOND SURVEY
ACHIEVED TO BE SYSTEM WITH POWER GÜNERATION/POWERS CONVERSION
ACHIEVED IS BASED ON DEMONSTRATED HENCE CONVERSION
ACHIEVED IS BASED ON DEMONSTRATED HENCEPT POWER. POWER IS BASED ON SECOND SURVEY
ACHIEVED IS BASED ON DEMONSTRATED HENCEPT POWER. SALL EXCEPT POWERS ON SECOND SURVEY
ACHIEVED IS FOR SYSTEM WITH POWER GÜNERATE FROM ESR REPORT FOR ALL AM/TSC-60(Y)
SPECIFIED AVAILABLITY IS AN AVAILABLITY FOR A/ESAU-8 FROM TAC ESR
SPECIFIED AMD ACHIEVED AVAILABLITY FOR A/FSC-60(Y) EQUIPMENTS

The second second

71

3.3.2.3 AN/TSC-60(V)-1 Results

The percent specified (predicted) and achieved MTBF, MTTR and A_a contribution of the power, ECU, power distribution and electronic equipments to the AN/TSC-60(V)-1 system is given below for the three report types:

TAC BLIS REPORT

EQUIPMENT	MTB	F (1)	PERCENT CONTRIBUTION MTTR (2)			Aa	
LQOTT MEM			PREDICTED	ACHIEVED	PREDICTE	ACHIEVED	
WITH POWER GENERATION							
ELECTRONICS	40.3	23.7	15.0	40.4	14.9	40.7	
POWER DISTRIBUTION	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	
ECU	32.7	0.5	60.3	0.3	59.5	0.3	
POWER GENERATION	26.8	75.6	24.6	59.2	23.4	58.9	
WITH POWER CONVERSION							
ELECTRONICS	52.6	83.8	15.0	62.9	14.9	62.5	
POWER DISTRIBUTION	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	
ECU	42.6	1.9	60.3	0.4	59.5	0.5	
POWER CONVERSION	4.6	13.6	24.6	36.6	23.4	36.9	

Notes: 1) Achieved is MTBME 2) Achieved is MMMR

D056B5503 REPORT

EQUIPMENT	MTB		MTTR		ON A. PREDICTED	ACHIEVED
WITH POWER GENERATION ELECTRONICS POWER DISTRIBUTION ECU POWER GENERATION	38.8 0.2 31.6 29.4	41.8 0.1 1.5 56.6	15.0 0.1 60.3 24.6	41.1 0.1 1.5 57.3	14.9 0.2 59.5 23.4	41.2 0.1 1.6 57.1
WITH POWER CONVERSION ELECTRONICS POWER DISTRIBUTION ECU POWER CONVERSION	52.6 0.2 42.6 4.6	90.5 0.3 3.1 6.2	15.0 0.1 60.3 24.6	62.7 0.1 2.3 34.9	14.9 0.2 59.5 23.4	62.3 0.1 2.4 35.2

Notes: 1) Achieved is MTBME 2) Achieved is MMMR The results indicate the ECU and power distribution equipments do not have an adverse impact on the system R/M. The power generation and power conversion equipments do have an adverse impact. These results were obtained from both the TAC BLIS and the D056B5503 reports. Since none of the ECU or power distribution equipment failures resulted in system downtime, the failures had no impact on the system functional reliability.

ESR REPORT (AVAILABILITY)

	SPECIFIED	TAC STANDARD	ACHIEVED
TSC-60(V)	0.839	0.92	0.842

3.3.2.4 AN/TSC-60(V)-2 Analysis

The field experience data summarized from the D056B5503 report are given below. This data covers a twelve month reporting period for fifty-seven (57) AN/TSC-60(V)-2 equipments.

CHARACTERISTIC	SYSTEM	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	POWER DISTRIBUTION	ECU
FAILURES OTHER MALFUNCTIONS NO DEFECT TOTAL EVENTS MAINTENANCE MAN HOURS AVERAGE OPHRS/YEAR TOTAL OPERATE HOURS TOTAL POSSESSION HOURS	653	624	10	19
	38	37	0	1
	0	0	0	0
	691	661	10	20
	3406.8	3306.8	17.9	82.1
	2664.8	2664.8	2664.8	2664.8
	151894	151894	151894	151894
	499320	499320	499320	499320

As can be seen by the data presented above 94.5% of field maintenance actions are failures.

The AN/TSC-60(V)-2 field experience data used for the percentage calculations are presented in Table 3.3.2-3. The specified, predicted and demonstrated R/M numerics for the power equipment are presented in Table 3.3.2-2.

TABLE 3.3.2-3: AN/TSC-60(V)-2 R/M NUMERICS

s	6, 7, 8, 9			7, 8, 9, 10, 11,				
MOTES	န္တွတ္တွင္ ကိုလာတစ	တတ <i>ာ</i> ထော်ထံထံ	6,7	6, 7,	1, 6			
ESR				37 0.842				
005685503	63.3/195 54.9/171 72.8/220 56.5/176	578/584 523/496 637/677 535/513	5.5/9.3	0.9191/0.9537 0.842	230 215 2 45 218	755 708 806 718	5.0	0.9787
DEMONSTRATION	278		1.2	0.9958	609 128 11871 157		0.2	0.9997
PREDICTED	232		1.1	0.9953	427		0.3	0.9993
SPECIFIED	131/166			0.839	291			
AFTRIBUTE	MTBM (QPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTHATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTINATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED	MTTR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAN HOURS)	AVAILABILITY (Aa)	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTINATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MITR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAN HOURS)	AVAILABILITY (As)
EQUIPMENT	SYSTEM				ELECTRONICS			

TABLE 3.3.2-3: AN/TSC-60(V)-2 R/M NUMERICS (CONT'D)

EQUIPMENT	ATTRIBUTE	SPECIFIED	PREDICTED	DEMONSTRATION	005685503	ESR	MOTES
POMER DISTRI- BUTION	M. AM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT	61616	90300	264 660	15189 8956 27999 9863		1, 5
	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMALE—SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT SIMALE—SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT				49932 29441 92041 32423		
	MTTR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAN HOURS)		0.2		1.8		
	AVAILABILITY (Aa)		0.9999		0.9999		
ECU	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTHATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	434		885 682 1169 719	7595 5227 11459 5616		ร เการ์ก
	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMSLE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT SIMSLE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT			6670 5141 8803	24966 17182 37670 18463		0000
	MTR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAN HOURS)			2.5	4.1		2
	AVA11.AB11.TY (Aa)			0.9972	0.9975		

TABLE 3.3.2-3: AN/TSC-60(V)-2 R/H MUMERICS (CONT'D)

	E. Ectronics and Power
MOTES	IVATLABLE THE ELI
ESR	TA MERE A
005685503	LEVEL TEST DA PREDICTEO MUM MD SURVEY
PREDICTED DEMONSTRATION DOSGBS503	IFIED NUMERICS RNTS. NO SYSTEM EQUIPMENTS AND F IS BASED ON SECO
PREDICTED	DWERSION SPEC: PARATE EQUIPME CU AND POWER RSION POWER. TORRALL ANTI
SPECIFIED	INTS CU & POMER CC CS FOR THE SE CS FOR THE E M/POMER CONVE R ALL EXCEPT ROM ESR REPORE
ATRIBUTE	SPECIFIED IS AM ALLOCATED MUMERIC DEMONSTRATED IS AM ALLOCATED MUMERIC DEMONSTRATED IS AM AVERAGE FROM IPT EQUIPMENTS SPECIFIED IS A WEGINED SPECIFIED INCLUDES SEU & POWER GENERATION/ECU & POWER CONVERSION SPECIFIED NUMERICS SPECIFIED INCLUDES SEU & POWER GENERATION/ECU & POWER CONVERSION SPECIFIED INCLUDES SEU & POWER GENERATION/ECU & POWER SEVENTIAL SPECIFIED IS WITH DEMONSTRATE IS BASED ON DEMONSTRATED MUMERICS FOR THE ECU AND POWER EQUIPMENTS AND PREDICTED INMERICS FOR THE ELECTRONICS AND POWER PREDICTED IS BASED ON DEMONSTRATED MUMERICS FOR THE ELECTRONICS AND POWER ACHIEVED DOSSESSOR IS RASED ON DOSSESSOR FOR ALL EXCEPT POWER. POWER IS BASED ON SECOND SURVEY ACHIEVED FOR SECOND SHALMBILITY IS TAC REQUIREMENT FROM ESR REPORT FOR ALL MAYISC-SO(V)
EQUIPMENT MOTES:	1000 1000 1000 100 100 100 100 100 100

3.3.2.5 AN/TSC-60(V)-2 Results

The percent specified (predicted) and achieved MTBF, MTTR and A_a contribution of the power, ECU, power distribution and electronic equipments to the AN/TSC-60(V)-2 system is given below:

D056B5503 REPORT

EQUIPMENT	MTBI SPECIFIED		PERCENT CO MTTR PREDICTED	(2)		A _a D ACHIEVED
WITH POWER GENERATION ELECTRONICS POWER DISTRIBUTION ECU POWER GENERATION	45.0 0.2 30.2 24.6	27.5 0.4 0.8 71.3	14.8 0.1 59.8 24.3	25.2 0.1 0.6 74.1	14.9 2.1 59.6 23.4	25.5 0.1 0.6 73.8
WITH POWER CONVERSION ELECTRONICS POWER DISTRIBUTION ECU POWER CONVERSION	57.3 0.3 38.2 4.2	85.0 1.3 2.6 1.1	14.8 0.1 59.8 24.3	45.5 0.1 1.1 53.3	14.9 2.1 59.6 33.4	45.4 0.2 1.0 53.4

Notes: 1) Achieved is MTBME

2) Achieved is MMMR

The results indicate that the ECU and power distribution equipments do not have an adverse impact on the system R/M. The power generation and power conversion equipments do have an adverse impact.

3.3.2.6 <u>AN/TSC-60(V)-3 Analysis</u>

The field experience data summarized from the D056B5503 report are given below. This data covers a twelve month reporting period for fifteen (15) AN/TSC-60(V)-3 equipments.

CHARACTERISTIC	SYSTEM	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	POWER DISTRIBUTION	ECU
FAILURES OTHER MALFUNCTIONS NO DEFECT TOTAL EVENTS MAINTENANCE MAN HOURS AVERAGE OPHRS/YEAR TOTAL OPERATE HOURS TOTAL POSSESSION HOURS	369	349	7	13
	25	24	0	1
	0	0	0	0
	394	373	7	14
	2389	2261	33.9	94.1
	2664.8	2664.8	2664.8	26 6 4.8
	39960	39960	39960	39960
	131400	131400	131400	131400

As can be seen by the data presented above 93.6% of field maintenance actions are failures.

The AN/TSC-60(V)-3 field experience data used for the percentage calculations are presented in Table 3.3.2-4. The specified, predicted and demonstrated R/M numerics for the power equipment are presented in Table 3.3.2-2.

TABLE 3.3.2-4: AN/TSC-60(V)-3 R/M NUMERICS

EQUIPMENT	ATTRIBUTE	SPECIFIED	PREDICTED	DEMONSTRATION	DO5685503 ESR	NOTES
SYSTEM	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE	157/212	246	223	47.3/95.8	4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
	LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT				41.1/83.7 54.4/109 42.3/86	တာ တာ တာ ထို ထို ထိ
	MTBM (POSSESSED MOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED				299/300 265/258 335/346 272/266	တတ ထိထိထိ
	MTTR (CLOCK-HOURS)		1.1	1.0	5.9/8.2	6, 9 9, 9
	AVAILABILITY (Aa)	0.839	0.9954	0.9956	0.8862/0.9195 0.842	6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
ELECTROMICS	POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	465	479	158 395	107 98.3 117 100	1, 6
	MTBN (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT				352 323 384 329	
	MTTR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAN HOURS)		0.3	0.2	6.1	
	AVAILÁBILITY (Aa)	0.9994	0.9995	0.9461		

TABLE 3.3.2-4: AN/TSC-60(V)-3 R/M NUMERICS (CONT'D)

EQUIPMENT	ATRIBUTE	SPECIFIED	PREDICTED	DEMONSTRATION	005685503	ESR	MOTES
POMER 015'K 1 - BUTION	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	45327	46707	158 395	5709 3039 12164 3395		1, 5
	MTBM (PUSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTHATE LOMEN 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT				18771 9992 400′.0 11164		
	MITR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAM HOURS)		0.2		4.8		
	AVAILABILITY (Aa)		0.9999		0.99992		
ECU	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMBLE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT SIMBLE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT	434		885 682 1169 719	2854 1826 4723 1985		ง เกษากลุ่ม
	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTINATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT			6670 5141 8803	9386 6004 15532 6528		0000
	MTTR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAN HOURS)			2.5	6.7		~
	AVAILABILITY (As)			0.9972	9.9976		

TABLE 3.3.2-4: AN/TSC-60(V)-3 R/M NUMERICS (COMT'D)

MOTES

£3

SPECIFIED IS AM ALLOCATED MUMERIC
DEMONSTRAILED IS AM ANERAGE FROM 19T EQUIPMENTS
DEMONSTRAILED IS AM ANERAGE FROM 19T EQUIPMENTS
SPECIFIED IS A WHIGHTED AVERAGE
SPECIFIED INCLUDES ECU & POWER GEWERATIOM/ECU & POWER CONVERSION SPECIFIED INCLUDES ECU & POWER GEWERATIOM/ECU & POWER CONVERSION NUMERICS FOR THE ELECTROMICS AND POWER
SPECIFIED IS MITED
DEMONSTRAILE SASSED ON DEMONSTRAITED NUMERICS FOR THE ECU AND POWER EQUIPMENTS AND PREDICTED NUMERICS FOR THE ELECTROMICS AND POWER
DISTRIBUTION
ACHIEVED IS FOR SYSTEM WITH POWER GEMERATIOM/POWER CONVERSION
ACHIEVED DOGGESSES IS BASED ON DOGGESSO FOR ALL EXCEPT POWER. POWER IS BASED ON SECOND SURVEY
ACHIEVED ESR IS FOR ALL TAC REQUIREMENT FROM ESR REPORT FOR ALL AN/TSC-60(V)
ACHIEVED ESR IS FOR ALL TAC AN/TSC-60(V) EQUIPMENTS DEMONSTRATION 005685503 PREDICTED SPECIFIED TUMARON BAGE EQUIPMENT

3.3.2.7 AN/TSC-60(V)-3 Results

The percent specified (predicted) and achieved MTBF, MTTR and A_a contribution of the power, ECU, power distribution and electronic equipments to the AN/TSC-60(V)-3 system is given below:

D056B5503 REPORT

		- /41		ONTRIBUTIO	_	
EQUIPMENT	MTB	F (1)	MTTR	(2)	A ₂	A .
•	SPECIFIED	ACHIEVED			PREDICTED	ACHIEVED
WITH POWER GENERATION						
ELECTRONICS	33.9	44.2	13.0	45.7	13.0	45.9
POWER DISTRIBUTION	0.3	0.8	0.1	0.7	2.2	0.7
ECU	36.2	1.6	62.2	1.9	60.9	2.0
POWER GENERATION	29.6	53.4	24.7	51.7	23.9	51.4
WITH POWER CONVERSION						
ELECTRONICS	45.5	89.5	13.0	66.6	13.0	66.0
POWER DISTRIBUTION	0.5	1.7	0.1	0.1	2.2	1.0
ECU	48.7	3.4	62.2	2.7	60.9	2.9
POWER CONVERSION	5.3	5.4	24.7	29.7	23.9	30.1

Notes: 1) Achieved is MTBME 2) Achieved is MMMR

The results indicate the ECU and power distribution equipments do not have an adverse impact on the system R/M. The power generation and power conversion equipments do have an adverse impact.

3.3.2.8 AN/TSQ Analysis

The current Air Force inventory was obtained from the Item Manager at SM-ALC on 10 February 1982. The inventory is for maximum configuration systems and is as follows:

EQUIPMENT	AIR FORCE	TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (TAC)
AN/TSQ-91	16	5
AN/TSQ-92 AN/TSQ-93	6 <u>13</u>	4
TOTAL	35	<u>13</u>

The information used to derive the average operating time is given in Table 3.3.2-5. Two averages were calculated. One for TAC units and one for all Air Force units. The TAC operating time estimate was derived from the two TAC units. This estimate was used to develop the R/M numerics for the field experience data given for the AN/TSQ-91 TAC BLIS report. The operating time estimates derived from all the Air Force units for the AN/TSQ-91, AN/TSQ-92 and AN/TSQ-93 were used to develop the R/M numerics for the field experience data given in the D056B5503 reports.

Figures 3.3.2-2 through 3.3.2-4 give simplified Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) and Reliability Mathematical Models (RMM) for the AN/TSQ-91, AN/TSQ-92 and AN/TSQ-93 equipments. The diagrams and models depict a logistics configuration wherein it is assumed that if any equipment fails the system fails. The functional RBD and RMM for the TSQ equipments includes redundant elements and provides a more realistic representation of the system operation success paths. The logistics R/M numerics were used because the data available from the field maintenance reports could be used to generate reasonably accurate comparisons for logistics R/M numerics, but could not be relied upon to provide information on system mission capability. Any mission capability data collected during the study are discussed in the appropriate section.

The specified and predicted R/M numerics for the AN/TSQ systems were extracted from the AAA report (ref 32). These data are listed in Table 3.3.2-6. The system level R/M numerics were calculated based on the data given in Table 3.3.2-6 for the modules and a maximum configuration system which was assumed from the inventory data. The MTBF and Mct specified and predicted estimates for the power distribution and ECU equipments were obtained from reference 32. The M numeric for the AN/TSQ systems was specified as Mct. The M numeric for the power equipments was specified as Aa or MTTR. For consistency Mct was assumed to be equal to MTTR. This assumption does not create any biases if one maintenance person repairs the equipment. The MTBF and MTTR estimates for the power equipment were obtained from data extracted from the equipment specifications or from data extracted from the Initial Production Test (IPT) reports (ref 2, 11, The AN/TSQ systems operate with two different types of power equipment - power generation and power conversion. The MTBF, MTTR and Aa system level estimates were revised utilizing both types of power source. The power

TABLE 3.3.2-5: AN/TSQ OPERATING TIME INFORMATION

AN/TSQ-91

	H	OURS/EQUIPM	ENT				
UNIT	HOME	DEPLOYED	TOTAL	NO EQUIP	TOTAL OP HRS	MODULE Type	UNIT TYPE
103 TCS 603 TCS 101 TCS 606 TCS 609 TCS 728 TCS	1512 8760 4800 3360 2400	810 0 336 2160 1632 1680	2322 8760 336 6960 4992 4080 TOTALS	1 1 1 1 2 7	2322 8760 336 6960 4992 8160 31530		ANG AF ANG AF AF AF TAC
			AN/TSQ	-92			
	H(DURS/EQUIPME	ENT				
UNIT	HOME	DEPLOYED	TOTAL	NO EQUIP	TOTAL OP HRS	MODULE TYPE (1)	UNIT TYPE

2700 2700 1350 6750 TOTALS

TSA-34 0A`8448 TSA-35

ANG ANG **ANG**

	H	OURS/EQUIPM	ENT				
UNIT	HOME	DEPLOYED	TOTAL	NO EQUIP	TOTAL OP HRS	MODULE Type	UNIT TYPE
604 DASS 111 CEM SQ 105 CEM	3104 1600 560	432 1188 2160	3536 2788 2720 TOTALS	1 1 1 3	3536 2788 2720 9044		AF ANG ANG

AN/TSQ-93


1350 1350 1350

Notes: 1) Data were given for each module type. This is one system.

105 TCS 105 TCS 105 TCS

720 720 720

630 630 630



Power Distribution R7


Reliability math Model: Ro = R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7

Three configurations of the TSQ-91 vary the reliability block diagram by number of modules:

Туре		Configuration	
Modules	Minimum	Intermediate	Maximum
Air Conditioning	1	2	2
Ancillary Equipment	1	1	1
Data Processing	1	1	1
Console	1	2	3
Group Display	1	2	3

Note 1: R_1 and R_2 does not include shelter or pallet, R_3 - R_6 includes shelter. R_7 includes portions of R_1 - R_6 .

FIGURE 3.3.2-2: AN/TSQ-91 RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM AND MATH MODEL




Reliability math Model: R_S = R₁ R₂ R₃ R₄ R₅


There are three configurations of the TSQ-92:

Туре	Co	nfiguration	
Modules	Combat Ops & Plans	Combat Ops	Combat plans
Air Conditioning (1)	· 1	1	1
Group Display (1)	2	2	2
Furnishings	2	2	2

Note 1: Air conditioning and Group Display Modules are interchangeable with TSQ- 91

FIGURE 3.3.2-3: AN/TSQ-92 RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM AND MATH MODEL





Reliability math Model: $R_S = R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5$

Three configurations vary the reliability block diagram by number of modules:

Type Modules	Alternate	Configuration Minimum	Medium
Air Conditioning Operations Comm Center	1	2	3
	1	1	2
	0	1	1

FIGURE 3.3.2-4: AN/TSQ-93 RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM AND MATH MODEL

TABLE 3.3.2-6: AN/TSQ R/M NUMERICS

AVAILABILITY	PREDICTED ACCEPTABLE PREDICTED	0.51 0.980 0.9919 1.01 0.988 0.9999	0.988	0.97 1.12 0.55	-	(5:1	2.00 2.00 1.47 1.47 1.47
Mct (HOURS)	MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE	1.46 2.00(3)	· 2.00(3) 0.65	1.30	3.50 1.40 1.40	119	2000 2000 8865 55249 10081
	SPECIFIED	0.65	.30	1.25			in A
	PREDICTED (5)	190(1)	250(1) 122/63.4	101 118 671	378		2000(1) 2000(1) 16500(1) 102000(1) 18600(1)
MTBF (MOURS)	MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE	88. 75.	125 100(2)	79.2 118 200	250(2) 251 70.6	119	TER TER
-	SPECIFIED			158(2) 158(2) 336(2) 400(2)			OPERATIONS HEATER COMMUNICATIONS HEATER DATA PROCESSING PON CONSOLE PON AMOUNT PAY FOUTPHENT P
	FORITPMENT	TSQ-91 (MAXIMUM)	/TSQ-92 (MKD1UM) /TSQ-93 (MED1UM) IA PROCESSING	CONSOLE ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT FURMISHINGS	C TSQ-91 & TSQ-92 C TSQ-93	PPLINI CATIONS	

ALLOCATED MUMERIC BASED ON 2:1 DISCRIMINATION RATIO 0.9 Mmax VALUE FUNCTIONAL/LOGISTICS MTBF

TUES

MOTES:

88

equipment R/M numerics are averages of the types used with the system and were obtained by calculating the R/M numerics from the data obtained during the second survey. The AN/TSQ systems utilize the A/E24U-8, EMU-12, EMU-21, EMU-22 and MB-15, for power generation and MD-4 for power conversion. The R/M numerics for the power equipments used with the AN/TSQ equipments are:

R/M NUMERIC

			M	ITBF	MTTR		A _a		
EQUIPMENT	TYPE	QTY	SPEC	ACHIEVED	SPEC	ACHIEVED	SPEC	ACHIEVED	
POWER GENERATION	MB-15	23	1000	35.5	2.0	4.2		0.8942	
GENELOTT 10W	EMU-30 Total	134 157	500 540	167 108	2.0	6.3 6.0	0.90	0.9636 0.9474	
POWER CONVERSION	MD-4		4000	1745	0.5	44.7	0.90	0.9750	

3.3.2.9 AN/TSQ-91 Analysis

The field experience data summarized from the TAC BLIS report are given below. This data covers the twelve month calendar period August 1980 to August 1981 for five AN/TSQ-91 systems.

CHARACTERISTIC	SYSTEM	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	POWER DISTRIBUTION	ECU
Total Maintenance Events Total Maintenance Actions Maintenance Events with System Downtime	439 732 30	408 661 29	5 5 0	26 57 1
Total Maintenance Manhours Maintenance Manhours with System Down time	2516.9 646.9	2286.8 646.4	17.6 0	212.5 0.5
Average Operate hours/year Total operate hours/year Mean Time Between Maintenance Events (MTBME)	4080 20400 46.5	4080 20400 50.0	4080 20400 4080	4080 20400 785
(Hours) Mean Time Between System Downtime	680	730		20400

The power distribution network was defined as WUCs ABAAO, ABABO, ABACO, ACAGO, ACDCO, ADAFO, ADEAO, ADEBO, ADEBO, ADEEO, AERBO and AERAO.

As can be seen by the data presented above there is an average of 1.65 maintenance actions for each maintenance event. This is one reason why it is imperative that maintenance events be identified and used to assess the achieved R/M rather than the number of maintenance actions. It can also be seen that only 6.8% of the maintenance events resulted in system downtime; therefore, MTBME should not be used to assess the achieved mission reliability unless the events can be further qualified to determine if system downtime resulted from the event. The power distribution equipment did not cause any system downtime during this reporting period and only one of the ECU failures (3.8%) resulted in system downtime.

The field experience data summarized from the D056B5503 report is given below. This data covers a twelve month reporting period for sixteen (16) AN/TSQ-91 equipments.

CHARACTERISTIC	SYSTEM	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	POWER DISTRIBUTION	ECU
FAILURES	2413	2222	43	148
OTHER MALFUNCTIONS	170	159	8	3
NO DEFECT	0	0	0	0
TOTAL EVENTS	2583	2381	51	151
MAINTENANCE MAN HOURS	8263.4	6779.8	233.8	1249.8
AVERAGE OPHRS/YEAR	4080	4080	4080	4080
TOTAL OPERATE HOURS	65280	65280	65280	65280
TOTAL POSSESSION HOURS	140160	140160	140160	140160

As can be seen by the data presented above 93% of field maintenance actions are classifed as failures.

The data used for the percentage calculations are presented in Table 3.3.2-7.

TABLE 3.3.2-7: AN/TSQ-91 R/M NUMERICS

EQUIPMENT	ATTRIBUTE	SPECIF1ED (SPECIFIED PREDICTED DEMONSTRATION 2ND SURVEY TAC BLIS	TAC BLIS	005685503	MOTES
SYSTEM	MTBH (DPERATE MOURS) POINTS ESTHATE LOARS 90X CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90X CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMBLE-SIDED 90X CONFIDENCE LIMIT SIMBLE-SIDED 60X CONFIDENCE LIMIT	23.7/25.7 17.0		22.7/44.1 19.8/38.9 26.0/49.8 20.4/39.9	16.1/24.5 14.7/23.2 17.6/26.0 15.0/23.5	5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 11, 12, 13 11, 12, 13 11, 12, 13
	MTUM (POSSESSED MOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMALE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT			93.1/93.4 83.6/82.0 104/106 85.7/84.5	52.3/52.4 49.8/49.3 54.9/55.4 50.3/49.9	11, 12, 13 11, 12, 13 11, 12, 13
	MIR	J	6.0	5.7/7.7	4.1/4.3	9, 10, 11, 12, 13
	AVAILABILITY (Aa)	J	0.9459	0.7880/0.8458	0.7860/0.8437	0.7880/0.8458 0.7860/0.8437 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
ELECTRONICA	ELECTRONICS MIBN (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOKE 905 CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT UPPER 905 CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT SINGLE-SIDED 905 CONFIDENCE LINIT SINGLE-SIDED 605 CONFIDENCE LINIT	29.0	50.9	50 46.2 54.3 46.9	27.4 26.5 28.4 26.7	1, 15
	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMALE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT			107 99.2 101	58.9 56.9 57.3	
	MITR	J	9.0	5.6	2.8	
	AVAILABILITY (As)	Ū	0.9698	0.8993	0.9073	

TABL: 3.3.2-7: AN/TSQ-91 R/N NUMERICS (CONT-D)

QUIPMENT.	ATTRIBUTE	SPECIFIED (PREDICTED DEMON	SPECIFIED PREDICTED DEMONSTRATION 2ND SURVEY TAC BLIS	EY TAC BLIS	005685503	NOTES
OMER DISTRI- Bution	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LONER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	· 5619	3344		4080 1940 10355 2199	1280 1014 1638 1063	-
	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE L'ONER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT				8760 4165 22234 4722	2748 2176 3517 2282	
	MITR		1.5		3.5	4.6	
	AVAILABILITY (As)		0.9996		0.9991	0.9964	
ತ	MTBH (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTINATE LONER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT	250	1146 90 96	220 175 279 194	785 565 1120 603	432 378 497 388	2, 16, 18, 2, 16, 18, 2, 16, 18, 2, 6, 16, 18
	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LONER BOX COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT WPPER BOX COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMALE-SIDED BOX COMFIDENCE LIMIT SIMALE-SIDED 60K COMFIDENCE LIMIT		834 643 1100	1162 926 1476	1685 1214 2404 1294	928 811 1067 834	2, 16, 18 2, 16, 18 2, 16, 18 2, 16, 18
	MITR (SPECIFIED) (MAX ACCEPTABLE)	3.4	2.0 2.5	4.5	8.2	6.3	~
	AVAILABILITY (As)	0.9866	0.9780	0.9799	0.9897	0.9811	

TABLE 3.3.2-7: AN/TSQ-91 R/H NUMERICS (CONT'D)

005685503 MOTES	2. 4. 6, 8, 17, 19, 20 2, 8, 17, 19 2, 8, 17, 19 2, 8, 17, 19	2, 17, 19 2, 17, 19 2, 17, 19	. ~~	~ ~	2, 6, 7, 8, 17, 19, 20 2, 8, 13, 19 2, 8, 11, 19 2, 8, 17, 19	2, 17, 19 2, 17, 19 2, 17, 19 2, 17, 19	~~	
SPECIFIED PREDICTED DEMONSTRATION 2ND SURVEY TAC BLIS	44.4 37.7 52.5 39.0	1450 1230 1720 1273	5.7	0.8862	872 558 1444 607	1526 976 2525 1061	44.7	0.9512
PREDICTED DENONSTRATI	610/111 239/91.0 1227/145 371/87.0	3068 1700 6166	1.8	0.9977	610/111 138/91 1227/145 376/82	3068 1700 6166	1.8	0.9977
SPECIFIED	265		2.0	0.9925	2000/200		0.5	0.9998
INT ATTAIDUTE	NTON (OPERATE HOURS) LONG DOS CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER SOR CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED SOR CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED SOR CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MTDM (PUSSESSED HOURS) PUBLIT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT SIMELE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LINIT	MITR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAIN HOURS)	AVAILABILITY (AL)	SION (OPERATE HOURS) SION POINT ESTIMATE UPER 90S CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPER 90S CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMELE-SIOEO 90S CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MTOM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMALE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT	MTTR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAN HOURS)	AVAILABILITY (A4)
EQUIPMENT	POMER GENERATION				CONTERSION			

TABLE 3.3.2-7: AN/TSQ-91 R/M NUMERICS (CONT'D)

ATTREBUTE ELWIPMENT

SPECIFIED PREDICTED DEMONSTRATION 2ND SURVEY TAC BLIS

MOTES

DO: v85503

MOTES:

TOTOGCOCOCCENTED S

SPECIFIED IS AM ALLOCATED HUMERIC
DEMONSTRATED IS AM AVERAGE FROM 1PT EQUIPMENTS

PERFORMED IS AM AVERAGE FROM 1PT EQUIPMENTS

PERFORMED IS AM AVERAGE

SPECIFIED IS NIBS

SPECIFIED IN SPECIFI

94

The system, ECU, Electronics and power R/M numerics are based on the following equipment quantities:

EQUIPMENT	QUANITITY
AIR CONDITIONING (ACM) ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT (AEM) DATA PROCESSING (DPM) CONSOLE (CM) GROUP DISPLAY (GDM) POWER	2 1 1 3 3
PUNEK	۷

These estimates are based on a maximum configuration system. The system level specified MTBF is given then by:

$$\frac{1}{MTBF(System)} = \frac{2}{MTBF(ACM)} + \frac{1}{MTBF(AEM)} + \frac{1}{MTBF(DPM)} + \frac{3}{MTBF(CM)} + \frac{3}{MTBF(GDM)} + \frac{2}{MTBF(Power)}$$

The ECU, Electronics, Power Distribution Network and Power equipment specified MTBF is equal to the MTBF of the equipment divided by the quantity used. Each ACM has four A/Cs; therefore the IPT and second survey achieved ECU MTBMs were divided by four to obtain an MTBM equivalent to the ACM.

The system and electronic equipment specified MTTR is a weighted average derived by the equation:

MTTR (S) =
$$\frac{\int_{\Sigma}^{n} ((Failure \ rate)_{i} \ X \ (Mct)_{i} \ X \ QTY_{i})}{\int_{i=1}^{n} ((Failure \ rate)_{i} \ X \ QTY_{i})}$$

3.3.2.10 AN/TSQ-91 Results

The percent specified (predicted) and achieved MTBM, MTTR and Aa contribution of the power, ECU, power distribution and electronic equipments to the AN/TSQ-91 system is given below for the three report types:

TAC BLIS REPORT

			PERCENT CO	ONTRIBUTIO	N	
EQUIPMENT	MTB		MTTR	(2)	A	a
	SPECIFIED	ACHIEVED	PREDICTED	ACHIEVED	PREDICTED	ACHIEVED
WITH POWER GENERATION						
ELECTRONICS	81.4	45.4	53.3	44.5	55.2	44.6
POWER DISTRIBUTION	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.3	0.7	0.4
ECU	9.4	2.9	41.7	4.2	40.0	4.3
POWER GENERATION	8.8	51.1	4.2	51.0	4.1	50.7
WITH POWER CONVERSION						
ELECTRONICS	88.1	88.2	53.3	64.1	55.2	63.4
POWER DISTRIBUTION	0.4	1.1	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.5
ECU	10.2	5.6	41.7	6.0	40.0	6.2
POWER CONVERSION	1.3	5.1	4.2	29.4	4.1	29.9

Notes: 1) Achieved is MTBME 2) Achieved is MMMR

D056B5503 REPORT

EQUIPMENT	MTBI SPECIFIED		PERCENT CO MTTR PREDICTED	(2)	A,	ACHIEVED
WITH POWER GENERATION ELECTRONICS POWER DISTRIBUTION ECU POWER GENERATION	81.4 0.4 9.4 8.8	58.8 1.2 3.7 36.3	53.3 0.8 41.7 4.2	40.4 1.4 7.5 50.7	55.2 0.7 40.0 4.1	40.4 1.5 7.9 50.2
WITH POWER CONVERSION ELECTRONICS POWER DISTRIBUTION ECU POWER CONVERSION	88.1 0.4 10.2 1.3	89.6 1.9 5.7 2.8	53.3 0.8 41.7 4.2	58.0 2.0 10.9 29.1	55.2 0.7 40.0 4.1	57.3 2.1 11.2 29.4

Notes: 1) Achieved is MTBME 2) Achieved is MMMR

The results indicate that the ECU and power distribution equipments do not have an adverse impact on the system R/M, but that the power generation and power conversion equipments do have an adverse impact. These results were obtained from both the TAC BLIS and the D056B5503 reports. Since none of the power distribution equipment failures resulted in system downtime, the failures had no impact on the system functional reliability; also, since only one of the ECU failures resulted in system downtime, the ECU equipment has a small impact on system functional reliability (one failure every five calendar year).

ESR REPORT (AVAILABILITY)

	SPECIFIED	TAC STANDARD	ACHIEVED
TSQ-91	0.893	0.95	0.878

3.3.2.11 AN/TSQ-92 Analysis

The field experience data summarized from the D056B5503 report is given below. This data covers a twelve month reporting period for six (6) AN/TSQ-92 equipments.

CHARACTERISTIC	SYSTEM	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	POWER DISTRIBUTION	ECU
FAILURES OTHER MALFUNCTIONS NO DEFECT TOTAL EVENTS MAINTENANCE MAN HOURS AVERAGE OPHRS/YEAR TOTAL OPERATE HOURS TOTAL POSSESSION HOURS	61	57	0	4
	9	9	0	0
	0	0	0	0
	70	66	0	4
	82.3	60.6	0	21.7
	1350	1350	1350	1350
	8100	8100	8100	8100
	52560	52560	52560	52560

The power distribution network definition used for the AN/TSQ-92 is the same as was used for the AN/TSQ-91.

As can be seen by the data presented above 87.1% of field maintenance actions are failures.

The AN/TSQ-92 field experience data used for the percentage calculations are presented in Table 3.3.2-8. The specified, predicted and demonstrated R/M numerics for the power equipment are presented in Table 3.3.2-7.

The system, ECU, Electronics and power R/M numerics are based on the following equipment quantities:

EQUIPMENT	QUANITITY
AIR CONDITIONING (ACM) FURNISHINGS (FM) GROUP DISPLAY (GDM)	1 2 2
POWER	2

These estimates are based on a maximum configuration system. The system level specified MTBF is given then by:

$$\frac{1}{MTBF(System)} = \frac{1}{MTBF(ACM)} + \frac{2}{MTBF(FM)} + \frac{2}{MTBF(GDM)} + \frac{2}{MTBF(Power)}$$

The ECU, Electronics, Power Distribution Network and Power equipment specified MTBF is equal to the MTBF of the equipment divided by the quantity used. Each ACM has four A/Cs; therefore the IPT and second survey achieved MTBMs were divided by four to obtain an MTBM equivalent to the ACM.

The system and electronic equipment specified MTTR is a weighted average derived by the equation:

MTTR (S) =
$$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} ((Failure \ rate)_{j} \ X \ (Mct)_{j} \ X \ QTY_{j})}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} ((Failure \ rate)_{j} \ X \ QTY_{j})}$$

TABLE 3.3.2-8: AN/TSQ-92 R/M NUMERICS

M D05685503 NOTES	32.1/102 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 26.6/77.4 8, 9 38.8/134 8, 9 27.6/81.6 8, 9	494/503 8, 9 396/365 8, 9 617/697 8, 9 414/389	4.4/6.2 6, 7, 8, 9	0.8774/0.9417 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,	123 1, 6 100 152 104	796 649 987 677	0.9	19927
DEMONSTRATION								
PREDICTED	38.3		1.3	0.9672	50.2		1.0	0.9805
SPECIFIED	59.8/74.3				91.3			
ATTRIBUTE	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTINATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LINIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LINIT	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MTTR (SPECIFIED)	AVAILABILITY (Aa)	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTINATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MIBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT	MIIR (SPECIFIED)	AVAILABILITY (Aa)
EQUIPMENT	SYSIEM				ELECIRONICS			

TABLE 3.3.2-8: AN/TSQ-92 R/M NUMERICS (CONT'D)

EQUIPMENT	ATRIBUTE	SPECIFIED	PREDICTED	DEMONSTRATION	005685503	NOTES
POWER DISTRI- BUTION	MYBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LONER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT	82000	45872		8785	1, 5
	MTBM (POSSESSED MOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LONER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT				97006	
	MTTR (SPECIFIED)		1.5		0.0	
	AVAILABILITY (Aa)		0.9999		1.0000	
ECO	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	909		221 170 292 180	2025 885 5934 1013	2, 10 2, 10 2, 10 2, 5, 10
	MTBM (PUSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT			1668 1285 2201	13140 5741 38505 6574	2, 10 2, 10 2, 10
	MTTR (CLOCK-HOURS) (MAN HOURS)			2.5	A. c	2
	AVAILABILITY (Aa)			0.9888	0.9973	

TABLE 3.3.2-8: AN/TSQ-92 R/M MIMERICS (CONT'D)

	RONICS AND POWER
NOTES	NATA WERE AVAILABLE. WERICS FOR THE ELECTI
005685503	LEVEL TEST (PREDICTED MA OND SURVEY
SPECIFIED PREDICTED DEMONSTRATION DOS685503	IFIED NAMERICS ENTS. NO SYSTEM EQUIPMENTS AND IS BASED ON SEC
PREDICTED	WVERSION SPEC PARATE EQUIPN CU AND PONER RSION PONER. PONER IMULATE 4 SER
SPECIFIED	NTS CU & POMER CO CS FOR THE SE CS FOR THE ER MAPOMER COMVEI R ALL EXCEPT I
ATIRIBUTE	DEMONSTRATED IS AN ALLOCATED NUMERIC DEMONSTRATED IS AN AVERAGE FROM IPT EQUIPMENTS SPECIFIED IS A WELGATED AVERAGE SPECIFIED IS MITHER AVERAGE ON DEMONSTRATED NUMERICS FOR THE ELECTRONICS AND POWER SPECIFIED IS MITHER AVERAGE ON DEMONSTRATED MAYERICS FOR THE ELECTRONICS AND POWER DISTRIBUTION OF SYSTEM MITH POWER GENERATION/POWER CYMPERSION ACHIEVED IS FOR SYSTEM MITH POWER GENERATION/POWER CYMPERSION ACHIEVED DISGRESSOS IS BASED ON DOSGRESSOS FOR ALL EXCEPT POWER. POWER IS BASED ON SECOND SURVEY THE DEMONSTRATED IPT WIRM DATA WERE DIVIDED BY FOUR TO SIMPLATE 4 SERIES UNITS
EQUIPMENT	EST STATE OF

3.3.2.12 <u>AN/TSQ-92 Results</u>

The percent specified (predicted) and achieved MTBF, MTTR and A_a contribution of the power, ECU, power distribution and electronic equipments to the AN/TSQ-92 system is given below:

D05685503 REPORT

EQUIPMENT	MTBI	= (1)	PERCENT CO			Δ_
EQUIFICAT			PREDICTED		PREDICTED	ACHIEVED
WITH POWER GENERATION						
ELECTRONICS	65.3	26.0	59.4	5.3	59.0	5.6
POWER DISTRIBUTION	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.0
ECU	12.0	1.6	33.7	1.9	33.8	2.1
POWER GENERATION	22.6	72.0	6.8	92.8	6.9	92.3
WITH POWER CONVERSION						
ELECTRONICS	31.3	82.1	59.4	12.0	59.0	12.2
POWER DISTRIBUTION	0.3	1.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.0
ECU	14.9	5.0	33.7	4.4	33.8	4.5
POWER CONVERSION	3.7	11.7	6.8	83.6	6.9	83.3

Notes: 1) Achieved is MTBME

2) Achieved is MMMR

ESR REPORT (AVAILABILITY)

	SPECIFIED	TAC STANDARD	ACHIEVED
TSQ-92	0.958	0.95	0.958

The results indicate that the ECU and power distribution equipments do not have an adverse impact on the system R/M. The power generation and power conversion equipments do have an adverse impact. The power distribution equipment achieved MTBM percentage was higher than what was predicted; however, this was due to the fact that zero failures occurred.

3.3.2.13 AN/TSQ-93 Analysis

The field experience data summarized from the DO56B5503 report are given below. This data covers a twelve month reporting period for thirteen (13) AN/TSQ-93 equipments.

CHARACTERISTIC	SYSTEM	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	POWER DISTRIBUTION	ECU
FAILURES	332	316	3	13
OTHER MALFUNCTIONS	208	200	1	7
NO DEFECT	0	0	0	0
TOTAL EVENTS	540	516	4	20
MAINTENANCE MAN HOURS	890.9	816.9	6.5	67.6
AVERAGE OPHRS/YEAR	3014.7	3014.7	3014.7	3014.7
TOTAL OPERATE HOURS	39191	39191	39191	39191
TOTAL POSSESSION HOURS	113880	113880	113880	113880

The power distribution network was defined as WUCs AAAAO, AAABO, AAACO, and ABABO.

As can be seen by the data presented above 61.5% of field maintenance actions are failures.

The AN/TSQ-93 field experience data used for the percentage calculations are presented in Table 3.3.2-9. The specified, predicted and demonstrated R/M numerics for the power equipment are presented in Table 3.3.2-7.

The system, ECU, Electronics and power R/M numerics are based on the following equipment quantities:

EQUIPMENT	QUANITITY
AIR CONDITIONING (ACM) COMMUNICATIONS MODULES (CM) OPERATIONS MODULE (OM) POWER	3 1 2 2

TABLE 3.3.2-9: AN/TSQ-93 R/M MINERICS

SPECIFIED PREDICTED DEMONSTRATION DOSGBSSO3 NOTES	35.5/40.2 53.4 27.6/67.0 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 24.0/59.1 8, 9 31.6/75.2 8, 9 24.7/64.0 8, 9	184/185 8, 9 168/162 8, 9 201/208 8, 9 169/165	1.2 4.2/5.0 6, 7	0.9780 0.8663/0.9298 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,	54.4 73.0 76.0 1, 6 70.6 81.8 71.7	221 205 236 236 208	0.8	0.9892
ATTRIBUTE	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LINIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LINIT	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SIMSLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MITR (SPECIFIED)	AVAILABILITY (Aa)	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTINATE LONER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LÜMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT SIMALE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LINIT	MITR (SPECIFIED)	AVAILABILITY (Aa)
EQUIPMENT	SYSTEM	·			ELECTRONICS			

TABLE 3.3.2-9: AN/TSQ-93 R/M NUMERICS (CONT'D)

EQUIPMENT	ATTAIBUTE	SPECIFIED	PREDICTED	DEMONSTRATION	005685503	NOTES
POWER DISTRI- BUTION	MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LONER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LINIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LINIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LINIT				9798 4281 28711 4902	1, 5
	MTBM (POSSESSED MOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIBED 90% COMFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT				28470 83428 12439 14244	
	MITR (SPECIFIED)				1.6	
	AVAILABILITY (A.)				0.9998	
ECU	MTBM (OPERATE MOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	167		295 227 390 240	1960 1349 2957 1449	22252 \$
	NTBM (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL-LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 90% CONFIDENCE LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT			2223 1714 2934	5694 3919 8591 4211	~~~
	MITR (SPECIFIED)			2.5	3.4	2
•	AVAILABII 11Y (Aa)			0.9916	0.9983	

TABLE 3.3.2-9: AN/TSQ-93 R/N MINERICS (CONT'D)

WOTES	NED IS AM ALLOCATED MUMERIC NED IS AM AVERAGE FROM FOT EQUIPMENTS NED IS AN AVERAGE FROM FOT EQUIPMENTS NED IS AN AVERAGE FROM FOT EQUIPMENTS NED IS WITHER NED IS AN AVERAGE NED IS AVERAGE NED IS WITHER NED IS AVERAGE NED IN THE TO STATE WITH TOWER TO STATE TO ST
	DATA WHER!
005685503	LEVEL TEST PREDICTED A
SPECIFIED PREDICTED DEMONSTRATION DOSGBS503	IFIED MUMERICS ENTS. NO SYSTEM EQUIPMENTS AND I IS BASED ON SECO RIES UNITS
PREDICTED	NYERSION SPEC PARATE EQUIPM 10 AND POAER RSION POMER. POMER. POMER
SPECIFIED	WENTS JECU & POMER CO RICS FOR THE SE RICS FOR THE EI TOW/POMER CONVE FOR ALL ENCEPT
ATRIBUTE	SPECIFIED IS AM ALLOCATED MANERIC DEMONSTRATED IS AM AVERAGE FROM 1PT EQUIPMENTS SPECIFIED IS AM AVERAGE FROM 1PT EQUIPMENTS SPECIFIED IS AM WEIGHTED AVERAGE SPECIFIED IS MILE OF THE SECOND SPECIFIED MANERICS SPECIFIED IS WITH THE SAXED ON DEMONSTRATED MANERICS FOR THE SEPARATE EQUIPMENTS. NO SYSTEM LEVEL TEST DEMONSTRATE IS BASED ON DEMONSTRATED MANERICS FOR THE ECU AND POMER EQUIPMENTS AND PREDICTED A DISTRIBUTION ACHIEVED IS FOR SYSTEM WITH POMER GENERALI OM/POMER CONVERSION ACHIEVED IS FOR SYSTEM WITH POMER GENERALI OM/POMER. POMER. FOMER IS BASED ON SECOND SURVEY THE DEMONSTRATED BY MIBM DATA WERE DIVIDED BY THREE TO SIMULATE 3 SERIES UNITS
EQUIPMENT	20165 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000

These estimates are based on a maximum configuration system. The system level specified MTBF is given then by:

$$\frac{1}{MTBF(System)} = \frac{3}{MTBF(ACM)} + \frac{1}{MTBF(CM)} + \frac{2}{MTBF(OM)} + \frac{2}{MTBF(Power)}$$

The ECU, Electronics, Power Distribution Network and Power equipment specified MTBF is equal to the MTBF of the equipment divided by the quantity used. Each ACM has one A/C; therefore, the IPT and second survey achieved MTBMs were used to obtain an MTBM equivalent to the ACM.

The system and electronic equipment specified MTTR is a weighted average derived by the equation:

MTTR (S) =
$$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} ((Failure \ rate)_{j} \ X \ (Mct)_{j} \ X \ QTY_{j})}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} ((Failure \ rate)_{j} \ X \ QTY_{j})}$$

3.3.2.14 AN/TSQ-93 Results

The percent specified (predicted) and achieved MTBF, MTTR and A_a contribution of the power, ECU, power distribution and electronic equipments to the AN/TSQ-93 system is given below:

DO56B5503 REPORT

EQUIPMENT	MTB			ONTRIBUTIO	A,	APUYEVEK
	SPECIFIED	WCHIEAED	PKEDICIED	WCUTEAED	PREDICIED	WCUIEAED
WITH POWER GENERATION ELECTRONICS POWER DISTRIBUTION ECU POWER GENERATION	65.4	36.3	50.4	13.8	50.3	14.5
	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
	21.2	1.4	38.9	1.1	39.0	1.2
	13.4	62.0	10.7	85.0	10.7	84.2
WITH POWER CONVERSION ELECTRONICS POWER DISTRIBUTION ECU POWER CONVERSION	73.9	88.2	50.4	28.3	50.3	28.6
	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3
	24.1	3.4	38.9	2.3	39.0	2.3
	2.0	7.7	10.7	69.2	10.7	68.8

Notes: 1) Achieved is MTBME

2) Achieved is MMMR

The results indicate that the ECU and power distribution equipments do not have an adverse impact on the system R/M. The power generation and power conversion equipments do have an adverse impact.

3.3.3 Airborne Tactical C³I System

The airborne tactical C³I system selected for analysis was the E-3A AWACS. The E-3A Aircraft is by far the most sophisticated system studied in this report. The first aircraft was delivered to the Air Force in 1973 and the inventory has been steadily increasing with the 25th aircraft being delivered in late 1981. All the Aircraft are assigned to Tinker AFB, OK. The E-3A project has received a great deal of publicity because of the unique capabilities of the aircraft. However, the E-3A was primarily an off-the-shelf system utilizing a Boeing 707 airframe modified with a rotating radar dome mounted on the aircraft's fuselage over the wings. The AWACS Mission systems, for the most part, are operationally

ground proven equipment which have been adapted for use in an aircraft. What makes the E-3A AWACS unique is that it can control Tactical Air Operation anywhere in the world without requiring ground support in or near enemy territory. This allows Tactical Air Forces to engage the enemy under radar guidance anytime it is advantageous.

Public interest in the E-3A caused problems during the data collection because the 552 AWACS Wing had numerous information requests on the system. This has caused delays in processing and in some cases rejection of data requests made for this report. Despite these problems, more data were acquired on the E-3A than any of the other systems studied. The data are also higher quality because of the command interest in this high cost system and because of the safety requirement that demands that high quality maintenance and accurate record keeping be maintained on all aircraft. Flying time is also recorded for each aircraft and gives a measure of operating time. Flying time can be multiplied by a factor to obtain ground operating time due to maintenance, training and checkout (maintenance, preflight, postflight, etc.) for the aircraft. The factor for the E-3A, estimated by E-3A maintenance personnel at Tinker AFB, is three. The significance of maintenance operating time is that an estimated 80% of the total KW HR consumed by the E-3A is produced by MEP-116A generators on the ground.

The large amount of ground operating time associated with all aircraft creates a need for efficient less-expensive ground support equipment (SE) to take the place of airborne systems while maintenance is being performed. The ability of the SE to support the aircraft has a definite impact on the availability and maintainability of the system. For this reason and for the obvious importance of reliable performance during flight, this study will consider the E-3A ancillary E/M equipment both inflight and on the ground. The E-3A AWACS inflight ancillary E/M equipment for this report are the aircraft electrical power generation and distribution system and air conditioning and pressurization system (Work Unit Code 41 of the E-3A). The ground equipment was limited to the 14 MEP-116A generators used at Tinker AFB.

The E-3A was analyzed by using the R/M attributes Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM), Mean Time Between Incidents (MTBI) and Maintenance Manhours per Flight Hour (MMHFH). MMHFH is commonly used by the Air Force for determining

support requirements. The data used in determining the attributes come from the MDS data base in the form of two reports: The R/M Index for the E-3A and AFALD 800-4 (both are described in the Data collection section).

Comparing the specified and predicted to the assessed R/M values presented the problem of trying to determine if there was true redundancy in the system. Redundancy was an uncertainty because most aircraft have backup systems that when used dictate a mission abort for safety considerations. An example is loss of one engine inflight. The E-3A is capable of effective mission accomplishment without system degradation with only three engines operating; however, the mission would be aborted for safety. The reason is that loss of a second engine could prevent safe recovery of the aircraft. A more subtle example would be failure of the aircraft battery. Inflight the battery is used as a standby emergency power source. The actual operation of aircraft systems inflight are unaffected by the status of the battery. However, in the event of four engine flameout the battery becomes the only electrical power source available to restart the engines; therefore, mission abort. The problems of redundancy are further complicated when considering various mission profiles, peacetime vs. wartime and weather considerations. The redundancy problem led to the decision to consider logistics R numerics instead of the functional R numerics for the evaluation criteria.

The R/M data extracted from AFALD 800-4 is presented in Table 3.3.3-1. These data represent the R/M experience of an average aircraft inventory of 13.2 covering the calendar period 1 April 1978 to 30 September 1980. During this period 24575 flying hours were accumulated.

The R/M data extracted from the R/M Index is presented in Table 3.3.3-2. These data represent the R/M experience of an average aircraft inventory of 19 covering the calendar period July 1979 through June 1980. During this period 12333 flying hours were accumulated.

The R/M data extracted from the MEP-116A BLIS are presented below. These data represent the R/M experience of 14 MEP-116A generator sets covering the

TABLE 3.3.3-1: R/M DATA FROM AFALD 800-4

SYSTEM	SYSTEM	MAINTENA	ANCE EVENTS	MA	INTENANCE HOUR) C
WUC	DESCRIPTION	TOTAL	INHERENT	ON EQUIP	OFF EQUIP	70740
11	AIRFRAME	4340	1353	11642	1901	13543
12	COCKPIT-FUSELAGE	783	303	3148	373	3521
13	LANDING GEAR	2767	1309	15733	1641	17374
14	FLT CONT SYSTEM	2510	990	9732	1599	11521
23	TURBO FAN PWR PLT	2348	1279	13519	1751	11331 20370
24	AUX PWR PLT	835	348	3694	227	3921
41	AIR COND PRESS	2879	1175	13896	403	19299
42	ELECT PWR SUPPLY	1383	662	9531	2781	12312
44	LIGHTING	762	539	2915	234	3049
45	HYD PNEUMATIC	1007	423	5526	384	5070
46	FUEL SYSTEM	1233	631	13447	521	18968
47	OXYGEN SYSTEM	465	229	2381	112	2493
49	MISC UTILITIES	379	155	2123	119	22:2
51	INSTRUMENTS	1255	758	5481	358	9253
52	AUTO PILOT	392	169	2717	103	2320
55	MALFUNCTION ANAL	83	34	514	21	535
61	HF COMM SYS	976	525	6769	536	7305
62	VHF COMM SYS	160	70	972	270	1242
63	UHF COMM SYS	1201	700	6415	556	5931
64	INTER PHONE SYS	1319	941	4817	3049	7366
65	IFF SYS	725	262	4613	1613	5226
66	EMERG COMM SYS	264	113	1374	559	1933
69	MISC COMM	613	291	2752	125	2377
71	RADIO NAVIGATION	1520	642	5164	2338	9002
72	RADAR NAVIGATION	1306	581	4835	3487	3322
81	RADAR SET	4860	1877	52625	1497	54122
82	COMPT DATA DISPLAY	4652	2584	40975	20009	50984
91	EMERG EQUIP	238	81	419	5	125
96	PERSONNEL MISC EQUIP	17	ii	17	3	17
97	EXP DEV & COMP	6	Ö	41	3	41
TOTAL	E-3A	41778	19035	269047	47083	315130

TABLE 3.3.3-2: R/M DATA FROM R & M INDEX

SYSTEM WUC	SYSTEM DESCRIPTION	MAINTENANCE FAILURES	EVENTS TOTAL	UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE MANHOURS
42AT0	INTEGRAL DRIVE CENERATOR	10		
42AE0	INTEGRAL DRIVE GENERATOR	10	16	160
	OIL COOLER	1	1	11
42AH0	GENERATOR APU	1 2 4	8	117
42AJA	CONTROL UNIT APU GEN		4	36
42AJ0	CONTROL APU GEN PO	4	9	50
42AJ9	NOC	1	1	10
42XXX	ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM	72	329	2424
24XXX	AUXILLARY POWER SYSTEM	139	372	3470
41XXX	AIR CONDITIONING & PRESS	389	1274	10308
61XXX	HF COMM SYS	230	343	3875
63XXX	UHF COMM SYS	290	505	3182
64XXX	INTER PHONE SYS	302	577	
65XXX	IFF SYS	100		3907
69XXX	MISC COMM		278	1670
71XXX		140	283	1461
	RADIO NAVIGATION	312	709	4727
72XXX	RADAR NAVIGATION	327	637	3984
81XXX	RADAR SET	676	1684	141296
82XXX	COMPT DATA DISPLAY	1108	2166	57488
ALL	E-3A AWACS	6542	18435	376249

calendar period January 1981 through December 1981. The AFALD 800-4 definition of a Failure Event, Other Malfunction Event and No Defect event was used.

	MAINTENANCE EVENTS	MAINTENANCE ACTIONS	MANHOURS
FAILURES	365	571	3538
OTHER MAL	34	48	194
NO DEFECT	39	65	395
TOTAL	438	684	4127

3.3.3.1 Airborne Tactical Ancillary E/M Equipment Analysis

This section presents the analyses of the achieved R/M of the ancillary E/M equipments against the specified and/or demonstrated R/M for the equipment. Achieved R/M numerics were obtained from data listed in an R&M Index (ref 37) and AFALD 800-4 (ref 52) for the airborne ancillary E/M equipment and a BLIS report for the MEP-116 generator set. The achieved R/M numerics were compared with specified R/M numerics for the equipments. The specified R/M numerics for the MEP-116 generator set were extracted from MIL-G-52884/12 (ref 53). The airborne ancillary E/M equipment allocated, predicted and demonstrated R/M numerics were extracted from Boeing R/M reports (ref 33-35) utilizing the USAF WUC manual (ref 54) to identify equipments. Table 3.3.3-3 contains a summary of the specified, allocated, predicted and demonstrated and achieved R/M numerics for both the airborne and ground ancillary E/M equipments. A description of the aircraft ancillary E/M equipment follows:

SYSTEM	COMPONENTS	WUC
AIRCRAFT POWER GENERATION	INTEGRAL DRIVE GENERATOR OIL COOLER	42ATO 42AEO
AIRCRAFT POWER DISTRIBUTION	ALL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM LESS INTEGRAL DRIVE GENERATOR OIL COOLER GENERATOR APU CONTROL UNIT APU GEN CONTROL APU GEN PO NOC	42XXX 42ATO 42AEO 42AHO 42AJA 42AJO 42AJ9
AIRCRAFT ECU	AIR CONDITIONING & PRESSURIZATION	41XXX

TABLE 3.3.3-3: ANCILLARY E/M EQUIPMENT R/M NUMERICS

AIRCRAFT POWER GENERATION (6) SPECIFIED PREDICTED RAW INDEX 800-4 SPECIFIED PREDICTED RAW INDEX 800-4	108 472 1462 1121 146 452 247 98.8 677 195 118 2000 316	5 15131 3329 9142 2630 7 26998 4272	89.8 725 42.5 82.9 484 38.6 97.3 1139 47.0	0.032 0.165
MEP-116 SPECIFIED BLIS	380(1) 10	336 308 367	222(4)	
ATTR18UTE S	MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (OPERATE HOURS) (2) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (FOSSESSED HOURS) (2) FOINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE EVENTS (3) (OPERATE HOURS) (2) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	MAINTENANCE MANHOURS/FLIGHT HOURS (HOURS)

TABLE 3.3.3-3: ANCILLARY E/M EQUIPMENT R/M NUMERICS (CONT'D)

ATTRIBUTE	SPECIFIED	AIRCRAFT ECU (6) PREDICTED REM I	ECU (6) REM INDEX	800-4	AIRCR	AIRCRAFT PWR GEN & PWR DIST (6)	PWR DIST (6)	
MEAN TIME BETMEEN MAINTENANCE (OPERATE HOURS) (2) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SIMELE-SIDED 60% COMFIDENCE LIMIT	116	283	31.7 29.2 34.5	20.9 19.9 22.0		345	58.4 52.1 65.7	24.3 24.3 23.1 25.6
MEAN TINE BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (POSSESSED HOURS) (2) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SINGLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT			428 393 466	148 141 155			789 704 887	172 163 181
NEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE EVENTS (3) (OPERATE HOURS) (2) POINT ESTIMATE LONER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SIMSLE-SIDED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT			9.68 9.24 10.1	8.54 8.28 8.80			17.6 16.5 18.7	17.8 16.7 18.9
MAINTENANCE MANKOURS/FLIGHT HOURS (HOURS) MEAN DUAN TIME (HOURS)	0.614	0.066	0.836	0.785	0.478	0.249	0.478	0.864

TABLE 3.3.3-3: ANCILLARY E/M EQUIPMENT R/M NUMERICS

AIR VEHICLE LES SPECIFIED PRE	MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (OPERATE HOUNS) (2) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SIMBLE SOX CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SIMBLE SINED 60% CONFIDENCE LIMIT	FAN TINE BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (POSSESSED HOURS) (2) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% COWFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% COWFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT STNGLE-SIDED 60% COWFIDENCE LIMIT	EAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE EVENTS (3) (UPERATE HOURS) (2) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT SIMULE—SIDED BUX CONFIDENCE LIMIT	ITATE NAME: MANHOURS/FLIGHT HOURS (HOURS) AN DUAN TIME (HOURS)	MINIMUM ACCEPIABLE MTBF BASED ON TOTAL MAINTENANCE EVENTS FOR AFALD BUO-4 AND FALLURES FOR THE RAM INDEX AND BLIS USED DATA FROM POMER GENERATION EQUITMENT (TABLE 3.3.2-2) USED AFSHIS FROM 1PT REPURIS (TABLE 3.3.1-6)
AIR VEHICLE LESS PG. PD. FCIL AND EMACS (6) PECIFIED PREDICTED RAM INDEX 800-4	4 5.02 2.91 4.86 2.86 5.19 2.96	67.7 20.5 65.5 20.2 70.0 20.9	1.33 1.26 1.31 1.24 1.35 1.27	12.376 4.91	ND FAILURES FOR THE REM INDEX AND 2)

SYSTEM	COMPONENTS	WUC
AIRCRAFT POWER GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION	AUX POWER PLANT ELECT POWER SUPPLY	24XXX 42XXX
AIR VEHICLE	ALL EQUIPMENTS LESS AWACS HF COMM SYS UHF COMM SYS INTER PHONE SYS IFF SYS MISC COMM RADIO NAVIGATION RADAR NAVIGATION RADAR SET COMPT DATA DISPLAY	61XXX 63XXX 64XXX 65XXX 69XXX 71XXX 72XXX 81XXX 82XXX
AIR VEHICLE LESS AWACS, POWER GENERATIONS, POWER DISTRIBUTION AND ECU	ALL EQUIPMENTS LESS HF COMM SYS UHF COMM SYS INTER PHONE SYS IFF SYS MISC COMM RADIO NAVIGATION RADAR NAVIGATION RADAR SET COMPT DATA DISPLAY AUX POWER PLANT ELECT POWER SUPPLY AIR CONDITIONING & PRESSURIZATION	61xxx 63xxx 64xxx 65xxx 69xxx 71xxx 72xxx 81xxx 82xxx 24xxx 42xxx

An adverse R/M impact was defined as an achieved R/M numeric that did not meet the allocated R/M numeric.

From one to four MEP-116As can be connected to the E-3A for maintenance. Since the number utilized varies, an estimate of operating time could not be calculated from the flying hours and ground utilization factors. An average was obtained from the following utilization data: an average of 14 units operating 5 days/week at 9 hours/day, and 2 days/week at 4.5 hours/day. These data were obtained from AWACW/MAM, Tinker AFB, OK.

The Mean Time Between Incidents (MTBI) numeric is based on the total number of maintenance events reported during a mission. The specified MTBI for the airborne equipments are:

E-3A AWACS	1.88 hours
AWACS Electronics	4.05 hours
Aircraft Power Generation (PG)	864 hours
Aircraft Power Distribution (PD)	172 hours
Aircraft ECU	24 hours

No data were obtained to calculate an achieved MTBI.

Estimates of ground operating time versus flying time for the E-3A that were obtained were:

FACTOR	SOURCE
3.0X	AWACW/MAM Tinker AFB
0.5X	AFALD 800-4

The R/M numerics given in Table 3.3.3-3 are based on flying time. The power distribution network for the E3-A is utilized for both ground and airborne operation. Based on the ground to air factors given above, the actual point estimate MTBM for the power distribution network would fall between 987 and 370 hours, and the point estimate MTBME would fall between 171 and 64 hours.

The airborne ECU equipment is normally not used during maintenance on the ground. A trailer mounted air filter, type GSU-266/E is used on the flightline to filter conditioned air required by E3-A airplane mission avionic equipment during operation and maintenance. The predicted MTBF is 11,402 hours, the specified is 4,000 hours. A trailer mounted cooling cart provides a means of removing heat loads from the AWACS aircraft liquid cooling system during periods of extended ground operation of the aircraft Surveillance Radar Functional Group. The specified MTBF is "Not-Less-Than-500-Hours" and a MTBI of "Not-Less-Than-250-Hours." The predicted MTBF is 514 hours. The specified MTTR is 2.5 hours and the specified maintenance manhours per operating hour is "Not-Greater-Than-0.10." No achieved R/M numerics were obtained for these equipments.

3.3.3.2 Airborne Tactical Ancillary E/M Equipment Results

The following list of equipment-attributes satisfied the definition of an adverse impact:

EQUIPMENT	ATTRIBUTE
AIRCRAFT POWER GENERATION (PG)	MTBME
AIRCRAFT POWER DISTRIBUTION (PD)	MTBME
AIRCRAFT ECU (ECU)	MTBM MTBME MMHFH
AIRCRAFT POWER GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION	MTBM MTBME MMHFH
AIR VEHICLE LESS PG, PD, ECU AND AWACS ELECTRONICS	MMHFH
MEP-116A	MTBM MTBME MDT

As can be seen all of the airborne equipment failed to meet the MTBME standard, regardless of the data source. The aircraft ECU, and the aircraft total Power Generation and Power Distribution system and Air Vehicle failed to meet the MTBM and MMHFH standards. The MEP-116A failed to meet the MTBM, MTBME and MDT standards. Even given the ground-to-air factors of 3.0 or 0.5, the Power Distribution System still does not meet the MTBME standard.

3.3.3.3 Airborne Tactical C³I System Analysis

This section presents the analyses of the achieved R/M of ancillary E/M equipments as a percentage of the system R/M. The achieved Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM), Mean Time Between Maintenance Events (MTBME) and Mean Man hours per Flight Hour (MMHFH) for the system, AWACS electronics and ancillary E/M equipments were summarized from data obtained from BLIS, AFALD 800-4 and R&M Index reports, and the percent system contribution of the ancillary E/M equipments was calculated. The percentage was then compared with the percentage anticipated by the specified and/or predicted values (where available). An

adverse impact was defined as a higher achieved percentage than the specified value.

The specified (allocated) MTBF, and MMHFH are based on the airborne configuration. No specified ground (allocated) ground configuration R/M numerics were given; however, R/M numerics are a function of the environmental stresses applied to the equipments. A recent RADC study, Revision Of Environmental Factors For MIL-HDBK-217, (ref 55) showed that the Ground, Mobile (GM) environment and the Airborne, Inhabited, Transport (AIT) environment are comparable; the GM environment had a Environmental Severity Ratio (ESR) of 11.5 and the AIT had an ESR of 10.2. The GM environment was ranked 8th least severe and the AIT 7th least severe out of all the MIL-HDBK-217 environmental categories; therefore, the specified (allocated) R numeric for the system ground configuration was assumed to be the same as what was specified (allocated) for the airborne configuration. The E-3A AWACS system specified and achieved MTBF numeric were revised to include four MEP-116A generator sets using the equation:

No specified MMHFH numerics were given for the MEP-116A. Table 3.3.3-4 contains the specified and achieved R/M numerics. The achieved R/M numerics for the airborne equipment are based on the R&M Index Report. The achieved R/M numerics for the MEP-116A are based on the BLIS. The Logistics Configuration Reliability Block Diagram and Math Model is shown in Figure 3.3.3-1 for the airborne equipment arrangement and in Figure 3.3.3-2 for the ground equipment arrangement.

The MTBM and MTBME calculations for the system ground configurations are based on an estimate of 19656 system operating hours, which in turn is based on an average of 2 MEP-116As needed to perform maintenance on the E-3A AWACS system, and the MEP-116A operating time estimate provided by AWACW/MAM, Tinker AFB, OK.

TABLE 3.3.3-4: E-3A ANACS R/M NUMERICS

Equipment	ATIRLBUTE	SPECIFIED	AIRBORNE PREDICTED	REN INDEX (4)	SPECTFIED	GROUND PREDICTED	REM INDEX (5)	REM INDEX (6)
SYSTEM	MTBH (OPERATE HUNS) POINT ESTHATE LÜMER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	2.38	6.79	1.89 1.85 1,92	3.08(3)		3.00 3.07	4.89 4.79 4.99
	MINN (POSSES HOURS) POURT ESTINATE LONGR 906 CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LINIT LONGR 906 CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LINIT LONGRAFILE FOR FOR THE FOR			25.4 24.9 26.0			25.4 24.9 26.0	25.4 24.9 26.0
	NEW (USEXIE ESTEMBLE LOWER 90S CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90S CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT INTERVAL LIMIT MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT INTERVAL LIMIT	66	14 720	0.00 0.66 0.68 0.68			1.07 1.05 1.08	1.74 1.71 1.76
	MAINTERANCE MANAGORS/OPERATE HOUR		77.150	30. 30.			19.142	11.762
ELECTRONICS	S POINT ESTIMATE HAURS) 1 FOUNT ESTIMATE 1.OMER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LINIT MINM (PRESCEED LANDER)	4.81	9.86	3.54 3.54 3.64	4.81	9.86	5.6 8.6 8.8 8.8	9.18 8.93 9.44
	PUINT ESTIMATE LONER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT MITTER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT MITTER FOR FAST FOR THE MITTER FOR FOR			47.8 46.4 49.1			47.8 46.4 49.1	47.8 46.4 49.1
	POINT ESTINATE HOURS) LOUER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT			1.72	4.05		2.22 2.68 2.68	54.4
	MATRITERANCE MARKOURS/FLIGHT KOUR MATRITERANCE MARKOURS/OPERATE HOUR	6.967	3.321	17.27	6.967	3.321	11.273	6.927

TABLE 3.3.3-4: E-3A AMACS R/M NUMERICS (CONT'D)

1824 TRUEX (6)		640 505 821 3329 2630 4272 110 110 122
140EX (5)		393 310 310 3329 2630 4272 4272 67.6 61.5 0.104
GROUND		452
SPECIFIED		146
REAT THDEX (4)	1121 677 2000 15131 9142 26998 725 725 1139	247 195 316 3329 2630 42.5 42.5 38.6 47.0
AIRBORME PREDICTED	1462	482
SPECTFIED	472	146
		LIMIT LIMIT LIMIT LIMIT
	INTERVAL INTERVAL INTERVAL INTERVAL INTERVAL	INTERVAL LINIT INTERVAL LINIT INTERVAL LINIT INTERVAL LINIT
ATTRIBUTE	HTBH (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTINATE LOURS ONG CONFIDENCE LOURS ONG CONFIDENCE HTPH (POSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTINATE LOURS ONG CONFIDENCE	HONON HITTON (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LONEN SOC CONFIDENCE I UPPER SOX CONFIDENCE I U
EQUIPHENT	AINCRAFT (AC) POWER GENERATION	A INCRAFT POWER DISTRIBUTION

TABLE 3.3.3-4: E-3A AMACS R/M NUMERICS (CONT.D)

EQUIPMENT	ATKIBUTE		SPECIFIED	AIRBORNE PREDICTED	REM INDEX (4)	SPECIFIED	GROUND PREDICTED	KEM INDEX (5)	REM INDEX (6)
AIRCRAFT POWER GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION	MYBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LONER 90% CONFIDENCE UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE MYBM POSSESSED HABBES)	INTERVAL LIMIT INTERVAL LIMIT	111	345	58.4 52.1 65.7				
	POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE NTBME (OPERATE HAMES)	INTERVAL LIMIT INTERVAL LIMIT			789 70 4 887				
		INTERVAL LIMIT INTERVAL LIMIT	0.478	0.249	17.6 16.5 18.7 0.478				
AIRCIAFT ECU		MTERVAL LÍMIT MTERVAL LÍMIT	116	283	31.7 29.2 34.5				
		INTERVAL LIMIT INTERVAL LIMIT			428 393 461				
		INTERVAL LIMIT INTERVAL LIMIT	0.614	990.0	9.68 9.24 10.10 0.836				

TABLE 3.3.3-4: E-3A AMACS R/M NUMERICS (CONT'D)

BLA INDEX	(9)	13.0 12.59 13.46	67.7 65.5 70.0	3.45 3.39 3.51	4.77				
DEM THINE Y	(5)	8.00 7.74 8.27	67.7 65.5 79.0	2.12 2.08 2.16	7.765	53.8 49.4 58.8	168 154 184	44.9 41.5 48.6	0.210
GROUND		25.4		172	11.085			111(2,3)	
131,311,311	SPECIFICD	9.54				190			2.0(1)
2000	KEM INDEX (4)	5.02 4.86 5.19	67.7 65.5 70.0	1.33 1.31 1.35	12.210				
ATRBORNE	PREDICTED	25.4			11.085				
	SPECTIFIED	9.54							
	ATTRIBUTE	MIBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTHANTS LONES OSK CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER SOX CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	_ ww			MTBM (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMER 9GX CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 9GX CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	MTBM (PUSSESSED HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOWER 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALLIMIT UPPER 90% COMFIDENCE INTERVALLIMIT	MTBME (OPERATE HOURS) POINT ESTIMATE LOMES 902 CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT UPPER 903 CONFIDENCE INTERVAL LIMIT	1944/1 101/04 10
	EQUIPMENT	AINFRAME				MEP-116A			

TABLE 3.3.3-4; E-3A AWACS R/M NUMERICS (CONT'D)

		ALKOUNE					
EQUIPMENT	ATIRIBUTE	SPECIFIED PREDICTED RAM INDEX SPECIFIED PREDICTED RAM INDEX RAM INDEX (6)	REM TNDEX (4)	SPECIFIED	PREDICTED	REM TRDEX (5)	REM INDEX (6)
NOTES:							
- 2) USED MATA FROM PUMER GENERATION EQUIPMENT (TABLE 3.3.2-2)) USED RESULTS FROM IPT REPORTS (TABLE 3.3.1-6)	(IAGLE 3.3.2-2) 1-6)					
m	ASSUMED AN AVERAGE OF TWO MEP-116As ARE U	SED					
•	JEANSED ON PLYING HOURS						
S) BASED ON GROUND HOURS						
•	ARASED ON GOODING AND FLYING HOUSE						




FIGURE 3.3.3-1: E-3A AWACS LOGISTICS CONFIGURATION AIRBORNE RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM




FIGURE 3.3.3-2: E-3A AWACS LOGISTICS CONFIGURATION GROUND RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM

3.3.3.4 E-3A AWACS Results

The percent specified (allocated or predicted) and achieved MTBM, MTBME, and MMHFH contribution of the power generation, power distribution, ECU, airframe and AWACS electronics to the E-3A AWACS system are given below for the airborne configuration.

AIRBORNE SYSTEM CONFIGURATION

			PERCENT C	ONTRIBUTIO	NC	
EQUIPMENT		TBM		BME		HFH
·	SPECIFIED	ACHIEVED	SPECIFIED	ACHIEVED	PREDICTED	ACHIEVED
AWACS ELECTRONICS	63.0	53.4		40.3	22.6	56.1
PWR GEN	0.6	0.2		0.1		
PWR DIST	2.0	0.8		1.6		
PWR GEN & PWR DIST	2.7	3.2			1.7	1.6
ECU	2.6	6.0		7.0	0.4	2.7
AIRFRAME	31.7	37.6		51.0	75.3	36.6

It was not feasible to construct a table similar to the one above for the ground configuration because it could not be determined in which environment the failures occurred. The ground configuration data do show that the MEP-116A MTBM is 6X better than the AWACS electronics MTBM, the MEP-116A MTBME is 10X better than the AWACS electronics MTBME, and the MEP-116A MMHOH is 33X better than the AWACS electronics MTBMOH. The data also show that the Aircraft Power Distribution (PD) system MTBM is 70X better than the AWACS electronics MTBM, the Aircraft PD system MTBME is 25X better than the AWACS electronics MTBME, and the Aircraft PD system MMHOH is 108X better than the AWACS electronics MMHOH.

4.0 INVESTIGATION OF R/M ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES

4.1 Equipment Reliability Specification and Demonstration

It is generally recognized that the reliability requirement and the test to demonstrate that the requirement has been satisfied must be rigorously specified. The characteristics which must be specified to use the MIL-STD-781 test plans are:

- o the acceptable reliability value, θ_0
- o The unacceptable reliability value (previously called minimum acceptable reliability) θ₁
- o producer's risk
- o consumer's risk
- o the failure probability distribution
- o the test plan

The reliability requirements for the engine generators, motor generators, and the environmental control units used with the 407L system were reviewed to assess their completeness in terms of these criteria. The reliability requirements are shown in summary form in Table 4.1-1 for engine generators, Table 4.1-2 for motor generators, and Table 4.1-3 for air conditioners.

It is obvious from these tables that none of the specifications contain adequately stated reliability specification or demonstration requirements. The situation is compounded by the fact that in many instances the requirements are not correctly stated or will lead to conclusions having questionable statistical validity.

In all cases the exponential distribution has been assumed. While such an assumption is attractive owing to the tractability of the related mathematics and the availability of MIL-STD-781 test plans, it does not excuse the use of what may be an erroneous and costly assumption. No evidence was found during this study to either confirm or refute the validity of the assumption. None the less, the fact that the major failure mechanisms of engine generators and air conditioners are time dependent is sufficient to view the exponential assumption with suspicion.

TABLE 4.1-1: ENGINE GENERATOR RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS

	G.T.E.D. GENERATOR 60KW, 400HZ EMU-30/U AND MEP404A	DED GENERATOR 400HZ EMU-21/U (30KW) AND EMU-22/U (60KW)
SPECIFICATION	MIL-G-83380	MIL-G-38441C
ACCEPTABLE RELIABILITY	NOT GIVEN	NOT GIVEN
UNACCEPTABLE RELIABILITY	SPECIFIED MTBF NOT LESS THAN 500 HOURS	MIMIMUM OPERATING LIFE OF 1000 HOURS BETWEEN MINOR OVERHAULS
CONSUMER"S RISK	20%	10%
PRODUCERS RISK	20%	:
FAILURE DISTRIBUTION	NOT DIRECTLY STATED. ASSUMED, BY REFERENCE TO MI1-STD-781, TO BE EXPONENTIAL	EXPONENTIAL ASSUMED
TEST PLAN	DATA GENERATED DURING ENDURANCE TEST EVALUATED BY TEST PLAN IV, MIL-STD-781 MODIFIED BY 1,500 HOUR TERMINATION OF THE TEST PLAN	ACCEPT ON ZERO FAILURES DURING PRE- PRODUCTION TESTING, OTHERWISE ACCEPT WHERE X{2r + 2), 0.1 (MTBF) t >

₹ -3% ·

TABLE 4.1-2: MOTOR GENERATOR RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS

	MD-2 (10KM)	MD-4 (50KW)
SPECIFICATION	MIL-M-48180	MIL-M-4820E
ACCEPTABLE RELIABILITY	4000 HOURS	SAME
UNACCEPTABLE RELIABILITY	1000 HOURS	SAME
CONSUMER'S RISK	1	:
PRODUCER'S RISK	;	1
FAILURE DISTRIBUTION	NOT DIRECTLY STATED. ASSUMED, BY REFERENCE TO MIL-STD-781, TO BE EXPONENTIAL	SAME
TEST PLAN	FOUR UNITS OPERATED FOR 625 HOURS EACH FOR TOTAL TEST TIME OF 2500 HOURS ACCEPT ON ONE FAILURE. REJECT ON TWO FAILURES.	SAME

TABLE 4.1-3: AIR CONDITIONER RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS

COMPACT LIGHTWEIGHT AIR CONDITIONERS, MIL-A-38339D 18,000 BTU/HOUR	A/E32C-17, 208V, 60/50 HZ, 3 PHASE, MIL-A-38269		:08V, 60/50HZ, 3 PHASE, MIL-A-38345	:08V, 400HZ, 3 PHASE, MIL-A-38346	3	208V, 60/50HZ, 3 PHASE, MIL-A-38347	A/E32C-27, 208V, 400HZ, 3 PHASE, MIL-A-38348
COMPACT LIGHTWE 18,000 BTU/HOUR	A/E32C-17,	36,000 BTU/HOUR	A/E32-24, 2	A/E32-25, 2	54,000 BTU/HO	A/E32C-26,	A/E32C-27,

;	434 HOURS MINIMUM	10%	;	EXPONENTIAL ASSUMED	ACCEPT GIVEN ZERO FAILURES OCCUR DURING PREPRODUCTION TESTING.
ACCEPTABLE RELIABLITY	UNACCEPTABLE RELIABILITY	CONSUMER'S RISK	PRODUCER'S RISK	FAILURE DIȘTRIBUTION	TEST PLAN

The sequential test plans of MIL-STD-781, under the exponential assumption are most attractive since with various trade offs of discrimination ratio and risks, total test time can be held to a minimum. Further where the true θ closely approaches either the upper test limit, θ_0 , or the lower test limit θ_1 , a very early accept or reject decision can be made.

A literature search for test plans applicable to the Weibull distribution and analogous to those of MIL-STD-781 revealed that little work has been done in this area. One deterrent lies in the fact that while the exponential total test time and accept/reject criteria are linearly related to the lower test level θ_1 , such is not the case for the general Weibull where the relationship is the b th root of the sum of the b th power of the times-to-failure (TTF) for a Weibull slope of b

(
$$\left[\sum_{i=1}^{r} \left[TTF\right]_{i}^{b}\right]^{1/b}$$
).

In spite of this difficulty, in the course of this study a Weibull sequential test plan similar to those of MIL-STD-781C was developed and is presented in Figure 4.1-1. This development is based on the following inequalities for the accept/reject criteria for the Weibull distribution of failures resulting from sequential (variables) testing (ref 56):

Accept Ho if

$$\sum_{i=1}^{r} x_{i}^{b} > \frac{\theta_{o}^{b}}{db-1} \left[b \cdot r \cdot \ln \left(d \right) + \ln \left(\frac{1-\beta}{\alpha} \right) \right]$$
 (1)

Reject Ho (Accept Hi) if

$$\sum_{i=1}^{r} x_{i}^{b} < \frac{\theta_{o}^{b}}{db-1} \left[b \cdot r \cdot \ln (d) + \ln (\frac{\beta}{1-\alpha}) \right]$$
 (2)

where H_0 is the null hypothesis that the true θ is θ_0 H_1 is the alternative that the true θ is θ_1

 θ_0 is the upper test limit (acceptable) Weibull characteristic life

01 is the lower test limit (unacceptable) Weibull characteristic life

d is the discrimination ratio (θ_0/θ_1)

b is the Weibull shape parameter

a is the risk of incorrect rejection

B is the risk of incorrect acceptance

r is the number of failures observed

x; is the survival time of the ith item tested

In denotes natural logorithm.

There are three decisions to be made as follows:

D1-accept Ho

D2-Reject Ho

 D_3 -continue test when neither D_1 or D_2 can be made.

Where the decision is to continue testing, the minimum additional test time required to accept, given no failure occurs, may be computed by solving the following equality:

$$t_{D3} = \left[\frac{(d \cdot \theta_1)^b}{d^{b-1}} \left[b \cdot r \cdot \ln(d) + \ln(\frac{1-\beta}{\alpha})\right] - \sum_{i=1}^{r} x_i^{b-1/b}\right]$$
(3)


The accept/reject boundaries for the test plan shown in Figure 4.1-1 were obtained by evaluating the following identities which are based on the previously stated accept/reject inequalities (1) and (2).

Accept

$$k_a = \frac{db}{db-1} \left[b \cdot r \cdot \ln (d) + \ln \left(\frac{1-\beta}{\alpha} \right) \right]$$
 (4)

Reject

$$k_r = \frac{db}{db-1} \left[b \cdot r \cdot \ln (d) + \ln (\frac{\beta}{1-\alpha}) \right]$$
 (5)



TEST TIME (IN MULTIPLES OF LOWER TEST TIME $\theta_1^2)$

NUMBER OF FAILURES	REJECT (EQUAL OR LESS)	ACCEPT (EQUAL OR MORE)
0	N/A	1.85
1	N/A	3.69
2	1.85	5.54
3	3.69	7.39
	5.52	9.24
4	7.39	11.09
5	9.24	12.96
6	7.24	22.30

FIGURE 4.1-1: TEST PLAN Z

where

 $k = multiples of lower test time <math>\theta_1^b$

d = 2.0:1

b = 2

 $\beta = .20$

 $\alpha = .20$

It should be noted that equalities 4 and 5 may be used to establish the accept/reject boundries for other values of d, b, β , and α . An understanding of equations 1, 2, 3 and Figure 4.1-1 can be best conveyed by a series of five examples.

EXAMPLE 1

It is required that a mechanical equipment shall have a lower test level θ_1 of 135 hours and an upper test level θ_0 of 270 hours, i.e., a discrimination ratio (d) of 2.0:1. A sequential test with β and α risks of 0.20 shall be used to demonstrate achievement of the requirement. A Weibull distribution of failure is assumed; however, the slope, b, is unknown.


Three equipments when tested to failure, result in life times of 140 hours, 230 hours, and 350 hours. These data when plotted on Weibull probability paper with the plotting positions adjusted for median rank (ref 56) indicates a Weibull slope, b, of approximately 2 as shown by Figure 4.1-2.

Neither a D_1 (accept) nor D_2 (reject) decision is reached based on the first 2 life times and testing is continued. The third attempt at a D_1 decision is as follows:

$$(140)^2 + (230)^2 + (350)^2 > \frac{(270)^2}{2^2-1} ((2) (3) (ln 2) + ln (\frac{1-.20}{.20}))$$

195000 > 134719.2

With the inequality satisfied it has been demonstrated that the true θ is more likely 270 than 135. As with all sequential tests no measure of the true θ has been made. The total test time was 720 hours.



Example 2

The same equipment as in Example 1 with identical requirements except that the Weibull slope is known to be 2 and is so specified. Thus Test Plan Z, Figure 4.1-1 is specified.

The first equipment tested again fails at 140 hours or 1.08 multiples of θ_1^2 , i.e., $(140)^2/(135)^2$, (see Figure 4.1-3) resulting in a D₃ decision. Using equation 3 it is found that an accept decision can be made if the second equipment survives at least 219 hours.

$$t_{D3} = \left[\frac{4(135)^2}{3}\right] \left[(2)(1)(.693) + 1.386\right] - (140)^2 = 218.5 \text{ Hours}$$
This is equivalent to $2.62\theta_1^2$.

The second equipment survives for the required 218.5 hours resulting in an D₁ decision. It has been shown again that the true θ is more likely 270 hours than 135 hours. The total minimum test time was 358.5 hours.


Example 3

The equipment and the requirements are the same as in Example 1 except that it is erroneously assumed that the failure distribution is exponential and Test Plan IVC of MIL-STD-781C is specified.

The failure times 140, 230, and 350 are shown graphically in Figure 4.1-4. The decision after 3 failures and 720 hours of test time is to continue testing.

These three examples show the advantage in terms of test time of the specification of a valid test plan. The value in terms of cost is quite clear where in example 2 an accept decision is reached in 358.5 hours as compared to the continue test decision after 720 hours of testing which was reached by erroneously using test plan IVC (example 3).


It has been earlier stated that sequential testing will also provide early rejection where θ approaches the value of θ_1 . The following two examples using



TEST TIME (IN MULTIPLES OF LOWER TEST TIME $\theta_1^2)$

NUMBER OF FAILURES	REJECT (EQUAL OR LESS)	ACCEPT (EQUAL OR MORE)
Q	N/A	1.85
1	N/A	3.69
2	1.85	5.54
3	3.69	7.39
-	5.52	9.24
4 5	7.39	11.09
5 6	9.24	12.96
O	J , L .	

FIGURE 4.1-3: TEST PLAN Z, EXAMPLE 2



TOTAL TEST TIME (IN MULTIPLES OF LOWER TEST MTBF, 81)

Total Test Time*

Number of Failures	Reject (Equal or less)	Accept (Equal or more)
0	N/A	2.80
1	N/A	4,18
2	.70	5.5 8
3	2.08	6.96
4	3.46	8.34
5	4.86	9.74
6	6.24	9.74
7	7. 62	9.74
8	9.74	N/A

^{*} Total test time is total unit hours of equipment on time and is expressed in multiples of the lower test MTBF. Refer to 4.5.2.4 for minimum test time per equipment.

FIGURE C-4. Accept-reject criteria for Test Plan IVC.
FIGURE 4.1-4: TEST PLAN IVC, EXAMPLE 3

test plan Z and IVC illustrate the consequences of using the yalid test plan under this condition.

Example 4

The requirements of example 1 apply, the Weibull slope, b, is known to be 2, and test plan Z is specified. The times to failure are 70, 115, and 170 hours. When plotted, Figure 4.1-5, a reject decision is reached in 0.99 multiples of θ_1 or 185 hours of testing.

Example 5


The equipment and requirements are the same as in example 4 except that it is erroneously assumed that the failure distribution is exponential and test plan IVC of MIL-STD-781C is specified.

The failure times 70, 115, and 170 are shown graphically in Figure 4.1-6. The decision after 3 failures and 355 hours of testing is to continue testing.

4.2 System Reliability Specification, Prediction and Demonstration

The reliability requirements of the AN/TSC-60(V), AN/TSQ-XX and E-3A AWACS systems were reviewed to determine the level to which reliability is predicted. The review of these requirements is presented in the following paragraphs along with a description of a preferred prediction methodology.

The AN/TSC-60(V) system level predictions and reliability math models did not include the power generation, power conversion or ECU equipments. The power distribution network was included but it was not broken out so that its impact on system reliability was not readily discernible. The AN/TSQ-XX systems level predictions and reliability math models included the power, ECU and power distribution equipment; however, the predictions did not treat both power generation and power conversion equipments. The E-3A AWACS system level prediction and reliability math model included the airborne ancillary equipments. Reliability predictions were given for the ground ancillary E/M equipments, but no system level reliability math model was found that included




TEST TIME (IN MULTIPLES OF LOWER TEST TIME θ_1^2)

NUMBER OF FAILURES	REJECT (EQUAL OR LESS)	ACCEPT (EQUAL OR MORE)
0 1 2 3 4 5	N/A N/A 1.85 3.69 5.52 7.39	1.85 3.69 5.54 7.39 9.24 11.09
6	9.24	12.96

FIGURE 4.1-5: TEST PLAN Z, EXAMPLE 4

HIL-SID-781C APPENDIX C 21 October 1977



TOTAL TEST TIME (IN MULTIPLES OF LOWER TEST MTBF, θ_1)

Total Test Time*

Number of Failures	Reject (Equal or less)	Accept (Equal or more)
0	N/A	2.80
1	N/A	4.18
2	.70	5.58
3	2.08	6.9 6
4	3.46	8.34
5	4.86	9.74
•	6.24	9.74
7	7.62	9.74
	9.74	N/A

Total test time is total unit hours of equipment on time and is expressed in multiples of the lower test MTBF. Refer to 4.5.2.4 for minimum test time per equipment.

Accept-reject criteria for Test Plan IVC. FIGURE 4.1-6: TEST PLAN IVC, EXAMPLE 5

these equipments. Since estimates of from 33% to 75% of the operating time of the AWACS is spent using the ground ancillary E/M equipments, a model should have been specified that includes these equipments.

The reliability predictions for the ancillary E/M equipments used with both the E3-A AWACS and AN/TSQ-XX equipments were given as averages based on historical data from similar equipments. This method of prediction is an accepted method that has been used in industry for both electronic and nonelectronic equipments. The AN/TSQ-XX power distribution networks reliability predictions were based on the detailed stress analysis method on RADC Reliability Notebook, Volume II.

The system level reliability predictions should include consideration of the power and ECU equipments. The contractor should be required to make two predictions whenever Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) is provided, one for Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) and one for both CFE and GFE. Furthermore this requirement should be imposed on every possible system configuration; for example, airborne and ground for the AWACS, and using engine generators and motor generators for the AN/TSQ-XX and AN/TSC-60(V) systems.

The reliability requirements of the AN/TSC-60(V), AN/TSQ-XX and E-3A AWACS systems were reviewed to determine the level to which reliability is demonstrated. The review of these requirements is presented in the following paragraphs along with a description of a preferred demonstration methodology.

The AN/TSC-60(V) reliability demonstration did not include the power and ECU equipments associated with the system. The AN/TSQ-XX reliability demonstration test plan included provisions for power conversion using motor generators, and air conditioning using the Air Conditioning Modules (ACM). The demonstration test was conducted using factory supplied air conditioning because the GFE air conditioners were not available. The E-3A AWACS reliability demonstration included the air vehicle, but did not include the GFE AGE.

The power and ECU equipment for the AN/TSC-60(V) and AN/TSQ-XX systems were provided to the contractor as GFE. The contractor can not be held contractually responsible for the reliability of these equipments; therefore, they can not be

included in the reliability test accept-reject decision. They should, however, be a part of the demonstration test so that interface, sneak circuit, power surge, ECU thermal response, etc. problems are identified prior to deployment. Failures of these equipments would be classified as non-relevant for accept-reject purposes, but could be summed with the relevant failures to ascertain whether the system met the minimum acceptable reliability requirement.

The ground power and ECU equipments for a system such as the E-3A AWACS whether they are CFE or GFE are difficult to include in a system level MIL-STD-781 demonstration test when the airborne power and ECU equipments are also CFE or GFE. Two demonstration tests would be necessary because one can not call out a MIL-STD-781 sequential test plan for a system and then test equipments separately. An example will serve to illustrate this. Given that the specified system reliability is 272 hours, and this is allocated to the equipments as follows: ECU - 700 hours, power generation - 800 hours and electronics - 1000 If the system is tested to MIL-STD-781C Test Plan IV C and if each equipment fails once at any time prior to 272 hours into the test, the system would fail the test (3 failures). However, if each equipment were tested separately and each failed once during the test and prior to 272 hours, all three Therefore the accept-reject criteria are equipments would pass the test. different and the results obtained if one tested each equipment separately may be erroneous.

Since it is probably not feasible due to cost and time constraints to conduct two reliability demonstration tests, whenever GFE are provided as part of an electronics systems, the Contracting Officer should allocate the system reliability requirement to the electronics and GFE. The resultant allocated electronics reliability numeric should be called out as the specified reliability numeric for the electronics. The Contracting Officer should then provide the GFE that have demonstrated the allocated reliability numeric. The Government should specify that the GFE be utilized in the reliability demonstration test so that there is a greater probability that problem areas are found prior to deployment.

4.3 Maintainability Specification, Prediction and Demonstration

The maintainability requirements of several power and ECU equipments were reviewed to determine the level to which maintainability is specified, predicted and demonstrated. Table 4.1-4 contains excerpted paragraphs which detail the maintainability requirements called out in the specifications. As can be seen these requirements vary from none specified to the detailed requirement called out in MIL-A-52767B.

Of the ancillary E/M equipments used with the AN/TSC-60, AN/TSQ and AWACS systems only the MD-2, MD-4, MB-15 and AWACS cooling cart had specified maintainability numerics called out. The specified numerics were:

EQUIPMENT	MTTR(HOURS)	MMHOH	MEAN MAN HOURS TO REPAIR (HOURS)
AWACS COOLING CART	2.5	0.10	_
MD-2	0.5		1.0
MD-4	0.5		1.0
MB-15	0.5		

The specifications did not require a predicted value and the specified value was usually demonstrated during the Preproduction Tests.

The review of the IPT reports (ref 1 to 16) disclosed that eleven of the sixteen test reports included maintainability test requirements. These requirements are:

EQUIPMENT	REF	MTTR(HOURS)	MR	Aa	Mct	MTBPM(HOURS)
MEP-115A	1					••
36K BTU/HR AC	2					
12K BTU/HR AC	1 2 3			0.95		••
18K BTU/HR AC	4					
AN/TTC-39	5	0.25		0.999		
36K BTU/HR AC	6			0.95		
18K BTU/HR AC	7			0.95		
60K BTU/HR AC	8			0.95		
100KW 60HZ EG	9			0.95		
9K BTU/HR AC	10			0.95		••
MEP-017A	11		-	0.85		••
10KW 60HZ EG	12					
5KW 6OHZ EG	13			0.85		
18K BTU/HR AC	14					
18K BTU/HR AC	15		-	0.95		••
9K BTU/HR AC	16		0.03			250

TABLE 4.1-4: MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENTS

SPECIFICATION/STANDARD	PARA	MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT
MIL-STD-633E-27		None
MIL-G-38441C (USAF)	4.4.2.1	PreProduction Testing: All failures, servicing, adjustments, maintenance, and irregular functioning shall be identified by accumulated operating time, cycles, miles, or position in the test procedure, as appropriate. Test conditions at the time of the events identified shall be recorded. These data are to be included as an appendix to the test report.
	4.3.11	The valve clearance, oil filter and air filter may be inspected at the completion of each 100 hours of operation. No adjustments shall be made. The oil system shall be drained and refilled with new oil at the start of the preproduction tests and at the completion of each 100 hours of operation. Oil may be added at intervals of 30 hours.
MIL-G-52889B	3.7	Maintenance ratio shall not be more than 0.04. Preventative maintenance schedule given for endurance test (Table II). Maintenance ratio measured during Reliability Test.
MIL-G-21480(AER)		None
MIL-G-6162B	3.4.4	Maintainability - Careful attention shall be given in the design to provide for ease of inspection, testing, disassembly, maintenance, repair and reassembly, preferably without the need for special tools or fixtures. Machine component parts shall be as fool proof as possible to avoid incorrect assembly which would result in damage or malfunction or involve safety of flight.
MIL-G-28670	3.4.3	Operating test gives preventative maintenance schedule (Table 1). No corrective maintenance permitted.

TABLE 4.1-4: MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENTS (CONT'D)

SPECIFICATION/STANDARD	PARA	MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT
	3.6.2	Maintainability. The set shall operate as specified herein with only the maintenance authorized by the maintenance literature. All assemblies, installed attachments, wiring, and tubing shall be accessible for servicing, repair, and replacement without removal of other major assemblies and other inscalled attachments. Covers, safety guards, and plates which must be removed for component adjustment, repair, replacement, or maintenance shall be equipped with quick-disconnect fastenings. Dimensions of hand access openings shall be in accordance with MIL-STD-1472. All fuel, lubricant, and liquid reservoirs shall be piped to drain in accordance with 3.3.5. Each maintenance assembly or disassembly operation shall be accomplished with common tools and special tools furnished with the set.
	3.6.3	Mean preventive maintenance time. The mean preventive maintenance time to check, fill, adjust, clean, or replace (as appropriate), the item or system, shall not exceed 1.4 man hours. The need for preventive maintenance shall not occur more often than the intervals listed in Table I.
MIL-G-52732		Preventative Maintenance Schedules given in slash sheets.
MIL-A-52767B	3.2.0.1	Maintenance Ratio. The air conditioners shall have a maintenance ratio of not more than 0.03 when tested as specified in 4.6.3.25. Maintenance ratio is defined as the ratio of the total active maintenance man-hours required (scheduled and unscheduled) to the total operating time. Man-hours for repair of replaced components and scheduled before and after operational checks are excluded. A maintenance schedule shall be furnished prior to the start of testing. Not more than 25 percent of repairs shall require maintenance at the general support level.

TABLE 4.1-4: MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENTS (CONT'D)

SPECIFICATION/STANDARD	<u>PARA</u>	MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT
	3.20.2	Scheduled Maintenance. The air conditioners shall not require scheduled maintenance more often than every 250 hours of operation when tested as specified in 4.6.3.25. Scheduled maintenance shall not be required at any level higher than organizational maintenance.
	4.6.3.25	Maintenance evaluation. The maintenance ratio shall be computed during initial production testing. All maintenance actions required during initial production testing shall be assessed to determine conformance to 3.20. Non conformance to 3.20 shall constitute failure of this test.
MIL-G-26727D (USAF)	3.8.2	Maintainability. Maintainability requirements shall be in accordance with MIL-STD-470 and MIL-STD-471.
	3.8.3	Mean-Time-To-Repair. The mean-time-to- repair for corrective maintenance shall not be more than 2 hours.
	4.4.2.1	Maintainence information required to be submitted as part of the Preproduction Test report.

The most widely used maintainability criteria specified was A_a (10 out of 11). MTTR and MR were each specified once. A quantitative preventative maintenance requirement, Mean Time Between Preventative Maintainence (MTBPM), was called out once.

A review of the AN/TSC-60(V), AN/TSQ-XX and AWACS AAA reports revealed the following maintainability information:

SYSTEM

MAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION

AN/TSC-60(V)

System requirement specified was MTTR; however, the ECU and power generation (conversion) equipments did not appear to be included in the requirement. The power distribution network was included, but it was not broken out so that it could be easily evaluated.

AN/TSQ-XX

System requirements specified were Mct and Mct max (95%). These requirements were broken out to both the module level and for both Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). Availability (A_a) was also called out at the system level. Maintainability Prediction was by MIL-HDBK-472, Procedure 3. Maintainability Test was by MIL-STD-471 Notice 1, Method 2. The predicted M values for the GFE equipments were based on estimates of MTBF taken from Government procurement specifications for the GFE equipment. Where these data were not available, the estimates were based on system's test data.

E-3A AWACS

Requirements given for Flight Line MTTR and M_{max} and total MMH/FH. The requirements were allocated to the air vehicle and air vehicle equipments. Predictions were made for the air vehicle equipments for the following numerics:

	Base Level
Organizational	MTTR
Organizational	Mmax
Organizational	M _{max} MMH/FH
Intermediate	MMH/FH
ORG & INTER	MMH/FH

Depot Level

MMH/FH

Total

MMH/FH

Predictions were based on achieved numerics by similar equipments. Demonstrated was obtained by flight tests. The AWACS cooling cart had MTTR and MMHOH specified.

The specification of maintainability requirements for ancillary E/M equipments is inconsistant for both the equipment specifications and when the E/M equipments are incorporated as part of a system. When a maintainability numeric is specified, it is most often Aa, and it is demonstrated by collecting data during other qualification tests. The data collected on the system level maintainability numerics indicated that the ancillary E/M equipments may or may not be included when the system level numeric is allocated to the equipment level, and they may or may not be included in the maintainability demonstration. If they are included in the maintainability demonstration is usually conducted concurrently with other qualification tests.

Maintainability predictions of ancillary E/M equipments appear to be made from test or field experience data on similar equipments.

Twelve methods for demonstrating maintainability are called out in MIL-STD-471A Notice 1. Methods 1 through 4 and 7 through 11 allow for the use of natural occurring failures or the use of simulated failures, and methods 5 and 6 allow for the use of natural occurring failures. There are arguments against the use of both simulated failures and naturally occurring failures. Those against simulated failures usually center around the fact that they may not duplicate actual real world failure symptoms, and the repair personnel are anticipating the failure and have tools and maintenance documents close at hand; therefore, the repair times are not realistic. The arguments against the use of naturally occurring failures centers around the fact that the sample size may be negligible and that the repair of critical items or long repair time items may not be demonstrated.

One method of resolving these concerns would be to allow the use of natural occurring failures during other qualification tests, but specify a minimum

sample size. Simulated failures would be used to make up the difference between what occurred naturally and the minimum requirement. Care would have to be taken to select the correct test method for the simulation test. Methods 1-A, 2, 4 and 8 are based on the assumption that the repair times are lognormally distribution. An analysis of the A/E24U-8 repair times showed that the repair times were not lognormally distributed, but rather that they followed the Weibull distribution with a Beta (β) of 0.75. Care should also be taken in the task selection since the procedures used to select the tasks are based on a constant failure rate which may not be valid for electromechanical parts.

The method of specifying maintainability given for the AN/TSQ equipments appears to be a good method when the ancillary E/M equipments are furnished as GFE. The M numeric was allocated to the equipment, but it was not part of the demonstration requirement. The allocated and predicted data were included in the AAA reports so that the impact of these equipments on the system could be readily ascertained. On thing that should be specified, however, is the inclusion of all E/M equipments, for instance, both engine generators and motor generators in the assessments. For systems such as the E-3A AWACS, the AGE equipment should be included in the allocations if a true estimate of the required system logistics is desired.

The procedure of basing the maintainability prediction of the E/M equipments on historical data from similar systems is at present the most acceptable method since the present methods called out in MIL-HDBK-472 are based on the concept of an average failure rate and either normally or lognormally distributed repair times.

5.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of Results and Conclusions

A primary objective of this study was to investigate the R/M impact of ancillary electromechanical (E/M) equipments on the USAF C³I Systems they support. Two methods of assessing the impact were used. One method compared the individual E/M achieved R/M numeric with what was specified in the equipment specification, or, in the absence of a specified value, with a demonstrated value that was derived from the results of similar equipments during Initial Production Tests (IPTs). The objective of the method was to determine if the achieved R/M numeric was better or worse than what was specified or what would be anticipated based on the results of the IPTs. For the purpose of determining a result, an adverse impact was defined as when the R/M numeric did not meet the specified or IPT result. The results of this assessment were:

NUMERIC

EQUIPMENT	RELIABILITY	MAINTAINABILITY
GROUND C ³ I SYSTEM ECU POWER DISTRIBUTION ENGINE GENERATOR MOTOR GENERATOR	BETTER WORSE WORSE BETTER	WORSE WORSE WORSE WORSE
AIRBORNE C3I SYSTEM AIRCRAFT POWER GENERATION (PG) AIRCRAFT POWER DISTRIBUTION (PD) AIRCRAFT ECU AIR VEHICLE LESS PG, PD, ECU AND ELECTRONICS MEP-116A	WORSE WORSE WORSE BETTER WORSE	BETTER BETTER WORSE WORSE WORSE

The results show that in general the achieved R/M numerics are not as good as what was anticipated.

The second method compared the percent of achieved system R/M associated with the ancillary E/M equipment with the percentage called out as a requirement in the procurement specification, or what was specified or demonstrated on similar type equipments during IPTs. The objective of this method was to determine if

the achieved R/M percent of achieved system R/M was higher than what was anticipated during system development. For the purpose of determining a result, an adverse impact was defined as when the achieved R/M percentage was higher than the percentage generated from the specified R/M numerics. The results of this assessment were:

NUMERIC

EQUIPMENT	RELIABILITY	MAINTAINABILITY	AVAILABILITY
AN/TSC-60(V)-1 POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK ECU POWER GENERATION POWER CONVERSION	BETTER	BETTER	BETTER
	BETTER	BETTER	BETTER
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
AN/TSC-60(V)-2 POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK ECU POWER GENERATION POWER CONVERSION	WORSE	SAME	BETTER
	BETTER	BETTER	BETTER
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
	BETTER	WORSE	WORSE
AN/TSC-60(V)-3 POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK ECU POWER GENERATION POWER CONVERSION	WORSE	WORSE	BETTER
	BETTER	BETTER	BETTER
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
AN/TSQ-91 POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK ECU POWER GESTRATION POWER CONVERSION	WORSE	BETTER(1)	BETTER(1)
	BETTER	BETTER	BETTER
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
AN/TSQ-92 POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK ECU POWER GENERATION POWER CONVERSION	WORSE	BETTER	BETTER
	BETTER	BETTER	BETTER
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
AN/TSQ-93 POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK ECU POWER GENERATION POWER CONVERSION	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
	BETTER	BETTER	BETTER
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
	WORSE	WORSE	WORSE
E-3A AHACS POWER GENERATION POWER DISTRIBUTION POWER GENERATION & DISTRIBUTION ECU AIR FRAME	BETTER BETTER ITON WORSE WORSE WORSE	- BETTER Worse Better	- - -

NOTES: 1) Results of the TAC BLIS. The results of the D056B5503 report indicate that the achieved numeric is worse.

The analyses led to the following conclusions:

- 1. The power distribution equipment achieved R/M numeric may or may not be worse than what was anticipated depending on the system. The percent of the achieved system R/M numeric attributed to the power distribution equipment is relatively low (worst case result approximately 2% of the system failures).
- 2. The achieved R/M numerics for the ECU equipment were consistently better than what was specified.
- The Power Generation and Power Conversion achieved R/M numerics are consistently worse that what was specified.
- 4. The results and conclusions drawn from the analyses are biased because data were extracted from different data sources. The achieved R/M numerics for the power generation and power conversion equipment were derived from data collected during the second survey. The second survey data are well documented and there is reasonable assurrance that all of the maintenance events were recorded. The data extracted from the TAC BLIS and D056B5503 reports may or may not be recorded with as much rigor. An estimate of the achieved ECU MTBM was derived from the Second Survey data and from all of the system D056B5503 reports. The MTBM estimates are:

	MTBM (HOURS)	
	SECOND SURVEY	D056B5503
Point Estimate Lower 90% Confidence Interval Limit	1757 1400	3792 3407
Upper 90% Confidence Interval Limit	2232	4231

A comparison of the MTBMs shows that the achieved MTBM reported on the DO56B5503 reports is considerably higher than what was reported during the Second Survey. Therefore, the achieved MTBM that was used for the power generation and conversion equipments may be lower than if it had been reported on the DO56B5503 reports, and, consequently, the percentage calculations for the power equipment may be pessimistically biased. The extent of the bias is unknown.

The analyses compared inherent R/M numerics with field experience data. The R/M numerics generated from the MDS data is in general always worse than what was specified. This bias can be traced directly to the difference in the definitions of the specified (MTBF, MTTR) and field experience (MTBM, Aa) R/M numerics. The specified R numeric includes only inherent part failures; the achieved R numeric includes design, workmanship and part failures. The specified M numeric considers optimum maintenance personnel and repair conditions (correct tools,

spares immediately on hand, etc.); the achieved M numeric can only hope to approach these conditions.

6. The study was restricted by the fact that in general R/M numerics are not specified for E/M equipments, and pseudo R/M numerics had to be derived.

Data were collected from a variety of sources including: Commercial Equipment Manufacturers, USAF Unit Failure Logs, USAF Maintenance Data Systems, US Army Test Reports, an USAF Unit Survey (Survey One), US Army Maintenance Data System, and an USAF Captive Sample Data Collection Effort (Survey Two). An evaluation of these sources led to the following conclusions:

- 1. Engine generators, motor generators and stand-alone ECUs are shared between systems within an USAF unit and are frequently lent to other USAF units. With permanently mounted ECUs, if a unit possesses a spare ECU, the spare is frequently installed in place of a failed ECU and the failed ECU then becomes the spare. Therefore it is impossible to track specific system-ancillary-E/M combinations with the present USAF data collection system.
- 2. Engine generators and motor generators are not included in the system WUC manual; therefore, the failure occurrences and maintenance activities of the power equipment can not be linked directly to a specific system with the present USAF data collection system. ECU and internal power distribution equipments are included in the WUC manual and can be tracked with the system.
- 3. The percentage of maintenance events that are classified as failures in the D056B5503 reports, AFALO Manual 800-4 and the E-3A AWACS R&M Index was considerably higher (61.5 94.5%) than what other sources indicated (2-43%) as being the percentage of maintenance events that are actually failures. This indicated that either the algorithms or the codes that are used to classify a failure are wrong or that the codes are not being used properly by the maintenance personnel, or that the estimates provided by references 42 and 51 are wrong (23 and 2-43% respectively).
- 4. The D056B5503 reports showed that none of the TSC-60(V)-1 and TSQ-91 power distribution failures resulted in system downtime. The reports also showed that none of the ECU failures on the TSC-60(V)-1 system resulted in system downtime and only 3.8% of the ECU failures on the TSQ-91 resulted in system downtime. The data collected during the second survey also showed that 4% of the ECU failures resulted in system downtime. These data coupled with the fact that the ECUs did not fail as frequently as anticipated would indicate that the ECUs do not have an adverse impact on system availability.
- 5. The AFTO 95 Forms, depot repair activities and the Supply Lists (ISSL) should not be used to derive estimates of equipment reliability because the AFTO 95 forms only list a small percentage of the repair actions

actually performed on the equipment, the depot may or may not be in the repair loop, and a large number of repair parts are procured locally.

- 6. The estimate of the number of ground operating hours for each flying hour (0.5) used by the Air Force does not agree with the estimate provided by using personnel at Tinker AFB (3.0); therefore, if the Tinker AFB estimate is accurate, the MTBF estimates given in AFALD 800-4 are unrealistically low.
- 7. Accurate estimates of operating times can only be obtained through a special data collection effort on selected equipments such as the second survey effort conducted for this study. Accurate operating time estimates are not currently being used for the USAF MDS reports; therefore, the R/M numerics presented in them are inaccurate. This would not be a problem if the data in the reports were used solely to gage the R/M impact of a sub system on a system since the operating time errors are the same for both; however, the data are used to make comparisons with specified R/M numerics and with other systems where the error may or may not be the same.
- 8. The USAF MDS data sources serve the purpose for which they were intended (logistics); they can be used to identify maintainability and reliability problems on Air Force equipment in a relative sense; however, they are inadequate for deriving R/M numerics because of missing, incorrect and incomplete data.

Information was collected pertaining to the specified, predicted and demonstrated R/M at both the equipment and system level. This information was collected from a variety of sources including: equipment and system manufacturers, military specifications and standards, and test reports. An evaluation of these sources led to the following conclusions:

- 1. The exponential distribution is usually assumed for Reliability Demonstration tests. This assumption may or may not be right for a particular equipment. A more realistic method of testing would be to use a Weibull type test plan similar to the one developed during this study.
- 2. The specification of R/M numerics at the equipment level is at best haphazard. The most widely used R numerics are reliability and minimum acceptable MTBF. The most widely used maintainability numeric was availability. Standardization is needed so that valid comparisons can be made between equipments.
- 3. The inclusion of the ancillary E/M equipment in the system level R/M allocations and assessments is inconsistent when the equipment is furnished as GFE. They need to be included to make an accurate system level R/M assessment.

4. The preventative maintenance criteria, if they were called out at all in the specification, were in general spelled out in subjective terms. Data were not available to compare specified to achieved.

5.2 Recommendations

The WUC manuals for each system should be revised to include a provision for the power generation equipment so that the USAF MDS can be used to provide an estimate of the power generation equipment impact on system R/M. A single WUC entry would be required to determine the impact that the power equipment has on system R/M. A three or four level indentured WUC would be required to determine problem areas within the power equipment.

The procedures governing the use of the AFTO 95 forms should be revised so that it is mandatory that Elapsed Time Meter (ETM) readings are recorded at least yearly and every time the ETM is changed.

A study should be instituted to develop accurate operating time estimates for both ground and airborne USAF systems and equipments.

The reliability demonstration test plans that are based on the exponential distribution may or may not be the most accurate or the most economical method of demonstrating the reliability of E/M equipments. A study should be instituted to investigate in greater depth other methods such as the Weibull Test Plan developed during this study.

It is recommended that whenever system or equipment unreliability becomes a significant logistic support problem to the logisticians or a major dependability/sustainability concern for the operations that:

- 1. The Air Force MDS and the data products available from it (see RADC-TR-81-267, pg 15, Note 1) be used for exactly as it was intended --a first indenture indicator of where the major problems exist.
- 2. A period of operational reliability reassessment be undertaken jointly by the development/acquisition (AFSC) logistic support (AFLC) organizations and the operational command (SAC/TAC). The objective of the reassessment would be to obtain from on-site observation and data recording, accurate failure and failure rate information as a function of true operating times. From this data, the significant failure items

could thus be isolated and an in-depth cause of failure investigation and corrective action programs undertaken using the investigative techniques developed under the Air Force's Rivet Gyro Program.

- 3. The RADC Reliability Analysis Center be utilized as a "feed forward" information center for data derived from the reassessment programs.
- 4. The RADC become the advocacy organization for such changes as may be required in Air Force policies, practices, and procedures whose deficiencies consistently contribute to system and equipment operational reliability problems.

An effort should be instituted by DoD to standardize the specifications of R/M numerics in the equipment specifications. The requirements should include a reliability, corrective maintenance and preventative maintenance quantitative numeric.

The procuring activity should specify that the GFE be included in all system level R/M allocations and assessments so that accurate R/M assessments are available for decision purposes.

A study was recently instituted by RADC that will derive factors to account for the differences between specified R/M numerics and the R/M numerics derived from field experience data. Ancillary E/M equipments should be included in the study.

REFERENCES

REFERENCE

TITLE

No.

- AFCS Pamphlet 100-98, AFCS Mobile/Transportable Communications and Supporting Equipment Directory, August, 1977.
- 2 TAC Pamphlet 55-43, Tactical Air Control System Equipment, May, 1981.
- 3 U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Letter Report Initial Production Test of Generator Set, 60KW, 400HZ, AD8022310, September, 1977.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Letter Report of Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 36,000 BTU/HR, Electric Motor Powered, 60HZ, 208 Volts, 3 phase, AD878388, November, 1970.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 18,000 BTU/HR, Compact Vertical, 208 Volt, 3 phase, 400 HZ, Final Report, TECOM Project No. 7-EG-175-018-013, Report No. APG-MT-4375, November, 1973.
- 6 U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Letter Report, Reconditioning Test of Air Conditioner, 18,000 BTUH, Multipackage, ADBO31323, September, 1978.
- 7 U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, TECOM Independent Evaluation Report Development Test II for the AN/TTC-39()(V) Circuit Switch (CS), ADB046938, May, 1980.
- 8 U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioners, Compact Vertical, 36,000 BTU/HR, 50/60 HZ Class I and 400 HZ, Class 2 Final Report, AD879643L, January, 1971.
- 9 U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 18,000 BTU/HR, 60 HZ, 5-Stack, Base Mounted Final Report, AD904959, August, 1972.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 60,000 BTU/HR, Gasoline-Engine-Driven, Self-Contained, Skid-Mounted Final Report, AD908047L, January, 1973.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Generator Set, 100-KW, 50/60 HZ, DED, General Purpose Final Report, AD878918L, December, 1970.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 9000 BTU/HR, Horizontal Compact, Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 Final Report, AD915390, November, 1973.

REFERENCE No.

TITLE

- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Generator Set, 5-KW, 60-Hertz, GED, Air-cooled, Portable, Tubular-Frame, Skid-Mounted Final Report, AD893325L, February, 1972.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Report Development Test III of Generator Set 10-KW, 60-Hertz, Air-cooled. Diesel-Engine-Driven, ADB016354, September, 1976.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Generator Set, 5-KW, 60-HZ, MEP Model 017A Final Report, AD919277, April, 1974.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Letter Report Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, Horizontal, Compact 18,000 BTU/HR 208 Volt, 400 HZ, ADB039145L, June, 1979.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Letter Report Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 18,000 BTU/HR, Compact, Horizontal, Type II, Class 2, ADB0223116, October, 1977.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Report Initial Production Test of Air Conditoner, 9,000 BTUH Compact Vertical, ADB041335, October, 1979.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioners, Compact Vertical, 60,000 BTU/HR, 50/60HZ, Class 1, and 400HZ, Class 2, Final Report, AD879789L, January, 1971.
- ARINC Research Corporation, CGN-42 HM & E Equipment R & M Study, ADA064699, January, 1979.
- U.S. Army Aberbeen Proving Ground, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command System Engineering Test Operations Procedure "Heating Equipment" AD742517, April, 1972.
- Gulton Industries, Inc., Development Program For 3.0KW Inverter, ADA068433, January, 1979.
- 23 U.S. Air Force, Operational Test and Evaluation Final Report, C-5 Single Air Conditioning Pack Capability, ADB006016, August, 1975.
- U.S. Navy Civil Engineering Laboratory, Compilation of Operational Performance Records Uninterruptible Electrical Power Supply Equipment, AD882819L, November, 1965.
- Philips Laboratories, Cryogenic Refrigerator For HALO Program Quarterly Technical Report, ADB02305L, October, 1977.

REFERENCE No.	TITLE
26	Varo, Inc., Reliability Study of Power Conditioning Ancillary Items, Final Report, AD723433, April, 1971.
27	Rockwell International, Nonnuclear System Response Analysis Vulnerability Data, Environmental Control Subsystem (ECS), ADB027313, July, 1975.
28	Collins Radio Company, Production Reliability Test II Evaluation Report (Final), Contract F19628-68-C-0164 AN/TSC-60(V) Program, September 29, 1972.
29	Collins Radio Company, Reliability Test and Evaluation Report (Final), Contract F1962B-68-C-0164 AN/TSC-60(V) Program, July 27, 1971.
30	Collins Radio Company, Final Maintainability/Reliability Status Report R&M Report For AN/TSC-60(V)1, AN/TSC-60V()2, and AN/TSC-60(V)3, July 21, 1971.
31	Hughes Aircraft Company, CDRL ITEMS 62/75 CDRL 62 Reliability Test and Evaluation CDRL Category I Test Procedure and results 407L Operations Centers, December 23, 1969.
32	Hughes Aircraft Company, CDRL ITEM 58 Reliability/Maintainability All ocation, Assessment and Analysis Report, September 15, 1968.
33	The Boeing Company, R-103-1 Report, Reliability and Maintainability Allocations, Assessments and Analysis - Reliability - Air Vehicle, April 16, 1973.
34	The Boeing Company, R-1-3-1 Report, Reliability and Maintainability Allocations, Assessments and Analysis - Reliability - Air Vehicle, April 16, 1973.
35	The Boeing Company, E-3A Reliability/Maintainability Program Status Report, June, 1980 to July, 1981.
36	AFLCR 66-15, Product Performance, August, 1974.
37	OC-ALC Concepts and Cost Group Logistics Analysis Section, Reliability and Maintainability Index, E-3A, Jim Mosley, July, 1979 to June, 1980.
38	AFALD 800-4, Aircraft Historical Reliability and Maintainability Data, January, 1981.
39	USAF Tactical Air Command, Production Analysis Summary September 30, 1981.

REFERENCE No.	TITLE
40	Headquarters Sacramento Air Logistics Center, ISSLs 19F00082 and 19F00114, AE24U-8 and MD-4 Generator Sets, Requested 23 July, 1981.
41	AFTO 00-20-2, Maintenance Data Collection System, November, 1981.
42	Orlansky, J. and String, J., The Performance of Maintenance Technicians on the Job, Institute For Defense Analyses, Science and Technology Division, IDA Paper P-1597, August, 1981.
43	IIT Research Institute, Least Cost Test Profile Final Report, Contract No. 30602-80-C-0263, November, 1981.
44	Natrella, Mary M., Experimental Statistics, National Bureau of Standards Handbook 91, August, 1963.
45	MIL-A-38229D, Military Specification, Air Conditioners, Lightweight, Compact, Military, General Requirements For, March, 1970.
46	MIL-G-83380, Military Specification, Generator Sets, Gas Turbine Engine Driven, 30 and 60 KW, 400 Hertz, February, 1979.
47	MIL-M-4820E, Military Specification, Motor-Generator, Skid Mounted MD-4, July, 1979.
48	MIL-M-4820E, Military Specification, Motor-Generator, Skid Mounted Type MD-2, July, 1979.
49	MIL-G-2627D, Military Specification, Generator Sets, Diesel Engine, 15KW thru 150KW, 50/60 Hertz, Type I (Tactical), Class 2 (Utility), June, 1974.
50	MIL-G-52884, Military Specification, Generator Sets, Diesel Engine Driven, 15 thru 200 Kilowatts 50/60 and 400 Hertz, Type I (Tactical), Class 2 (Utility), March, 1971.
51	Huss, K., Electronic Equipment Reliability Data, Reliability Analysis Center, Report EERD-1, Fall, 1980.
52	AFALD 800-4 Aircraft Historical Reliability and Maintainability Data, January, 1981.
53	MIL-G-52884/12, Generator Set, Diesel Engine Driven, 100 Kilowatt, 400 Hertz, Precise, (Tactical), Specification For, 23 November, 1976.
54	USAF Technical Manual T.O. IE-3A-06, Aircraft Work Unit Code Manual USAF Series E-3A Aircraft, August 1, 1980.

REFERENCE No.	TITLE
55	Kremp, B.F., Kimball, E.W., Revision of Environmental Factors For MIL-HDBK-217, RADC-TR-80-299, September, 1980. (A091837)
56	Johnson, L.G., The Statistical Treatment of Fatigue Experiments, Elsevier, 1964.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AFALD 800-4, Aircraft Historical Reliability and Maintainability Data, January, 1981.

AFCS Pamphlet 100-98, AFCS Mobile/Transportable Communications and Supporting Equipment Directory, August, 1977.

AFLCR 66-15, Product Performance, August, 1974.

AFR 80-5, Air Force Reliability and Maintainability Program, Change 1, July 1979.

AFTO 00-20-2, Maintenance Data System, November, 1981.

ARINC Research Corporation, CGN-42 HM&E Equipment R&M Study, ADA 064699, January, 1979.

The Boeing Company, E-3A Reliability/Maintainability Program Status Report, June, 1980 to July, 1981.

The Boeing Company, Maintainability of Air Force Ground Systems Nonelectronic Equipment/Devices, RADC-TR-72-251, AD905566L, October, 1972.

The Boeing Company, R-103-1 Report, Reliability and Maintainability Allocations, Assessments, and Analysis-Maintainability-Air Vehicle, April 16, 1973.

The Boeing Company, R-103-1 Report, Reliability and Maintainability Allocations, Assessments and Analysis-Reliability-Air Vehicle, April 16, 1973.

Collins Radio Company, Final Maintainability/Reliability Status Reports, R&M Report For AN/TSC-60(V)-1, AN/TSC-60(V)-2, and AN/TSC-60(V)-3., July 21, 1971.

Collins Radio Company, Production Reliability Test II Evaluation Report (Final), Contract F19628-68-C-0164, AN/TSC-60(V) Program, September 29, 1972.

Collins Radio Company, Reliability Test and Evaluation Report (Final), Contract F19628-68-C-0164, AN/TSC-60(V) Program July 27, 1971.

CP-351100-A, Prime Item Development Specification, CRC/CRP Operations Center for the TACS/TADS ART Configuration AN/TSQ-91(V) (), C1 Number 201000 B, March, 1974.

Gulton Industries, Inc., Development Program For 3.0KW Inverter, ADA068433, January, 1979.

Headquarters Sacramento Air Logistics Center, ISSLs 19F00082 and 19F00114, AE24U-8 and MD-4 Generator Sets, Requested 23 July 1981.

Hughes Aircraft Company, CDRL Item A035, Reliability/Maintainability Allocation, Assessment and Analysis Report for the 407L ART Improvement Program, August, 1974.

Hughes Aircraft Company, CDRL ITEM: 58, Reliability/Maintainability Allocation, Assessment and Analysis Report, September 15, 1968.

Hughes Aircraft Company, CDRL ITEM: 62/75 CDRL 62, Reliability Test and Evaluation, CDRL CATEGORY I TEST Procedure and Results, 407L Operations Centers, December 23, 1969.

IIT Research Institute, Least Cost Test Profile Final Report, Contract No. F30602-80-C-0263, November, 1981.

OC-ALC Concepts and Cost Group Logistics Aanlysis Section, Reliability and Maintainability Index, E-3A, Jim Mosley, July, 1979 to June, 1980.

Philips Laboratories, Cryogenic Refrigerator For HALO Program, Quarterly Technical Report, ADB02305L, October, 1977.

Rockwell International, Nonnuclear System Response Analysis Vulnerability Data, Environmental Control Subsystem (ECS), ADB027313, July, 1975.

TAC Pamphlet 55-43, Tactical Air Control System Equipment, May, 1981.

U.S. Air Force, Operational Test and Evaluation Final Report, C-5 Single Air Conditioning Pack Capability, ADBO06016, August, 1975.

USAF Tactical Air Command, Production Analysis Summary, September 30, 1981.

- U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, Production Analysis Summary, Ground Systems, September, 1981.
- U.S. Air Force, Tactical Air Command, Production Analysis Summary, July, 1980.
- U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, Production Analysis Summary, Ground Systems, November, 1981.

USAF Technical Manual T.O. IE-3A-06, Aircraft Work Unit Code Manual, USAF Series E-3A Aircraft, August 1, 1980.

USAF Technical Manual T031Z1-407-06, Depot, Intermediate and Organizational Maintenance Work Unit Code Manual, 407L Tactical Air Control System, June 24, 1981.

- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Letter Report, Initial Production Test of Generator Set, 60KW, 400HZ, ADB022310, September, 1977.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Letter Report of Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 36,000 BTU/HR, Electric Motor Powered, 60 HZ, 208 Volts, 3 Phase, AD878388, November, 1970.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Letter Report, Reconditioning Test of Air Conditioner, 18,000 BTU, Multipackage, ADB031323, September, 1978.

- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Report, Development Test III of Generator Set 10-KW, 60-Hertz, Air-cooled, Diesel-Engine-Driven, ADB016354, September, 1976.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Letter Report, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, Horizontal, Compact 18,000 BTU/HR 208 Volt, 400 Hz, ADB039145L, June, 1979.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Letter Report, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 18,000 BTU/HR, Compact, Horizontal, Type II, Class 2, ADB022311L, October, 1977.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Final Report, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 9,000 BTUH Compact Vertical, ADB041335, October, 1979.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 18,000 BTU/HR, Compact Vertical, 208 Volt, 3 phase, 400 Hz, Final Report, TECOM Project No. 7-EG-175-018-013, Report No. APG-MT-4375, November, 1973.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioners, Compact Vertical, 36,000-BTU/HR, 50/60 Hz, Class 1 and 400 Hz, Class 2 Final Report, AD879643L, January, 1971.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 18,000 BTU/HR, 60 Hz, 5-Stack, Base-Mounted Final Report, AD904959, August, 1972.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 60,000 BTU/HR, Gasoline-Engine-Driven, Self-Contained, Skid-Mounted Final Report, AD908047L, January, 1973.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Generator Set, 100-KW, 50/60 Hz, DED, General Purpose, Final Report, AD878918L, December, 1970.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioners, Compact Vertical, 60,000 BTU/HR, 50/60 Hz, Class 1, and 400 Hz, Class 2, Final Report, AD879789L, January, 1971.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Generator Set, 5-KW, 60-Hz, MEP Model 017A, Final Report, AD919277, April, 1974.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Generator Set, 5-KW, 60-Hertz, GED Air-cooled, Portable, Tubular-Frame, Skid-Mounted, Final Report, AD893325L, February, 1972.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Initial Production Test of Air Conditioner, 9000 BTU/HR, Horizontal Compact, Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4, Final Report, AD915390, November, 1973.

- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command System Engineering Test Operations Procedure "Heating Equipment", AD742517, April, 1972.
- U.S. Army Materiel Command, Engineering Design Handbook, Environmental Series, Part One, Basic Environmental Concepts, AD-784999, July, 1974.
- U.S. Army Materiel Command, Engineering Design Handbook: Electrical Systems, AD-783697, June, 1974.
- U.S. Army Materiel Command, Engineering Design Handbook, Criteria for Environmental Control of Mobile Systems, AD889588L, September, 1971.
- U.S. Army, Sample Data Collection, 5, 15, 30KW Generator, SDC Logistics Analysis Management Quarterly Summary, April, 1981.
- U.S. Army, Sample Data Collection, 5, 15, 30KW Generator, SDC Logistics Analysis Management Quarterly Summary, January, 1981.
- U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, TECOM Independent Evaluation Report, Development Test II for the AN/TTC-39() (V) Circuit Switch (CS), ADB046938, May, 1980.
- U.S. Navy Civil Engineering Laboratory, Compilation of Operational Performance Records, Uninterruptible Electrical Power Supply Equipment, AD882819L, November, 1965.
- Varo, Inc., Reliability Study of Power Conditioning Ancillary Items, Final Report, AD723433, April, 1971.
- Fiorentino, E., The Use of Air Force Field Maintenance Data for R&M Assessments of Ground Electronic Systems. RADC-TR-79-103. April. 1979.
- Huss, K., Electronic Equipment Reliability Data, Reliability Analysis Center, Report EERD-1, Fall, 1980.
- Ireson, W. G., Reliability Handbook, McGraw-Hill, 1966.
- Johnson, L. G., The Statistical Treatment of Fatigue Experiments, Elsevier, 1964.
- Kremp, B. F., Kimball, E. W., Revision Of Environmental Factors for MIL-HDBK-217, RADC-TR-80-299, September, 1980.
- Natrella, Mary, M., Experimental Statistics, National Bureau of Standards Handbook 91, August, 1963.
- Orlansky, J. and String, J., The Performance of Maintenance Technicians on the Job, Institute For Defense Analyses, Science and Technology Division, IDA Paper P-1597, August, 1981.

Short, J. E., An Assessment of the Magnitude of Electromechanical Failures Occurring Within Air Force Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C^3I) Systems, Draft Final Technical Report, June, 1981.

MIL-A-38269E, Military Specification, Air Conditioner, A/E32C-17, February, 1975.

MIL-A-383390, Military Specification, Air Conditioners, Lightweight, Compact, Military, General Requirements For, March, 1970.

MIL-A-38340C, Military Specification, Air Conditioner, A/E32C-18, November, 1977.

MIL-A-38345D, Military Specification, Air Conditioner, A/E32C-24, February, 1970.

MIL-A-38346D, Military Specification, Air Conditioner, A/E32C-25, December, 1978.

MIL-A-38347D, Military Specification, Air Conditioner, A/E32C-26, February, 1970.

MIL-A-38348C, Military Specification, Air Conditioner, A/E32C-27, January, 1970.

MIL-A-52767B, Military Specification, Air Conditioners: Vertical and Horizontal, Compact, September, 1979.

MIL-G-26727D, Military Specification, Generator Sets, Diesel Engine, 15KW through 150KW, 50/60 Hertz, Type I (Tactical), Class 2 (Utility), June, 1979.

MIL-G-38195C, Military Specification, Generator Set, Gas Turbine Engine, 60KW, 400 Hertz, General Purpose, July, 1978.

MIL-G-38441C, Military Specification, Generator Sets, Diesel Engine EMU-19/U, EMU-20/U, EMU-21/U, EMU-23/U, EMU-24/U, 400 Cycle Output, Multi-Installation, August, 1971.

MIL-G-52884, Military Specification, Generator Sets, Diesel Engine Driven, 15 through 200 kilowatts, 50/60 and 400 Hertz (Tactical) General Specification for, March, 1981.

MIL-G-52884/12, Generator Set, Diesel Engine Driven, 100 Kilowatt, 400 Hertz, Precise, (Tactical), Specification for, 23 November 1976.

MIL-G-52886A, Military Specification, Generator Set, Diesel Engine, Trailer Mounted, 60KW, 400 Hertz, PU-707A/M, September, 1977.

MIL-G-83380, Military Specification, Generator Sets, Gas Turbine Engine Driven, 30 and 60KW, 400 Hertz, February, 1979.

MIL-HDBK-217D, Military Handbook Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment, January 15, 1982.

MIL-M-4820E, Military Specification, Motor-Generator, Skid Mounted MD-4, July, 1979.

MIL-STD-471A, Military Standard, Maintainability Verification, Demonstration, Evaluation, March, 1973.

MIL-STD-490, Military Standard, Specification Practices, October, 1968.

MIL-STD-633E, Military Standard, Mobile Electric Power Engine Generator Standard Family, General Characteristics, February, 1980.

MIL-STD-705B, Military Standard, Generator Sets, Engine Driven, Methods of Tests and Instructions, June, 1972.

MIL-STD-721C, Military Standard, Definitions of Terms for Reliability and Maintainability, June, 1981.

MIL-STD-756A, Military Standard, Reliability Prediction, May, 1973.

MIL-STD-781C, Military Standard, Reliability Design Qualification and Production Acceptance Tests: Exponential Distribution, October, 1977.

MIL-STD-785A, Military Standard, Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment Development and Production, March, 1969.

MIL-STD-1322B, Military Standard, Definitions of Tactical, Prime, Precise, and Utility Terminologies for Classification of the DoD Mobile Electric Power Engine Generator Set Family, March, 1973.

MIL-STD-1408A, Military Standard, Air Conditioners, Family of Environmental Control Units, General Application Characteristics, April, 1975.

MIL-STD- 1650, Military Standard, DoD Standard Family of Aircraft Ground Support Power Units, June, 1974.

APPENDIX

SURVEY FORMS

F30602-81-C-0046

Generator Maintenance Data Survey

ORGANIZATION	
ADDRESS	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
NAME/RANK	
TITLE/PHONE	
INITIAL INFORMATION (Survey begins upon	receipt of these forms.)
Nomenclature of Generator Set Serial Num	
Reading of Elapsed Time Meter at start of survey: Al	\\ \lambda \
Date of this reading	
If this generator set is unusual in anyway (in quality, use you describe these distinctions on the back of this form.	
FAILURE DATA (Information on failures and repairs shown separate FAILURE DATA form for generator	
INSPECTIONS Date Meter readings: Al	A2
FINAL INFORMATION (Survey ends on)	
Did this set fail during the survey? Is FAILURE D	
Reading of Elapsed Time Meter at end of survey: Al	A2
Date of this reading	<u></u>
Would you estimate how many times a week this generator set is started upAl Both survival data as well as failure data is needed, so r this generator set failed or did not fail during the surve form with the final meter readings entered above. Thank y	y period, complete this.
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION	
If the failure pattern observed during this survey is not performance of this generator set as known to you, would y that come to mind on the back of this form. (Use Comment L	ou describe the difference
If the operating time accumulated during the survey period is not typical of the ordinary usage of this generator set, would you comment on the differences in usage that come to mind on the back of this form. (Use Comment Label P2)	At end of survey, please hold forms for Jim Carsy RADC/RBRAG' Griffiss AFB, NY 13440
CC:MENTS, OBSERVATIONS, PROBLEMS: (Use back of form.)	AUTOVON 8-587-4151

F30602-81-C-0046

Reliability Analysis Center (RAC) Generator Maintenance Data Survey

FA	LURE	DATE

Gen-Set Nomenc	lature
Gen-Set Serial	Number

A failure of an engine generator set or a motor generator set occurs if: It can't start after a few tries; or, it is shut down for repair during operation. If a set continues, to operate satisfactorily in support of its mission, it is not considered a failure

	First	Second	Third
RELIABILITY INFORMATION	Failure	Pailure	Failure
Rl. Date of gen-set failure			ļ
R2. Reading of Elapsed Time Meter of failed set			<u> </u>
R3. (Which generator set failed: A1 or A2) (A/E24U-8			ļ
R4. Did failure occur at start up or during operation?			
R5. Is this type of failure a significant problem on these gen-sets?		<u> </u>	

M1. Actual Labor Hours for Time To Repair			
42. Time Lost Awaiting Parts		ļ	1
M3. Briefly describe the nature of the failure/repair on the back of this form	M4/1	14/2	M4/3

System information		ļ	}
S1. Did failure occur during a PMI Test of the gen. set or during actual operation?			
\$2. What was the power load on the gen set?		<u> </u>	<u> </u>
S3. Nomenclatures of systems receiving power			}
S4. Were you able to switch over to another power source?(Nomenclature?)			
S5. How long did it take to switch over?	•[
S6. If unable to switch over, why not?	56/1	S6/2	S6/3

COMMENTS, OBSERVATIONS, PROBLEMS: (Use back of form as needed.)

:30602-61-C-0646

Environmental Control Unit (ECU) Maintenance Data Survey

addpess	
NAME/RANK	
TITLE/PHONE	
INITIAL INFORMATION	(Survey begins upon receipt of these forms.)
	Serial Numberwhich this ECU is attached
_	
Initial Reading of Elapsed	Time Meter (if any)
Date of this reading	·
If this ECU is unusual in a describe these distinctions	any way (in quality, usage, age, etc), would you son the back of this form. (Use comment label II)
FAILURE DATA	
	d repairs should be entered on the separate
FAILURE DATA form for ECUs	
FINAL INFORMATION	(Survey ends)
Did this ECU fail during t	he survey? Is FAILURE DATA attached?
Final Reading of Elapsed T	
	f operation of this reading
Both survival data as well this ECU failed or did not	as failure data is needed, so regardless of whether fail during the survey period, complete this form
with the final meter readi	ng entered above. Ithere you.
	ng entered above. Mank jou.
	ng entered above. Mank you.
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION If the failure pattern obsordinary performance of the	served during this survey period is not typical of the his ECU as known to you, would you describe the difference of this form. (Use comment label P1)
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION If the failure pattern obsordinary performance of the	derived during this survey period is not typical of the his ECU as known to you, would you describe the difference of this form. (Use comment label P1) Invalided during the survey the ordinary usage of this the differences in usage Jim Carey
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION If the failure pattern obsordinary performance of the that come to mind on the buff the operating time accupation is not typical of the ECU, would you comment on that come to mind on the buff to make the mind on the buff that come to mind that c	derved during this survey period is not typical of the his ECU as known to you, would you describe the difference hack of this form. (Use comment label P1) The implicated during the survey hack of this please hold forms forms the differences in usage The differences in usage ack of the form.

F30602-81-C-0046

Environmental Control Unit (ECU) Maintenance Data Survey

FAILUPE DATA ECU Nomenclature			
ECU Serial Number			
	First Failure	Second Failure	Third Failure
RELIABILITY INFORMATION			[
Rl, Date of ECU failure		<u> </u>	
R2. Reading of Elapsed Time Meter (if any) or Estimated Operation Hours Since Last Failure.			
R3. Did failure occur at start-up of ECU or during operation?			
R4. Mode ECU operation? (Cooling or Heating)	}	 	<u> </u>
R5. Is this type of failure a significant problem on these ECUs?		<u></u>	
		·	
MAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION	 		}
Ml. Actual Labor Hours for Time to Repair	ļ —		
M2. Time Lost Awating Parts			
M3. Was this ECU actually repaired or was another ECU substituted?	<u> </u>		
M4. Was this ECU actually repaired or was another ECU substituted?			
M5. (How long did it take to switch ECUs?)			
M6. Briefly describe the nature of the failure/repair on the back of this form	M6/1	M6/2	M6/3
	(Use these c	odes to labe	L your commen
SYSTEM INFORMATION			T
Sl. Did the failure occur during a PMI, Test of the ECU or during actual <u>Operation</u> of the shelt	22		
\$2. Did the electronic equipment in the shelter eventually have to be <u>shut off</u> or was it able to continue in <u>operation</u> during the ECU repair.			
\$3. (How long was the electronic equipment off?)		<u> </u>	
S4. What was the outdoor temperature at the time of ECU failure, if known?		ļ	
S5. How hot or cold did it get in the shelter?	1	<u></u>	<u> </u>

CCHMENTS, OBSERVATIONS, PROBLEMS:

